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“Language, Belief, Domestication: Constructing Paradise in Charlotte’s Web 
and The Animal Family” reads both E. B. White’s and Randall Jarrell’s novels as creation 
stories to better understand how language constructs Edenic realities. I specifically 
examine how human characters define White’s Wilbur as meat and object, and Jarrell’s 
bear and lynx as children or pets, to domesticate and dominate them into their inferior 
roles in paradise. However, the animals reject their domestication and attain agency either 
by appropriating human language and disseminating new narratives, as in Charlotte’s 
Web, or by preserving their animality and bringing home a human boy to halt their 
domestication, as in The Animal Family.
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In “Electronic Kairos: Creating the Opportune Moment in Contemporary 
Advertising,” I study how rhetors seize the classical concept of kairos, the opportune or 
right moment, in electronic mediums. An examination of fast food commercials from 
Burger King, Chick-Fil-A, and McDonald’s demonstrates how advertisers utilize 
multimodality to their advantage. By blurring the line between entertainment and 
persuasion, advertisers use primary (i.e., entertainment and narrative transportation) and 
secondary (i.e., intersections of ethos, logos, and pathos that “prove” a product’s value) 
appeals to produce kairotic conditions and mentalities that then allow viewers to seize 
advertisers’ intended opportune moment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In “Language, Belief, Domestication: Constructing Paradise in Charlotte’s Web 
and The Animal Family,” I analyze how speciesism informs various types of rhetorical 
domestication, or domestication enacted through objectifying and anthropomorphizing 
language, in E. B. White’s and Randall Jarrell’s books. Instead of foregrounding human 
characters, or animal characters as allegorical symbols, this essay reads each novel’s 
animal characters as animals.  
I first offer theoretical background in “Dominion’s Paradise: Constructing 
Animals,” which respectively outlines Judeo-Christian dominion over animals and how 
words design reality through social constructionism.  
Section two foregrounds Charlotte’s Web, elucidating why White writes his novel 
and how he responds to the 1950s animal welfare moment, condemning certain speciesist 
behavior. My close reading establishes how human language classifies Wilbur as “meat” 
and an “object,” and examines how the animals respond to his objectification by 
appropriating human language, constructing an alternative paradise that offers new 
narratives and perceptions.  
My third section analyzes The Animal Family to illuminate Jarrell’s authorial 
intentions and outline how he replies to the 1960s animal welfare movement, like White 
denouncing particular acts of speciesism. After showing how Jarrell’s mermaid becomes 
a domesticator, I then interpret how his hunter and mermaid domesticate the bear and
 
	 2 
lynx by anthropomorphizing them into “children” and “pets.” I demonstrate that these 
adoptive siblings resist domestication and conserve their animality by bringing home the 
boy to complete the family, thus constructing their alternate idea of paradise.  
My last section, “Children’s Literature as Activism,” considers why White and 
Jarrell use children’s literature to advocate for animal welfare and why they use differing 
literary methods, from White’s anthropomorphism of the animals’ communication to 
Jarrell’s preservation of the animals’ natural voices. I conclude by arguing that, while we 
should value both books for being radical during their time, we should resist 
romanticizing them because they perpetuate speciesism and anthropocentrism. Despite 
this finding, I suggest that the novels present pedagogical opportunities to explore such 
attitudes. 
In “Electronic Kairos: Creating the Opportune Moment in Contemporary 
Advertising,” I explore how advertisers utilize their electronic mediums to produce 
kairotic conditions and seize the opportune, or best, moment. My first section, entitled 
“Kairos: From Orality to Electricity,” reviews Gorgias’s understanding of the concept, 
followed by my notion of how fast food advertisers utilize electronic kairos. 
For the remainder of the essay I examine commercials from Burger King, Chick-
Fil-A, and McDonald’s, organizing each based on what it promotes—either a product 
(i.e., new, old, or returning) or brand. Each commercial’s analysis addresses the primary 
appeal (entertainment and narrative transportation) followed by its secondary appeal (a 
product’s or brand’s “proof” demonstrated through intersections of ethos, logos, and 
pathos).  
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My last section, “From Gorgias to Behind the Screen and Beyond,” summarizes 
Poulakos’s interpretation of how, even in antiquity, this sophist composed kairotic 
conditions in written texts to accommodate not seeing his audience, a method 
contemporary advertisers also follow but further develop by manipulating multimodality. 
Lastly, I outline why advertisers’ appeals effectively persuade viewers by giving them an 
experience they seek to recreate by consuming products and supporting brands.
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LANGUAGE, BELIEF, DOMESTICATION: CONSTRUCTING PARADISE  
 
IN CHARLOTTE’S WEB AND THE ANIMAL FAMILY 
 
 
Many contemporary readers have likely read or at least heard of E. B. White’s 
Charlotte’s Web and Randall Jarrell’s The Animal Family either in our personal lives or 
academic careers. Both titles enjoy classic status because of how they portray nature and 
challenge anthropocentric thought. While many scholars discuss Charlotte’s Web as a 
seminal work in children’s and ecocritical literature, few include The Animal Family in 
the conversation. When interpreting both novels, scholars often project anthropocentric 
ideologies onto the texts by construing animal characters as allegorical symbols or 
completely omitting them from their analysis. However, as I demonstrate, both White and 
Jarrell intended that readers perceive their animal characters as animals. These authors 
used children’s literature to advocate for animal welfare by addressing the animal-human 
dichotomy resulting from speciesism. As coined by Richard Ryder in 1970, speciesism is 
“the widespread discrimination that is practiced by [humanity] against other 
species…based upon appearances—if the other individual looks different then he [or she] 
is rated as being beyond the moral pale” (quoted in Waldau 28). White and Jarrell 
published their novels before Ryder defined the concept and before the animal rights 
movement as we know it today had begun, but discrimination against animals 
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nevertheless existed; writers began discussing animal suffering caused by humanity as 
early as the eighteenth century (Guither 1).1  
Given how White and Jarrell portray animals and their communication practices, 
both clearly understood how language and storytelling construct them to fulfill speciesist 
agendas. This essay studies how speciesism informs various types of rhetorical 
domestication, or domestication enacted through objectifying and anthropomorphizing 
discourse, in Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family.2 I first offer theoretical 
background in “Dominion’s Paradise: Constructing Animals,” which respectively 
outlines Judeo-Christian dominion over animals and how words design reality through 
social constructionism. Section two foregrounds Charlotte’s Web, elucidating why White 
writes his novel and how he responds to the 1950s animal welfare moment, condemning 
certain speciesist behavior. My close reading establishes how human language classifies 
Wilbur as “meat” and an “object,” and examines how the animals respond to his 
objectification by appropriating human language, constructing an alternative paradise that 
offers new narratives and perceptions.3  
																																																								
1 The animal rights movement did not begin until the 1970s in the United States (Guither 1). However, 
national and state animal welfare societies, such as The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to 
2 I do not define rhetorical domestication the same as literary anthropomorphism. While authors 
anthropomorphize animals to humanize them, fictional characters domesticate animals through dominating 
discourse—in this case, objectifying or anthropomorphizing language. However, both concepts serve an 
author’s rhetorical purpose, which is why I discuss how White’s and Jarrell’s animal representations aid 
their advocacy. 
3 The scare quotes around meat and object, and children and pets below, insinuate that Wilbur is supposedly 
meat and an object, or that the bear and lynx are the hunter’s and mermaid’s ostensible children and pets. 
Though I drop the quotes for convenience, each succeeding reference retains the same meaning to avoid 
objectifying or infantilizing these characters. I follow this practice for other words throughout this essay to 
indicate their putative meaning.  
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My third section analyzes The Animal Family to illuminate Jarrell’s authorial 
intentions and outline how he replies to the 1960s animal welfare movement, like White 
denouncing particular acts of speciesism. After showing how Jarrell’s mermaid becomes 
a domesticator, I then interpret how his hunter and mermaid domesticate the bear and 
lynx by anthropomorphizing them into “children” and “pets.” I demonstrate that these 
adoptive siblings resist domestication and conserve their animality by bringing home the 
boy to complete the family, thus constructing their alternate idea of paradise. My last 
section, “Children’s Literature as Activism,” considers why White and Jarrell use 
children’s literature to advocate for animal welfare and why they use differing literary 
methods, from White’s anthropomorphism of the animals’ communication to Jarrell’s 
preservation of the animals’ natural voices. I conclude by arguing that, while we should 
value both books for being radical during their time, we should resist romanticizing them 
because they perpetuate speciesism and anthropocentrism. Despite this finding, I suggest 
that the novels present pedagogical opportunities to explore such attitudes. 
To date only June Swanson and Amy Ratelle have studied White’s text 
ecocritically. Swanson reads Wilbur as a Thoreau figure living in the barn’s “simplicity” 
like Thoreau in Walden, but this interpretation disregards that, while Thoreau voluntarily 
embarked upon simplicity, Wilbur has no choice but to remain on the farm. Ratelle, in 
her essay grounded in animality studies, is the only one who discusses Charlotte Web’s, 
and by extension White’s, treatment of animals. While she introduces us to how animal 
characters appropriate human language to prove their subjectivity, White’s language 
deserves more analysis to understand how the animals linguistically and rhetorically 
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reverse speciesist narratives and reconstruct reality. Jarrell scholarship is also limited. 
Though his works as a whole have received substantial attention, few scholars study The 
Animal Family, and when they do, they largely omit the bear and the lynx from their 
readings, instead prioritizing the family’s human and animal-human members. Thus far, 
no ecocritical readings assess the animal-human dichotomy and animal-human 
relationships in the animal family. Even Richard Flynn, who examines how the hunter’s 
masculine language merges with the mermaid’s feminine language to form an ideal 
“semifeminine” discourse, overlooks the mermaid’s animality and how it affects the 
hunter’s actions toward her. With the exception of Ratelle’s essay, current readings of 
both Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family deny animal characters agency as actual 
animals and ignore how human doctrines portray them and their actions’ significance.  
Instead of foregrounding human characters, or animal characters as human, this essay 
demonstrates how language spoken, written, and performed corporeally from human, 
animal-human, and animal characters constructs our beliefs about animals. Social 
constructionism theory and animal studies help illuminate how language creates the 
nature-culture dichotomy that domesticates animals and what it means to 
anthropomorphize, as opposed to preserve, animals’ communication practices. Words 
work variously in each novel to create a paradise, an Edenic reality dependent on animal 
domestication in both language and content. In Charlotte’s Web, humans construct a 
speciesist perception of “farm” animals by using the objectifying “it” pronoun, the names 
of meat, and Judeo-Christian narratives. But the animals, especially Charlotte, do what 
human characters deem supernatural. They adopt human language to rework speciesist 
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stories. Templeton scavenges words from “paradise” (i.e., the dump and the fair), 
Charlotte authors with her web, and Wilbur speaks corporally, both becoming an 
advertisement and performing to prove his value. In The Animal Family, however, the 
hunter domesticates and Others the animal members (i.e., the mermaid, bear, and lynx). 
To tame the mermaid, the hunter appropriates her language and teaches her words that 
signify her Otherness. Together, the hunter and mermaid erase the bear’s and lynx’s 
animality by anthropomorphizing, Othering, and housetraining them. Despite their 
attempted erasure, or perhaps in spite of it, these brothers retain their animality by 
communicating mostly corporeally, never speaking through anthropomorphized words. 
As important, both the bear and lynx train their domesticators and, by bringing the boy 
home, complete the family and create a household where they may still be animals.  
I am not the first to suggest that these novels create paradise or Edenic realities. 
Though Sonia Landes and Lucien L. Agosta recognize certain Edenic elements in 
Charlotte’s Web, neither study extensively how these conditions affect Wilbur and the 
other animals. Similarly, when reflecting on The Animal Family, scholars such as Peter F. 
Neumeyer and Jerome Griswold reduce its paradisiacal foundation to a page or less. 
They, too, disregard how the animals fit into paradise but emphasize how the hunter and 
mermaid resemble Adam and Eve figures. Though Gretchen Katrina Shilts’s The World 
Lost and Found foregrounds the Eden myth in Jarrell’s works, including The Animal 
Family, it does not study the animals’ role. However, neglecting the role that language 
plays to construct paradise in White’s and Jarrell’s texts shortchanges our understanding 
of how their realities establish power structures and determine the animal-human 
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dichotomy. Ignoring the animals’ roles and representations in these human-made, and 
oftentimes animal-subverted, Edens also hinders our understanding of the novels’ 
messages about animality and our treatment of animals. As creation stories, these novels 
demonstrate how language creates paradise for humans through various forms of 
speciesism and domestication based on animal erasure (lack of agency) or animal 
presence (agency), and almost always at animals’ expense. But, as I will show, the 
animals resist distinctively. Charlotte’s Web’s and The Animal Family’s language gives 
readers insight into how animals utilize discourse to resist or subvert these human-made 
realities that seek to domesticate and marginalize them on the farm or in the family. 
White’s and Jarrell’s varying approaches to animal communication, where White 
anthropomorphizes animals but Jarrell preserves their animality, present contradictory 
ways in which animal-human and animal characters reconstruct the concept of paradise 
by making their animality present and their value as animals clear. Finally, White’s and 
Jarrell’s presentations of animals’ language suggest two different methods of literary 
animal activism, which urges us to consider why they use children’s literature as a 
vehicle for their advocacy.  
 
Dominion’s Paradise: Constructing Animals 
In Judeo-Christian scripture, the dominion of nature may be understood as either 
dominance or stewardship, but many misinterpret the idea as dominance. Michael W. Fox 
explains that some scholars, like Rene Dubos, believe that the Bible’s message regarding 
how humanity should “dress [the Garden of Eden] and keep it” in Genesis 2:15 advises 
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humanity to conserve, not dominate, the environment (193). Nancy M. Tischler reiterates 
this idea by arguing how Genesis designates humanity as “both masters and stewards of 
the earth, responsible for its replenishment as well as its fruitfulness” (41). Fox references 
biblical passages, such as Ecclesiastes 3:18-21, to suggest that “all life is sacred” and 
connected:  
 
For the fee of the sons of men and the fate of the beasts is the same: as one dies, 
so the other. They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the 
beast; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to 
dust again. Who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward and the spirit of 
the Beast goes down to earth? (The Bible: Authorized King James Version). 
 
 
However, since Judeo-Christianity’s inception, some believers have interpreted the Bible 
anthropocentrically. They misunderstand humanity as the dominator of all nature, where 
dominion functions, in Alastair Minnis’s words, as “the power of reason to command” 
that forces animals into subservience (95). Due to animals’ perceived inferiority, 
humanity measures their value based on their alleged purpose, or on how biblical 
misconceptions claim they should serve humanity (Minnis 93). This domination myth 
ultimately appears “natural” because many believe it to be God’s literal word; hence, 
exploiting nature becomes “God’s will.” 
To follow His word, some Christians have attempted to create Edenic realities. As 
Tischler states, “dreamers repeatedly design their own earthly paradises” because they 
cannot accept that Eden, a representation of “perfect harmony” (coexistence amongst 
humans, animals, and plants), is lost (21, 23). Though this kinship implies that dominion 
occurred after the Fall, Christians have ultimately understood paradise as a place that 
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necessitates dominion over animals. Essentially, Christian thought separated animals 
from humanity by claiming them as purely instinctual while considering humans as 
rational and therefore superior (Tischler 41).4 Animals’ perceived irrationality has meant 
that people have portrayed them as “amoral” creatures, further dividing them from 
humanity, because of their ostensible inability to distinguish between good and evil 
(Minnis 92). As a result of scripture’s speciesism, early Christians interpreted dominion 
as dominance and created the animal-human dichotomy which, in codifying animals’ 
inferiority and maintaining humanity’s supremacy, established a preferred animal-human 
relationship (Minnis 18). Humanity then began dominating animals by naming, 
controlling, and using them for food, clothing, labor, and even sacrifice (Tischler 40, 42).  
In Reinventing Eden, Carolyn Merchant details how humanity has sought to 
recreate paradise since the New World’s discovery. She defines this phenomenon as a 
Recovery Narrative, which seeks to recuperate the Genesis Eden by constructing an 
“earthly Eden” (39-40). Merchant’s explanation of how humanity appropriates the  
Genesis narrative is worth quoting at length: 
 
 
[Early] colonists, planters, and westward pioneers often explicitly cited the 
Genesis mandate in order to justify expansion. In Western culture, the Genesis 1 
and 2 accounts have usually been conflated. In the mainstream Recovery project, 
humanity has turned the entire earth into a vast garden by mastering nature. The 
Genesis 1:28 ethic of dominion has provided the rationale for the Recovery of the 
garden lost in Genesis 2 and 3, submerging the stewardship ethic of Genesis 2:15 
(25). 
																																																								
4 Common beliefs surrounding immorality also determine animals’ separation from humanity and resulting 
treatment. Many, such as John Wyclif, saw animals as disposable because of their perceived immorality. In 
fact, many believed that humans would not need animals for food or comfort in paradise or when 
resurrected because we would have “greater” means of pleasure (Minnis 150-1). 
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Merchant demonstrates that capitalism gardened, tamed, and subdued “wilderness” into 
civilization to create an Edenic reality. Thus, what she terms as “The Recovery of Eden 
Narrative” became the dominant reality that socialized Westerners in the late seventeenth 
century (68, 77). The Cartesian worldview, which supports Christian domination, helped 
shape our paradisiacal reality because it emphasized controlling nature (Merchant 77). 
After Rene Descartes’s philosophy, society viewed animals as machines, objectifying 
them as unconscious and insentient to validate their slaughter and other exploitations 
(Donovan 356, 364). Josephine Donovan relates how animals “were erased (at best) or 
manipulated (at worst) to behave in accordance with paradigms imposed by the rationalist 
lords” (366).5 Because of Christian and Cartesian narratives, The Recovery Narrative 
ultimately resulted to fulfill colonialist and capitalist needs (Merchant 77). But creating 
paradise on earth was not enough; individuals began restoring Eden through literature or 
other artistic mediums to accommodate their idea of paradise (Tischler 2, 14). Both 
narratives promoted animal domestication and reinforced domination under the animal-
human dichotomy, making it easier for humanity to treat animals, both fictional and real, 
as if they were objects. These narratives continue to rule contemporary Westerners, as 
their dissemination further constructs animals’ inferiority and sustains their exploitation. 
Social constructionism theory indicates that words and their resulting narratives 
disseminate knowledge but do not denote objective reality. In fact, within the social 
																																																								
5 Donovan also mentions that Cartesianism erased women alongside animals. To better understand the 
connection between animals’ and women’s exploitation, see Donovan’s essay entitled “Animal Rights and 
Feminist Theory.” Also see Carol J. Adam’s The Sexual Politics of Meat. 
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constructionist framework objective fact does not exist (Burr 7).6 Rather, words reflect 
subjective reality, or our perceptions (Burr 4). As Vivien Burr remarks, “We think of 
language as a bag of labels which we can choose from in trying to describe our internal 
states such as thoughts and feelings” (53). With each interaction, whether verbal or 
performative, we construct knowledge daily (Burr 4, 11). To do so, we use words to 
describe and categorize, which forms the illusion of fact and allows us to act upon such 
“facts” (Burr 65). When speaking or telling stories, we do not need to reiterate a word’s 
meaning each time we utter it because, as Tom Andrews notes, we understand words’ 
embedded meaning because of our shared culture. As they form narratives, often the 
prevailing ones, the words we use become reality, albeit subjective, making it redundant 
to redefine them with each utterance (Andrews 4).  
What makes social constructionism so important to issues like speciesism is how 
our discourse affects animals. As Burr emphasizes, “What people say and write is not 
divorced from the things they do…or from the way that society is organized and run” 
(75). Because they help determine reality, words matter. Language births narratives, 
those narratives shape perceptions that dictate actions, those actions then create new or 
reinforce old narratives, and the cycle continues with each utterance. Intrinsically, we 
cannot separate language from action. Our discourse, on an interactional and institutional 
																																																								
6 While constructionists believe we create rather than find knowledge, they also acknowledge that reality 
exists (Andrews 3). To illustrate the difference between realism and constructionism, Andrews uses our 
perception of diseases. Realists believe disease exists in reality, whereas social constructionists emphasize 
how we name diseases and construct perceptions of them (Andrews 5). Essentially, realism and 
constructionism embody the difference between objective and subjective existence. Andrews emphasizes 
that “being a realist is not inconsistent with being a constructionist” because both offer different but 
important perspectives (Andrews 3). However, because speciesism is a social construct, we must 
foreground a constructionist approach to ethically interpret Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family. 
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level, “sustains and reinforces existing, unequal power relations” (Burr 67). The 
repertoires that categorize animals as meat and objects in Charlotte’s Web, or children 
and pets in The Animal Family, rely on power systems that Other animals while 
constructing perceptions that normalize speciesism and its ensuing anthropocentric 
mentality. As Burr suggests, language attempts to legitimize behavior because it produces 
subjective knowledge that constructs differing versions of reality (69). Knowledge, 
therefore, favors those in power (Burr 7). Even so, it is important to note that individuals 
do not create narratives. Instead, discourse is what Burr calls a “social resource” available 
to all who speak the same language and culture (70). We may not know or mean words’ 
connotations, but they nevertheless have consequences, as they perpetuate speciesist 
narratives. For this reason, it is imperative that we discuss both speciesism and 
anthropocentrism, even in novels like Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family that 
appear to bypass such attitudes. These texts invite us to learn how words construct 
animals rhetorically and literally either to objectify or humanize them. After becoming 
aware of words’ implications, we may begin to counter speciesist language with 
alternative narratives. The animals in Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family, and by 
association their authors, are certainly aware of the narratives used to domesticate and 
dominate nonhuman creatures and, accordingly, rewrite them. As I discuss below, the 
authors’ animals use language to alter their roles and reshape the idea of paradise. 
 
 
 
 
	 15 
Charlotte’s Web: A Farmer’s Literary “Sanctuary”  
Though the animal rights movement had not yet begun in 1952 when White 
published Charlotte’s Web, after World War II ended American citizens had more time to 
spend in nature, which fostered environmental concerns that would cultivate animal 
rights in the coming decades (Beers 151, 3). Because of the late 1940s and early 1950s 
Red Scare, postwar activists attempted what Beers calls “feasible goals,” seeking animal 
welfarism rather than animal rights, to avoid being ostracized as too radical (155). From 
the 1950s through the 1970s, advocates challenged human superiority, despite such a 
stance being considered radical. When White published his novel, animal advocates 
primarily campaigned against the meat industry to prevent its cruelty (Beers 181).7 
Following World War II, the growing consumer economy and baby boom increased 
demand for meat (Beers 159), but the growth of factory farms, which replaced rural 
farms, helped fulfill consumers’ requests. As Matthew Scully indicates, between 1920 
and 1950, and again between 1950 and 1965, agricultural production doubled because of 
the growing population’s appetite for meat and other animal “products” (29).  
Though White depicts a family farm in Charlotte’s Web, he also speaks to the 
larger issue of increased animal agriculture. Because the Red Scare discouraged activism, 
no animal welfare reforms were enacted in the 1950s until 1954, two years after White’s 
novel, which makes it even more necessary.8 Even in 1957, American society still 
																																																								
7 During this period, activists also advocated against laboratory research and hunting (Beers 181). 
8 The Humane Society of the United States began in 1964 but unfortunately “caved in to the conservative 
pressures surrounding it” (Beers 154, 156). After slaughterhouse conditions became public in 1954 at the 
AHA National Convention’s documentary, a Minnesota senator, Hubery Humphrey, passed a bill in April 
of 1955 demanding humane slaughter. The bill, however, encountered criticism from the USDA, which 
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considered meat as a patriotic staple, or as Beers explains, “the cornerstone of a great 
American diet” (161).9 Groups supporting meat consumption worried that federal laws 
determining how animals should be slaughtered would harm the family farm, although 
potential legislation addressed only factory farms (Beers 161). Based on Beers’s study of 
the tense political environment and the resulting few welfare regulations, we can gather 
that conditions for activists and animals were no better when White published Charlotte’s 
Web. Accordingly, because of his interest in the animals on his farm, White challenges 
the farm’s speciesist structure that delineates pigs as meat. In his essay “Pigs and 
Spiders,” published in 1953, White recognizes that “a farm is a particular problem for a 
man who likes animals” (White, “Appendix D” 237). After grappling with his guilt from 
slaughtering pigs, heightened by watching one die on his farm, White redefines Wilbur, 
separating him from others considered meat, because he “needed a way to save a pig’s 
life” (White, “Appendix D” 218).10 Hence, White composes what he believes to be a 
literary sanctuary for Wilbur. 
My analysis below separates human and animal language to illustrate how each 
species uses words to construct their version of paradise. To understand how the animal 
characters’ language works as an alternative to human language, I first examine how 
humans employ words to construct Wilbur as “meat” and an “object.” Then, I explain 
																																																																																																																																																																					
claimed that the government should decide how they slaughter animals (Beers 160). The Humane Slaughter 
Act passed in 1958, just a few years after White published Charlotte’s Web. 
9 According to Heinz’s and Lee’s “Getting Down to the Meat,” one of meat’s social meanings still includes 
patriotism, among others such as religion, masculinity, health, and meat as supposed product, food, and 
meal (90). 
10 See White’s “Death of a Pig,” first published in 1948. A reprinted edition of this essay may be found in 
“Appendix D” of Neumeyer’s annotated Charlotte’s Web. 
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how Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton adopt human language, from the written to the 
performed or corporeal word, to rename Wilbur as each word or phrase in Charlotte’s 
web, making him a pig who cannot be slaughtered.11 
 
Zuckerman’s Farm: The Dominant Narrative 
The words we use to discuss animals determine our perception and thus behavior 
toward them as products. According to Carol J. Adams, when we brand animals as types 
of meat, or body parts, we detach the animal from the product made from their body. 
These butchered fragments of animals (i.e., bacon, ham, pork chop, hot dog, sausage, and 
even meat), erase the animal from the product through the process of the absent referent. 
In doing so, “animals in name and body are made absent as animals for meat to exist” 
(Adams 40, original emphasis). Animals disappear through their literal death (the first 
butchering) and the definition that renames (and further butchers) their body into types of 
meat (Adams 40). Consequently, we no longer see the live animal; we only see meat, the 
object, that we consume. As Star Madzerian Vanguri reminds us, names serve rhetorical 
purposes. Despite our constant participation in the act of naming, which normalizes the 
practice, we forget its power (Vanguri 1).12 Everyday rituals hierarchize referents, 
determining our social role and enabling or disabling us as individuals (Vanguri 1, 3). 
																																																								
11 Though proper grammar requires “that” and “which” when referencing animals, I reject this practice 
because it objectifies them. Instead, I reference animals as “who” and “whom” to counter their object status 
and grant them the right to a subject’s language that illustrates their personhood. 
12 According to Vanguri, names appear neutral because we normalize them with each utterance. Since we 
equate normalcy to neutrality, this repetition creates the illusion that both a name and its embedded cultural 
narratives are objective (Vanguri 5). However, as Vanguri clarifies, names are never neutral because they 
either favor the dominant or inferior perception (2-3). 
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Typically, these rituals result in roles of inequity, since those who govern them hold 
positions of power and belong to the dominant group (Vanguri 4). In turn, names shape 
the identities of both the namer and the named as they reiterate the values of the dominant 
group and perpetuate hegemony (Vanguri 5). 
 We see names’ rhetorical effects in Charlotte’s Web when human characters 
erase Wilbur, and in turn create a paradise that hierarchizes humanity’s superiority and 
animals’ inferiority, with the names they call him. White waits until more than halfway 
through the novel to define Wilbur as “ham” or “bacon.” It is not until Zuckerman takes 
Wilbur to the County Fair that Mr. Arable exclaims that Zuckerman will “get some extra 
good ham and bacon…when it comes time to kill that pig” (White 126, original 
emphasis).13 When Mr. Arable calls Wilbur ham and bacon, we witness Adams’s theory 
of the absent referent. Wilbur, as a pig, becomes invisible. Mr. Arable’s reference 
establishes a farmer-farmed dichotomy, which objectifies and places Wilbur underneath 
humanity as he becomes meat. Though humans call Wilbur bacon and ham only once, 
they also objectify him with other names such as “Zuckerman’s Famous Pig” (White 94, 
124). While such a label seemingly challenges the absent referent, as it contains the word 
“pig,” the possessive again denotes the farmer-farmed dichotomy; Zuckerman “owns” 
Wilbur. This phrase erases Wilbur’s agency and value as a pig. Due to Zuckerman’s 
perceived ownership, Wilbur’s only value lies in the fame and profit he brings the farmer 
at the County Fair and beyond. Even Fern’s naming Wilbur demonstrates inequality. Fern 
																																																								
13 For the entirety of this essay, all references to Charlotte’s Web come from Neumeyer’s annotated 
version, “Chapters I-XXII, Annotated.” 
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plays with him like a doll, anthropomorphizing him through dress, while defining him as 
a toy—something with which to play. Fern also infantilizes Wilbur by verbally 
classifying him an infant. Some may argue that attaching Wilbur to a human infant 
elevates him, but Fern’s maternalism simultaneously insinuates that Wilbur lacks the 
basic instinct to fend for himself. This maternalism erases Wilbur’s animal instinct, 
which humanity accepts as animal intelligence, and therefore his agency. Though not 
intentionally speciesist since she has good intentions, Fern nevertheless preserves her 
human authority when setting up this mother-helpless infant dichotomy. 
Serving rhetorical purposes similar to names, pronouns characterize individuals, 
and in doing so, they also reference one’s identity, social status, and ability to claim 
rights that go with both (Malone 43-4). In particular, when we use third person pronouns, 
we exclude the addressee from the conversation. As Martin J. Malone explains, third 
person pronouns talk about, rather than with, someone, and thus serve to construe the 
individual in a particular manner (Malone 72). As they describe, pronouns Other 
individuals by categorizing and defining them based on who the speaker is not (Malone 
73). Third person pronouns such as “you” and “they” set up an-us-versus them 
dichotomy. Whereas "you" describes "people like us" and connects the speaker to the 
referent, "they" describes people "different from us" and creates distance from referents 
(Malone 72-4). As a result, pronouns “are powerful metaphors for 'other'" (Malone 73). 
We see how the generic “it” pronoun similarly Others animals. When we reference them 
as meat, or object, we distance ourselves from them. We define ourselves as the opposite 
of the Cartesian animal; in naming animals as something we elevate ourselves as 
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someone. The rationalization behind using the generic “it” pronoun for animals but not 
people is that, if animals are Other, or meat, then humans are not. “It,” in the us-versus-
them dichotomy it creates, codifies our detachment from animals as animals, and sustains 
animal consumption.14  
Fern and her mother demonstrate their detachment from animals when they 
reference Wilbur as “it,” despite knowing his sex as a male piglet:  
 
“Well,” said her mother, “one of the pigs is a runt. It’s very small and weak, and it 
will never amount to anything. So your father has decided to do away with it.” 
 
“Do away with it?” shrieked Fern. “You mean kill it? Just because it’s smaller 
than the others?” (White 1, original emphasis). 
 
 
Of course, the immediate issue at hand for Fern is Wilbur’s possible slaughter, as 
demonstrated by her emphasis on “away,” but her statement also reveals how we 
legitimize animal slaughter through objectification. Both Mrs. Arable and Fern label 
Wilbur as an “it,” perhaps because referencing him as an object makes it easier to deal 
with his possible slaughter. When we label an animal an “it”—a thing—we erase and 
objectify him or her, just as we do when we call an animal meat (Adams 64). Since 
objects lack sentience and higher intelligence, this pronoun allows us to distance 
ourselves from animals, which then allows us to view them as expendable. As Joan 
Dunayer pointedly illuminates, “An ‘it’ doesn’t need or desire freedom, but imprisoning 
																																																								
14 Malone points out how we reference an organization as “they,” instead of “it,” to avoid objectifying their 
members (74). Because we break grammar’s rules to personify humanity but do not extend the same 
courtesy to animals, we demonstrate our inherent speciesism. Referring to animals as “it,” even when 
discussing a collective species, Others animals and benefits humanity as it reinforces human supremacy. 
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an innocent ‘he’ or ‘she’ diminishes someone’s well-being and violates their rights” (152, 
emphasis added). Had Fern noticed her and her mother’s objectification of Wilbur, she 
perhaps would have placed emphasis elsewhere to challenge his object status. After all, 
as Vicki Hearne points out, “even many animal lovers conventionally use the pronoun ‘it’ 
rather than ‘he’ or ‘she’ to refer to an animal” (169). When Fern calls Wilbur “it,” she 
likely only repeats the language she hears at home. Nonetheless, her prejudiced language 
objectifies Wilbur linguistically. Although Fern does not perceive Wilbur as an object, 
her words have the same rhetorical effect as her mother’s, as they further construct the 
farm’s paradise that prioritizes humanity. 
Just as names and pronouns designate status, Judeo-Christian narratives also 
rhetorically classify animals and determine their role. Though agriculture originated as a 
way for technology to bypass hunting, Christian notions of dominion, accomplished 
through New World civilization, encouraged farming’s inception (Merchant 83). To 
perpetuate The Recovery Narrative, settlers began domesticating animals and crops 
(Merchant 40). Colonialists believed, as some Christians still do, that Genesis’s portrayal 
of nature proves humanity’s superiority and encourages us to exploit animals. Take 
Genesis 1:26, for example: “26: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our 
likeness: and let him have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, 
and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepth upon 
the earth.” Because Christianity considers animals amoral and irrational, as mentioned 
earlier, contemporary consumers often misinterpret this “dominion” as domination, rather 
than stewardship, and cite it to legitimize animal consumption. They rationalize that, 
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since God ordered humanity to reign over nature, we seemingly possess more intellectual 
capacity and must subdue animals’ “wildness.” Correspondingly, Genesis 2:19 states “19: 
And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of 
the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever 
Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.” Some believers also 
misunderstand this passage. Because God tasked Adam with naming animals, many 
believe He did so because of their so-called lack of morality and intellect, which again 
reinforces conquering them. After all, as Vanguri’s and Burr’s studies evidence, whoever 
holds the most social power determines the names that become the dominant 
“knowledge.” When we name, we author, and when we author, we shape perceptions that 
enable us to dominate, or abuse, nonhuman creatures. 
To fulfill our perceived role as dominators, we name animals as meat and 
consume them. Consumers place the most emphasis on Genesis 1:29 to 1:30:  
 
29: And God said, Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is 
upon the face of all the earth, and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree 
yielding seed; to you it shall be for meat. 30: And to every beast of the earth, and 
to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein 
there is life, I have given every green herb for meat: and it was so.  
 
 
Many read this passage’s reference to meat as describing animals when, in reality, it 
refers to fruit and herbs made for all creatures. Minnis asserts that humans were 
vegetarian in Eden (17). We only began consuming animals after the Fall, when God 
punished us by making humans and animals enemies (Tischner 41). Regardless, such 
believers often misunderstand and appropriate the passages above to codify speciesism 
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that further Others animals. When animal consumption becomes God’s will, any kind of 
treatment becomes justifiable. 
In White’s novel, Zuckerman misreads animals’ role in paradise, believing them 
to be meat, just as contemporary consumers mistake the Genesis narrative. By virtue of 
the farm, Zuckerman dominates Wilbur and the others while creating his own Edenic 
reality. He and the town’s minister adopt Christianity’s speciesist portrayal of animals as 
irrational and amoral, which leads them to consider Wilbur incapable of human-level 
intelligence. After Charlotte weaves “SOME PIG!” into her web, the minster addresses 
the “miracle” at Church. We learn that “[the minister] said that the words on the spider’s 
web proved that human beings must always be on the watch for the coming of wonders” 
(White 85). Upon seeing Charlotte’s phrase, Zuckerman dismisses its occurrence as 
supernatural but then, like the minister, accepts it as a miracle. Neither the minister nor 
Zuckerman believe that Wilbur, and certainly not Charlotte, possess the intelligence to 
understand human language, much less manipulate it to communicate with “superior” 
humans. Instead, these characters insinuate that both animals, but especially Wilbur, only 
possess basic animal instinct, which preserves his inferior status in paradise. Since the 
minister and Zuckerman, and by extension everyone who knows Wilbur, believe “his” 
(Charlotte’s) authorship to be a miracle, they value him only because they perceive him 
as a divine messenger; these characters interpret the phrase as God’s essence rather than 
Wilbur’s talent. Wilbur’s value then relies on God, and neither the minister nor 
 
	 24 
Zuckerman appreciate Wilbur’s intrinsic value but rather his role as a pig through whom 
God supposedly speaks.15  
 
It Takes a Community: Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton Reweave Speciesism  
Undeterred by what Vanguri expresses as names’ “false sense of permanence” 
(3), the animals rename Wilbur. They adopt human language to rewrite speciesist 
narratives and convince Zuckerman not to slaughter the pig.16 To illustrate that 
challenging speciesism requires community effort, each animal plays a role in renaming 
Wilbur, which the old sheep instigates. He tells Wilbur that Zuckerman will slaughter and 
“[turn him] into smoked bacon and ham” because “almost all young pigs get murdered by 
the farmer as soon as the real cold weather sets in” (White 49).17 From this point, the 
other animals help reconstruct Wilbur’s image. The goose, gander, goslings, sheep, lamb, 
and of course Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton meet in the barn, where Charlotte seeks 
advice for new slogans. She chooses “SOME PIG!,” the goose proposes “TERRIFIC,” 
																																																								
15 Judith Butler theorizes seeing and reading in “Endangered/Endangering: Schematic Racism and White 
Paranoia,” which also illuminates how speciesism works. She describes how one’s white paranoia, or fear 
of losing white supremacy, originates from racism. When we see evidence of police brutality against the 
black community, racist schemas and stereotypes inform our interpretation; we read the black individual as 
always guilty, even when innocent, and legitimize police violence because it preserves white supremacy 
(Butler 206-8). The minister’s and Zuckerman’s speciesism similarly influences how they read the animals’ 
communication. These characters’ human paranoia, or fear of losing human supremacy, makes them 
perceive “Wilbur’s” (Charlotte’s) words and phrases as miracles because of speciesist schemas that claim 
animals are irrational. The human characters must “be on the watch” for the animals’ cleverness, 
understood as God’s “wonders,” because of how such intelligence challenges human superiority (White 
85). If the minister or Zuckerman accepted animal intelligence, then it would unravel animals’ inferiority, 
making it more difficult to justify oppressing them. 
16 For an analysis of how Charlotte’s web characterizes her instead of Wilbur, see Janice M. Alberghene’s 
“Writing in Charlotte’s Web.” 
17 Curiously, the animals mention the words “ham” and “bacon” before the human characters reference 
Wilbur by either name. 
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and the old sheep asks Templeton to scavenge words from the dump, where he finds the 
last two words, “RADIANT” and “HUMBLE.” Although their roles appear less 
significant, the goose, gander, goslings, sheep, and lambs work together to ensure that 
Charlotte and Templeton fit into Wilbur’s crate, unnoticed, as he goes to the County Fair. 
This moment builds up to Wilbur’s time away from the farm, where his renaming 
becomes most critical. The animals know that, without Charlotte and Templeton, people 
will no longer regard Wilbur as “some pig.” While at the County Fair, Wilbur must 
preserve his image, and to do so, he needs Templeton’s ability to scavenge and 
Charlotte’s ability to manipulate human words. Though the animal cohort enables 
Wilbur’s renaming, Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton play the most prominent roles in 
saving Wilbur and rewriting paradise.  
With her web, Charlotte reworks speciesist narratives by authoring words and 
phrases that depict Wilbur as an animal rather than an object. She first weaves “SOME 
PIG!” which makes Wilbur present in name and reverses the absent referent, setting the 
foundation for the successive words (White 77). To disassociate Wilbur from his 
previous names (i.e., “ham,” “bacon,” “Zuckerman’s Famous Pig,” “it,” “toy,” and 
“infant”), Charlotte renames him as some pig. She argues against Wilbur’s objectification 
by including his species, pig, instead of a type of meat. This phrase also argues against 
Zuckerman’s “ownership” of Wilbur, reclaiming Wilbur’s agency by emphasizing that no 
one owns him. Essentially, “SOME PIG!” animalizes Wilbur; he is no longer an object 
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for consumption or play but rather a special pig.18 Wilbur becomes someone instead of 
something. Charlotte suggests that, because of his perceived ability to weave words that 
compare to humanity’s intelligence, Wilbur is not food and therefore should not be 
slaughtered. After this first phrase, the human characters attach each subsequent word to 
Wilbur. When Charlotte weaves “TERRIFIC” into her web, the Zuckermans perceive 
Wilbur as a terrific pig. Following suit, Charlotte writes “RADIANT” and the 
Zuckermans recognize Wilbur’s radiance. Finally, after Charlotte transcribes 
“HUMBLE,” the Zuckermans believe Wilbur to be deeply modest.19 
While Charlotte’s composition begins constructing an alternative narrative, 
Wilbur plays a key role in strengthening its reality by connecting each word and phrase to 
his body. To advertise his characteristics, Wilbur performs and speaks corporeally. As the 
Zuckermans notice “SOME PIG!” in Charlotte’s web, Wilbur stands underneath the 
phrase to imply he authored it and ensure they know which pig the statement references. 
Wilbur performs similarly when Charlotte weaves “TERRIFIC” by standing under the 
word, but this time, he also swings his snout side to side. Wilbur respectively highlights 
his wonderful characteristics to showcase his identity as a pig, not a human or an infant. 
When Charlotte claims Wilbur as “RADIANT,” he demonstrates his radiance: “He would 
turn his head slightly and blink his long eye-lashes. Then he would breathe deeply. And 
																																																								
18 Here I have chosen the word “animalize,” as opposed to “anthropomorphize,” to legitimize Wilbur’s 
animality as a type of personhood. Plus, Charlotte weaves “SOME PIG!” instead of “SOME PERSON!” to 
highlight that Zuckerman should value Wilbur for his identity as a pig. 
19 White’s April 1940 essay, “A Shepherd’s Life,” articulates how naming animals connects us to them: 
“you find yourself growing close to sheep. You give them names not for whimsy but for convenience. And 
when one of them approaches her confinement [slaughter] you get almost as restless as she does” (“A 
Shepherds Life,” 192). Above all, White demonstrates why he carefully crafts Wilbur’s representation; he 
must incite readers’ sympathy to “save” a pig through Charlotte’s words and phrases. 
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when his audience grew bored, he would spring into the air and do a back flip with a half 
twist” (White 114-15). Here, Wilbur promotes his poise and beauty by modeling for his 
audience. His poses accentuate his snout and in turn his value as a pig. When Wilbur flips 
in the air, he illustrates his animal identity, which guides him through each performance, 
disproving Fern’s conviction of him as being incapable of surviving on his own. 
By the time Charlotte characterizes Wilbur as “HUMBLE” to completely rename 
him, he performs humility by staying in his crate. He no longer needs to engage in 
theatrics because Charlotte now weaves the truth. As Wilbur performs each word, he 
becomes more confident and embraces his new identity. Upon enacting “TERRIFIC,” 
Wilbur begins feeling terrific; next he feels radiant, and then humble, as he modestly 
addresses his oppressors to hone Charlotte’s portrayal of him. Though we typically 
reserve these characteristics for humans and companion animals because they connote 
intellectual and moral capacity, Wilbur’s corporeal communication proves that such 
qualities also apply to him. As a result, he and Charlotte subvert Zuckerman’s Christian-
based dominance ethos, prompting the farmer to decide against slaughtering such a 
valuable pig. As Karen Coats indicates in her “Lacan with Runt Pigs,” Wilbur’s 
performances create a speech act as they influence Zuckerman’s decision (123).20 Each 
name Charlotte attributes to Wilbur personifies him and clarifies his performances. As 
Vanguri states, names correlate to performance because they “allow us to understand the 
workings of performance, space, bodies, objects, and social spheres” (2). Without 
																																																								
20 For more information on animal subjectivity, see Karen Coats’s “Lacan with Runt Pigs,” which discusses 
how the human characters’ language, particularly Fern’s, affects Wilbur’s selfhood. 
 
	 28 
Charlotte’s words and phrases, Zuckerman would not have believed that Wilbur 
embodied each trait. Likewise, if not for Wilbur’s performances, Zuckerman would not 
have understood the pig as the author and would not have elevated Wilbur from his meat 
status to tourist attraction.  
Templeton’s role makes the animals’ language even more interesting. The rat 
utilizes “paradise,” the dump and County Fair, and scavenges human language from 
newspapers and magazines to find slogans appropriate for renaming Wilbur. We can 
understand the significance of Templeton’s discoveries, and even Charlotte’s word 
choices and Wilbur’s performances, if we acknowledge that we foster speciesism to 
reinvent an earthly Eden. As demonstrated in the Christian Genesis narrative, and the 
minister’s treatment of “Wilbur’s” (Charlotte’s) woven messages, we reserve higher 
intelligence for humanity to dominate nature. Because only Fern and Dr. Dorian believe 
that nonhuman creatures speak to humans, the animals must go beyond language—to 
discourse’s cultural influences in the media—to rework the narratives that exploit pigs.  
Mass media’s narratives construct a human-oriented paradise inspired from 
Genesis’s supposed dominion of animals. With its vast products that reinforce human 
superiority, the media objectifies and erases animals, especially “livestock,” as it defines 
them with names and pronouns. As Vicki Hearne explains, today we name animals as “an 
impulse to return to Adam’s divine condition,” or domination over animals (169-70). 
When we consider how the media maintains speciesism to sell animals’ bodies, 
Templeton’s scavenging becomes even more ingenious. While the animals need new 
slogans, which “paradise” offers, humans’ speciesist culture mirrors the “tree” of 
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knowledge (i.e., intellect and morale comparable to humanity’s) forbidden from animals. 
As Bettina Heinz’s and Ronald Lee’s study on meat’s cultural elements reveals, the 
discourse found in newspaper journalism, magazines, and advertisements, among other 
contexts, all portray animals as meat. Because the dump and County Fair contain words 
from these media, it is therefore not a coincidence that Charlotte asks Templeton to 
forage in both places.21  
As confirmed when they warn Wilbur of his fate, advocate against his slaughter, 
and successfully adopt human language to rename Wilbur, the animals already know the 
narratives used against pigs. Accordingly, they find advertisements and articles (rooted in 
humanity’s desire to return to paradise’s “dominion”) that discuss both human subjects 
and animal objects to learn which words we value, and which words sell, so Charlotte can 
attach them to Wilbur. Templeton first scavenges “crunchy” and “pre-shrunk,” which 
come from magazine advertisements. Charlotte comments on both, stating that “[the 
animals] must advertise Wilbur’s noble qualities, not his tastiness” and “[they] want 
Zuckerman to think Wilbur is nicely filled out, not all shrunk up” (White 98-99). In her 
statements, Charlotte affirms her awareness that these words would only strengthen 
Zuckerman’s perception of Wilbur as meat. Instead of seeming morally hollow (i.e., 
“shrunk up”), Wilbur must seem intrinsically valuable (i.e., “nicely filled out”), so 
																																																								
21 White clearly knew these elements because of his experience in journalism and advertising. While at 
Cornell University, he distributed the daily newspaper and prioritized journalism (Atkins 64). Unable to 
find sustainable writing jobs later in life, White worked for advertising agencies, such as in the production 
department at Frank Seaman, Inc., to support himself (Sims 76). Working in advertising, White saw 
marketing strategies firsthand, which he demonstrates in his chapter added to William Strunk’s The 
Elements of Style. In rule twenty-one, White discusses how advertising “profoundly influences the tongue 
and pens of children and adults” with its rhetorical appeals, especially pathos (i.e., emotion) and ethos (i.e., 
a speaker’s or product’s credibility) (White, “An Approach to Style” 68). 
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Charlotte sends Templeton to find words that better represent Wilbur (White 98-99). 
Templeton next finds “radiant,” which passes Charlotte’s judgment. Interestingly, this 
word comes from a box of soap flakes that promise “New Radiant Action” (White 99). 
By borrowing from such a source, the animals attempt to cleanse Wilbur’s image by 
addressing how humanity’s hygiene practices “prove” our civilization and thus 
“superiority” over pigs who bathe in mud instead of soap.  
Templeton’s second word, “humble,” originates from a newspaper ad folded over 
the leftovers of a ham sandwich (White 139). Though the narrator never mentions the 
story from which the word came, it is not a coincidence that the last trait used to 
characterize Wilbur is found in a newspaper covering pig flesh. Charlotte accepts this 
word because its two meanings (i.e., “not proud” and “near the ground”) fit Wilbur 
(White 140). His short legs place him near the ground and his inferiority positions him at 
the bottom of Christianity’s hierarchy. By choosing this word’s source, Charlotte thus 
protests how ham erases pigs and how journalism continuously normalizes such 
objectification with each reference that defines them as meat. Templeton, without whom 
this protest would be impossible, contrasts Wilbur’s portrayal as meat (i.e., “crunchy” 
and “ham”), by clarifying his value as an animal. The rat and the other animals thus 
follow Audre Lorde’s method to subvert Zuckerman’s Edenic reality; they use their 
oppressors’ tools, both linguistic and cultural, to dismantle speciesist narratives and halt 
Wilbur’s slaughter.  
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Wilbur’s “Paradise”: An Unslaughterable Counternarrative 
Similar to the creation stories Carolyn Merchant reviews in Reinventing Eden, 
Charlotte’s Web reads as a counternarrative told by nature (7). To achieve their goal, the 
animals play an active, not passive, role. Through Charlotte’s web, Wilbur’s body, 
Templeton’s words, and even the other animals’ selection of words and phrases, the 
animals become actors—agents of change. Though Merchant attends to narratives that 
seek to recover Eden, the animals create a “new American Eden,” one where animals 
begin to name themselves (Merchant 2). As I have shown, the animals master humanity 
in attempt to create a more inclusive paradise, one where human characters perceive 
Wilbur as unslaughterable. Whereas humanity’s idea of paradise remains intact when the 
novel begins, once the animals adopt our language and influence Zuckerman and the 
town, they challenge the paradisiacal farm. The words and phrases that characterize 
Wilbur as someone serve as food for thought that confronts human superiority. Wilbur’s 
final representation suggests that, if animals share human qualities—ones used to prove 
our sentience, intelligence, and value—we cannot justify slaughtering them. This 
implication consumes Zuckerman’s and nearly every other human character’s thoughts, 
because “people are not as smart as bugs,” as Charlotte claims (White 67).  
The animals’ ability to counter speciesist narratives and create “Wilbur’s” 
(White’s) paradise relies on the power of the written word, or as Charlotte comments, 
how “people believe almost anything they see in print” (White 89). Zuckerman’s reaction 
to the seeing “SOME PIG!” in Charlotte’s web demonstrates this observation. Prior to 
Charlotte’s interference, he viewed Wilbur as a runt pig meant for a puny meal. After 
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seeing this phrase and Wilbur’s display underneath the web, Zuckerman and his 
neighbor, Lurvy, begin adopting Charlotte’s language, as we see when they discuss 
Wilbur:  
 
“You know,” he said, in an important voice, “I’ve thought all along that that pig 
of ours was an extra good one. He’s a solid pig. That pig is as sold as they come. 
You notice how solid he is around the shoulders, Lurvy?” 
 
“Sure. Sure I do,” said Lurvy. “I’ve always noticed that pig. He’s quite a pig.” 
 
“He’s long, and he’s smooth,” said Zuckerman. 
 
“That’s right,” agreed Lurvy. “He’s as smooth as they come. He’s some pig” 
(White 81-2, emphasis added). 
 
 
Significantly, Zuckerman and Lurvy, Wilbur’s biggest threats because they both discuss 
his slaughter, change their perception. They view him more positively, and even repeat 
the phrase “some pig” (White 82). Despite Charlotte’s efforts to portray Wilbur as 
someone, these farmers still view him as meat, only a better piece of meat. From this 
moment, Zuckerman and his neighbors continue incorporating each word into their 
conversations; they see and speak of Wilbur as each adjective until, eventually, they 
realize that his “miraculous” ability to weave words into webs exempts him from 
slaughter. Charlotte knows her work is done when the County Fair’s speaker references 
Wilbur using all four words and phrases during the competition: “In the words of the 
spider’s web, ladies and gentlemen, this is some pig” (White 156, emphasis added), “This 
magnificent animal…is truly terrific” (White 158, emphasis added), “Note the general 
radiance of this animal” (White 158, emphasis added), and “This radiant, this terrific, 
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this humble pig” (White 158, emphasis added).22 Thanks to Charlotte, Wilbur, and 
Templeton’s endeavors, the humans no longer designate Wilbur as meat. The County Fair 
speaker awards Wilbur a trophy, seemingly for his language capabilities (though the 
narrator never specifies), and Wilbur becomes accepted as a pig.  
Mike Michael’s “Actors, Identities and ‘Natural’ Nonhumans” formulates how we 
socially construct human-nature identities and relationships. Typically, we create reality 
based on Michael’s Human-as-subject (I)/Nature-as-object (it) permutation, where 
“humans are conscious, volitional subjects whereas nature is an object or resource to be 
studied or exploited” (138). When the animals adopt human language to change Wilbur’s 
image, they construct reality to reflect Michael’s Human-as-subject (I)/Nature-as-subject 
(Thou) in which “both humans and nature are subjects/agents…viewed as cognizant, 
reflexive, volitional” (139). Within this configuration, humans and nature both 
communicate back and forth (Michael 139). The competition at the County Fair 
demonstrates such an interaction. When the speaker and nearly every other human 
character adopt the animals’ discourse, the animals become Thou; they communicate with 
and even successfully persuade the human characters to see them differently.  
However, not enough communication occurs to truly free Wilbur from 
exploitation. As Michael indicates, nonhuman agency depends on surrounding actors and 
constructs (136). The animals reshape Wilbur’s image, transforming him from meat to 
																																																								
22 As before, Zuckerman and his neighbors pretend they always saw each characteristic in Wilbur because 
his intelligence threatens them. Put simply, the human characters act as if they still have the advantage of 
higher intelligence when, in reality, Charlotte’s words confront animal inequality, though not enough to 
grant Wilbur equality.  
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pig so that the human characters no longer perceive him as food, but these creatures lack 
the power to overwrite speciesism’s entire foundation. The human characters no longer 
treat Wilbur as meat, which affords him special meals and clean straw, but he becomes a 
tourist attraction and subsequently an object. Because Zuckerman transforms him into a 
trophy pig, the animals change Wilbur’s social status only slightly; humanity still 
constructs reality and the animals lack complete agency. As Tom Andrews remarks, those 
with the most power are those whose “version of events predominate” (8). Though the 
animals construct “Wilbur’s” (White’s) version of paradise, it is never Paradise with a 
capital P because Wilbur never fully claims his free will or rights. The human characters, 
it seems, still complete Adam’s task by naming Wilbur as product that yields revenue, 
which restores the dominant Human-as-subject (I)/Nature-as-object (it) reality. 
Ultimately, in humans’ preserved rendition of Paradise, they reign over the farm and the 
animals.  
 
The Animal Family: A Zoo Tourist’s Literary “Sanctuary”  
The animal rights movement had not begun when Jarrell published The Animal 
Family in 1965, but advocates persistently challenged human superiority, despite the risk 
of being considered radical. Because little change had been made in the 1950s, in the 
1960s animal advocates continued seeking more humane conditions for animals 
slaughtered in the meat industry, tested for research, and hunted in nature (Beers 181). 
This period more openly accepted radicalism, which prompted animal advocates to 
intensify their demands for greater animal welfare (Beers 156). Rachel Carson’s Silent 
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Spring, published in 1962, opened the conversation for additional radicalism. Activists 
began discussing wild animals while boycotting skins, furs, and cages (Beers 180). They 
fought against hunting, specifically drawing attention to whether it helps or hinders 
biodiversity and ecology, and addressed its motives such as population control and sport 
(Beers 182, 184). Advocates particularly opposed canned hunting, where hunters 
purchase and shoot “farm-raised ‘wild’ animals,” or “tame target[s]” to ensure they return 
home with a kill (Beers 186). Activists retaliated by portraying hunters, especially those 
who kill for sport—even to the point of manipulating the “game” by reducing the number 
of animal predators nearby—as cruel and destructive despite their claim that the practice 
brought them closer to nature  (Beers 184-5). The Wilderness Act of 1964 helped protect 
land, but not enough for animal advocates, because it preserved large areas of land 
instead of specific animals, which worked in hunters’ favor.23  
In 1964, activists began creating sanctuaries for birds and other wild animals to 
help offset hunters’ destruction (Beers 182). Jarrell speaks to this conversation. Although 
he published The Animal Family to create an idyllic family and restore his childhood 
(Flynn, Randall Jarrell 3), he also creates what he perceives as a literary sanctuary—one 
where a hunter coexists with a few “wild” animals some would hunt as trophies.24 Jarrell 
clearly clashes with animal advocates, as he constructs his story around a hunter, but he 
																																																								
23 The Endangered Species Act did not pass until 1966, a year after The Animal Family’s publication (Beers 
154). Because legislators did not reform the act until 1973, it only indirectly protected animals and the 
environment against human depredations (Beers 189). 
24 Maurice Sendak, The Animal Family’s illustrator, mentions how Jarrell lived vicariously through his 
fictional families: “I know how desperately Randall needed a family. That’s the whole message of 
everything he wrote” (quoted in Griswold 112). Jarrell never recovered from his parents’ divorce and, as a 
result, felt as if he had lost his childhood (Flynn, Randall Jarrell 3). 
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advocates against killing certain wild animals or imprisoning them in zoos.25 According 
to his wife Mary, Jarrell modeled the lynx from his pet cat named Kitten and the 
Canadian lynx in the Washington Zoo, created the bear for “comic relief” because he 
“had a wish fantasy about owning a bear,” and then added the boy to complete the family 
with a sense of circular continuity (Introduction 15-6). As Stephen Burt mentions briefly, 
Jarrell paradoxically reinforces yet also remakes the nuclear family with adoptive 
children of various species (199). However, by including animals into the human family 
construct, Jarrell challenges so-called wild animals’ role, seeking to free them from their 
cages in zoos and allow them space in the human family structure.  
In his essay “The Woman at the Washington Zoo,” where he gives insight into his 
drafting process for the poem “Jerome,” Jarrell criticizes zoo visitors, writing that “the 
free beasts [human visitors] come to their imprisoned brothers and never know that they 
are not also free” (A Sad Heart, 170). Jarrell clearly recognizes that zoos hold animals 
captive and uses “Jerome” to expose this issue. Griswold states that The Animal Family’s 
lynx was based on the lynx in Jarrell’s “Jerome,” a poem from his volume The Woman at 
the Washington Zoo, because he enjoyed visiting the zoo and reading zoo stories (98). In 
“The Woman at the Washington Zoo,” also connected to Jarrell’s zoo visits, the author 
includes the bears by mentioning briefly that pigeons sit on their bread (The Woman at 
the Washington Zoo 2). Because both the lynx in “Jerome” and the bear in “The Woman 
at the Washington Zoo” play small roles, Jarrell sought to give them more active roles 
																																																								
25 Jarrell’s novel perhaps critiques hunting for sport, as each character hunts to survive. However, the 
author simultaneously reaffirms another form of dominion over animals by suggesting that the hunter, and 
by extension humanity, must consume animals to survive. 
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with The Animal Family, not merely for the sake of story but, like White, to change their 
societal representation. Because the public had already become more intimate with 
nature, 1960s activists “needed only to heighten that sensitivity” (Beers 186). Beers 
indicates that many still accepted hunting, but affection for pets helped reduce the desire 
to kill for sport (186). Even in scripture pets enjoy more protection than wild creatures. 
Moses’s law protects domestic animals who live with humans against mistreatment and 
sexual abuse, a comfort wild animals never receive because of their lack of relationship 
with humanity (Tischler 42). Some early Christians even believed that companion 
animals’ association with humanity might grant them entrance into “the future paradise,” 
or Heaven (Minnis 90). Thus, Jarrell creates the bear and lynx as human “children” and 
“pets” to elevate and create sympathy for them. 
To better distinguish where Jarrell draws and blurs boundaries between humanity, 
animal-humanity, and animality, I examine the hunter’s domestication of the mermaid 
and her transition into humanity, then explore the hunter’s and mermaid’s domestication 
of the bear and lynx, and finally demonstrate these animals’ creative agency, which they 
enact by bringing home the human boy, completing the family and changing their family 
role. Each section focuses on how an individual species constructs varying forms of 
paradise by either domesticating animals or maintaining animality. 
 
The Mermaid: From Animal-Human to Human 
To understand the hunter’s and mermaid’s domestication of the bear and lynx, we 
must first understand that the hunter domesticates the mermaid to begin his family.  
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Though the mermaid is part animal and part human, the hunter views her as an animal he 
must lure in by using her language. Flynn’s “Randall Jarrell’s Mermaid: The Animal 
Family and ‘Semifeminine’ Poetics” discusses how the hunter adopts the mermaid’s 
language to bait her, but Flynn does not discuss in depth how or why the hunter colonizes 
the mermaid. My analysis considers the hunter’s colonization of the mermaid as 
domestication, where the hunter views the mermaid as the key to creating his Edenic 
family; but before he can do so, he must domesticate her into his wifely companion. After 
hearing the mermaid’s enticing song, the hunter waits by the seal rock each night, 
repeating her melody in the hopes that she will swim to him as she would another sea 
person. The mermaid, like a wild animal, comes closer each night as the hunter continues 
using her language to tame her and to imply that he shares her culture. When the 
mermaid finally swims within speaking distance, they converse, and the hunter uses this 
opportunity to domesticate the mermaid by teaching her words that separate them. 
Whereas the mermaid teaches the hunter the word for “head,” the body part that connects 
them, the hunter teaches the mermaid the word for “leg,” the body part that divides them. 
 Despite proving her intellectual capacity when she repeats, remembers, and 
speaks the hunter’s language “so much better” than he can hers, where she even learns 
phrases like “oh well” that he never speaks, the hunter continues domesticating the 
mermaid (Jarrell 16-7).26 When she visits the beach each day, he points to the meadow 
and states, “in the clear divided tones of a teacher making something plain”: 
																																																								
26 When the hunter teaches the mermaid that the word “man” describes him but that the word “men” 
describes others like him, the mermaid replies, “The sea men, like me–“ (Jarrell 18). But he corrects her by 
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“That is my house.” 
 
“House,” hissed the mermaid. “House.” 
 
“I sleep in the house, on a bed. I eat in the house, on a table.” 
 
“Bed, said the mermaid. “Table.” But her quick eyes looked strained and hesitant; 
it was plain that she had no idea what the hunter was talking about. 
 
The hunter started cheerfully, “A table’s a big flat thing with legs”—the 
mermaid’s eyes brightened: she knew what legs meant, and felt very landish for 
knowing—“that you eat on” (Jarrell 20-1, original emphasis).27 
 
 
The hunter initiates this conversation not simply out of courtesy to share personal 
information with the mermaid and build a trusting relationship but rather to distinguish 
himself from her by portraying himself as more “landish” or “civilized.” He hopes that 
introducing the mermaid to civilization will erase her animality and foreground her 
humanity. Again the hunter uses what separates him from the mermaid, legs, to explain a 
table. Even the narration evidences their differences, as the mermaid hisses the word 
“house” when reciting it and struggles to understand the purpose of the hunter’s lifestyle, 
both of which highlight her animality or Otherness and in turn indicate her “need” to be 
domesticated. But most important is how the narrator describes the hunter’s tone as 
“clear” and “divided” when using civilization to split his and the mermaid’s species 
(Jarrell 20). Perhaps the hunter believes explaining his lifestyle will further entice the 
mermaid, as he continues to suggest his supposedly more cultured lifestyle by 
																																																																																																																																																																					
saying, “The sea people” (Jarrell 18, emphasis added). By grouping the mermaid alongside “people,” the 
hunter allows her a humanlike status, ultimately showing that he considers her as more human than animal 
after realizing her intelligence. 
27 For the rest of this essay, unless otherwise specified, each citation referencing only Jarrell’s name comes 
from The Animal Family. 
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highlighting his bed, table, and house. Regardless, the hunter differentiates between 
himself and the mermaid so she will perceive herself as Other and seek to feel more 
included by joining his home. 
Initially, the mermaid speaks in both her and the hunter’s language. She retains 
part of her animality, or culture from the sea people. Celebrating her nonhuman identity, 
she brings the hunter back “gifts” from the sea: shells, starfish, seahorses, fish they 
consume, trinkets from wrecked ships, and the ship’s figurehead. The mermaid brings 
carcasses from the sea, or more animal-like presents, but she also carries more human 
tokens such as the figurehead and the necklace she makes for her new husband. The 
figurehead, which she hangs in front of the door to make the hunter’s home more 
inclusive, especially celebrates her animality because the female centaur (part human and 
part deer/goat) represents her dual identity. Eventually, however, the mermaid abandons 
her animality and stops speaking both languages. She no longer considers the sea her 
home. Rather, she covers her tail with a long skirt and fully adopts the hunter’s language, 
where she speaks, thinks, and behaves in it; she cooks and cleans for her husbandly 
companion while also “mothering” the bear and lynx. Yet, as she does so, the hunter 
continues to domesticate her, which I will discuss below. The mermaid begins as an 
animal, an equal, but becomes more human than animal and therefore, according to the 
hunter (and those who share his perspective), “better.” From this point, she and the hunter 
domesticate their wild children together. By the end of the novel, the mermaid completes 
her transition from animal-human to human when she masters the hunter’s language, as 
evidenced by her role as co-domesticator, by her nearly six-page long monologue in the 
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last chapter, and by finally crying. Because the mermaid assimilates and proves her 
sentience, distinguishing herself from the other sea people who do not cry, the hunter 
considers her fully human.  
 
“Raising” The Bear and Lynx: The Hunter’s and Mermaid’s Dominant Narrative 
Names’ rhetorical influence also helps illuminate how Jarrell treats the animal 
family. In contrast to Charlotte’s Web, all of The Animal Family characters appear only 
by their title, a common noun: the hunter, mermaid, bear, lynx, and boy. Vanguri 
differentiates between common nouns and proper names, explaining that names identify 
new meanings whereas nouns describe a meaning agreed upon by society (1). But based 
on Vanguri’s assertion that names regulate one’s equity or inequity, power or impotence, 
societal position and accompanying role, and, as a result, one’s identity (1-5), the power 
of names is vast. Typically, parents give their children proper names, yet the hunter and 
mermaid never partake in this tradition, and even they have no proper names. Though 
each member of the animal family references one another by a common noun, likely to 
support the novel’s status as a fairy tale and make it more generally applicable, Adams’s 
theory of the absent referent still proves helpful because it shows how names can either 
erase animals or make them present.28  
At first glance, the characters’ common names seemingly showcase and value 
each identity (i.e., humanity, animal-humanity, or animality) by making that identity 
																																																								
28 See Peter F. Neumeyer’s “Randall Jarrell’s The Animal Family: New Land and Old” for an analysis of 
the novel as a fairy tale, based on both its content and style. 
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present, which fosters equality. But because the hunter’s lectures erase the mermaid’s 
animality, and then the hunter and mermaid erase the bear’s and lynx’s animality by 
anthropomorphizing them, these names fail to avoid the domesticator-domesticated 
dichotomy similar to the namer-named split. In fact, these common names create such a 
dichotomy that they Other the animal-human and animal characters based on their species 
and establish their secondary familial position by reminding the hunter of their animal 
difference. To reiterate Vanguri’s earlier claim, naming never serves neutral purposes but 
rather “represent[s] the entirety of the named…[based on] the values and interests of the 
namer” (2-3, 5). But these rhetorical devices only synecdochically depict individuals 
(Vanguri 5), as we see with the animals’ names, serving to construct the hunter’s 
paradise, which the mermaid follows because she believes it to be the landish norm. The 
domestication that anthropomorphizes and Others the mermaid, bear, and lynx also erases 
their animal characteristics. When the hunter colonizes the mermaid, he differentiates 
himself from her as more human and thus “superior,” just as the couple elevates 
themselves above their ostensible children when they anthropomorphize and train them.  
 Griswold discusses how the bear, lynx, and boy represent different childhood 
developmental stages (102), which aids our understanding of the animal family, but the 
hunter and mermaid do more than simply “raise” their adopted children. These “parents” 
forcefully remove the bear and lynx from the wild to create a family—their Edenic 
reality—but doing so requires domesticating the animals, a practice rooted in New World 
notions of civilization. Ever since Christopher Columbus believed he found Eden upon 
arriving in South America in 1498, scientists began using The Recovery Narrative to 
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recreate paradise with gardens and zoos that tamed so-called wilderness (Merchant 57). 
Colonialists defined humanity in opposition to animality. They misapprehended humans 
and animals who lacked laws and manners as wild, while they considered individuals 
who had manners and possessions (i.e., houses, land, animals) as civilized (Merchant 69-
70). Thus, settlers forced humans displaying putatively animal characteristics to suppress 
their naturalness if they desired civilization. The hunter and mermaid adopt a similar 
mentality. As opposed to human language in Charlotte’s Web that domesticates and 
dominates Wilbur through objectifying agricultural practices, human language in The 
Animal Family more intimately domesticates and dominates animals by humanizing 
them. To rid them of their animality, or supposed wildness, the hunter and mermaid 
domesticate and Other both the bear and lynx by humanizing or “civilizing” them. 
 To domesticate his children, the hunter uses methods that seem contradictory. He 
highlights their similarities to people by using personal pronouns to present them each as 
someone rather than something. Unlike human characters in Charlotte’s Web, the hunter 
never names the bear or lynx to prove his authority and construct his role in paradise. 
Instead, he references them both as “he” or “him,” but never “it” or “anything” except to 
create suspense when surprising the mermaid with them. Though referencing these 
siblings as “he” and “him” seems to grant them rights as animals by acknowledging their 
sentience and thus personhood, if we further examine their context we realize they serve 
different rhetorical purposes: to portray the bear and lynx as more human than animal.  
 Malone’s argument about third person pronouns, specifically how they exclude 
the referent from the conversation to define him or her in a particular way, explains how 
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the hunter employs personal pronouns (71-2). Rather than calling the bear or lynx only by 
their perceived sex, the hunter calls the bear a “boy”: “I’ve a boy for us” (Jarrell 62). 
Likewise, he calls the lynx “another boy” upon initiating him into family (Jarrell 103). 
While the hunter could be acknowledging the animals’ sex, the context of his bad dream 
informs us that he means boy as in human child. Generally, the meaning behind third-
person pronouns may be determined based on their interactional context (Malone 46). 
Malone calls this context the "indexical or situated nature of pronouns," meaning that 
pronoun references depend on their "situational relevancies" or "the demands of a 
situation which they index" (47). Understanding the context of the hunter’s statements 
clarifies the bear’s and lynx’s rights, or lack thereof, as animals to highlight how the 
hunter anthropomorphizes them by claiming each as “he” or “him.”29 
 The mermaid figures less significantly than the hunter when domesticating the 
bear. Upon first meeting him, the mermaid acts more as the bear’s peer—like another 
animal interacting with him in nature—as she overrides table manners to throw her new 
child meat while sitting at the table. The mermaid anthropomorphizes the bear by using 
the personal pronoun “he,” but she does so differently than the hunter. When the bear 
angers bees while stealing honey, she says, “Let’s teach him to run for the beach instead 
of his bearskin. We can tell him, ‘You’re a big bear now’” (Jarrell 92). Just as the hunter 
tells the mermaid he has a boy for them, the mermaid references the bear as a “big bear.” 
Contrasting with the hunter, however, the mermaid acknowledges that the bear is like a 
																																																								
29 For an extensive study on Jarrell’s anthropomorphism in his poetry, prose, and children’s books, see Levi 
Michael Manglitz’s Refiguring the Human and the Animal: Anthropomorphism & Zoomorphism in 
Twentieth Century American Poetry. 
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child but still a bear, as she uses “big bear” rather than “big boy.”  
 As she continues her transition from animal-humanity to humanity, the mermaid 
plays a larger role in domesticating the lynx. Soon after the hunter elaborates how he 
stole the lynx, the mermaid uses “him” to reference her second son: “But how long will it 
take to tame him?” (Jarrell 105).30 This question proves how much the hunter has 
domesticated the mermaid, but more importantly, that domestication for the mermaid is 
Othering. Viewing the lynx as “him,” when animals are often viewed as “its” and when 
the mermaid first saw him as an “it,” elevates the lynx to a more human status. But as I 
will demonstrate below, taming an animal oftentimes erases his or her animality, and the 
mermaid likely thought of their domestication of the bear when asking this question. 
However, once she sees that the hunter has already domesticated the lynx, the mermaid 
continues to reference him by personal pronouns. Following her husband, she even 
anthropomorphizes the lynx by comparing his nobleness to “the king…in the story,” one 
of the nursery rhymes the hunter teaches her (Jarrell 124).  
 Such personifying language and anthropomorphism allow the bear and lynx 
entrance into the family, but emphasize only the animal characteristics the hunter and 
mermaid accept. The hunter deprecates the bear’s animality as he states, “You certainly 
don’t have to think of anything for him to do after dinner,” suggesting that, because the 
bear sleeps all the time, he possesses a lower intellectual capacity (Jarrell 77, original 
																																																								
30 Despite knowing the lynx’s sex from the hunter’s earlier dialogue, the mermaid first calls him “it” by 
asking the hunter “No, what’s it really?” and “How on earth did you get it?” (Jarrell 104, emphasis added). 
Interestingly, the mermaid applies “her” to the lynx’s mother, yet continues to reference the lynx as “it” 
when she asks “But how did you get it without her knowing?” (Jarrell 104, emphasis added). In this 
instance, the mermaid allows the lynx’s mother cognizance and identifies with her more than her son 
perhaps because, after mothering the bear, the mermaid can imagine the lynx’s mother’s loss. 
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emphasis). In this statement, the hunter insinuates that his son lacks intelligence, at least 
compared to human standards determined through action or productivity rather than 
inaction or unproductivity. He also criticizes the bear’s bathing routine, claiming it makes 
him look worse because his “fur stick[s] out every which way” (Jarrell 76). Again, the 
hunter measures the bear’s hygiene based on human principles, believing that his bathing 
routine makes him look messy, like an “animal.” Despite previously valuing the land’s 
difference from the sea, the mermaid begins perceiving reality through the hunter’s 
speciesist anthropocentric lens and mocks the bear because of his animal identity or 
Otherness. She criticizes the bear for being an “inexperienced washer,” implying that he 
cannot master his animality (Jarrell 76). Just like the hunter, the mermaid compares her 
child’s appearance to a human’s to suggest he should look more presentable or more 
“civilized.”  
 To put her jeering into perspective, the mermaid also calls the bear a “walrus” to 
insult him for snoring (Jarrell 77). In this instance, the mermaid displays speciesism, and 
in turn devalues the bear’s animality, by implying that being an animal is an insult, 
interestingly enough for an action that both humans and animals do involuntarily. The 
couple clearly distinguishes themselves from the bear by elevating humanity and animal-
humanity over animality. They consider themselves more intelligent, cleaner, 
experienced, refined, and overall more civilized because they do not bathe with their 
tongues and partake in a more “productive” (i.e., intellectually planned) lifestyle. As 
such, the hunter’s and mermaid’s anthropomorphism of the bear Others him, just as third-
person pronouns create an us-versus-them dichotomy by defining a referent in opposition 
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to the speaker (Malone 73). Because the bear acts like a bear, the mermaid comments 
“We are two” to the hunter, excluding him from the family because of his animality.  
 Though these domesticators allow the bear to be himself when outside, they 
collectively train him against his natural tendencies. The bear is only allowed to act 
civilized while in the house. He bathes while sitting in a chair, and he eats at the table 
with the hunter and mermaid, at first in a chair but then on the floor because he outgrows 
his seat. As the hunter tames his son by telling him “No! no!,” he continues 
domesticating the mermaid by reminding her of civil behavior, which results in the 
mermaid reinforcing the hunter’s domestication. When in the house, the bear refrains 
from shaking himself dry because both the hunter and mermaid train the behavior out of 
him by commanding “No, no! No, no!” Essentially, the bear only sleeps and eats in the 
house in part because he enjoys being lazy, but also because his supposed parents forbid 
nearly everything besides playing with a domestic object, the leather ball. He must 
suppress his animality, or become a humanlike child, to enter the family. These 
contrasting identities work together to erase the bear’s nature and, at the same time, 
emphasize his presence in the family as a son, which helps establish the couple’s 
reinvented paradise.  
 The hunter’s and mermaid’s anthropomorphism of the lynx also includes him as a 
family member. Whereas the bear remained a “boy,” the lynx becomes “a baby lynx,” a 
more revered son (Jarrell 104). The couple particularly admires the lynx’s ability to walk 
on snow and jump heights, his intelligence when playing with the leather ball, and 
especially his active involvement in the family where he brings home meat. Because the 
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lynx’s adoptive parents believe he possesses more agreeable qualities, they allow him 
more animality than the bear. They even ennoble the lynx over his brother because “the 
bear was fond of the hunter and the mermaid, but the lynx adored them,” indicating that 
the siblings’ perception of their domesticators determines their worth (Jarrell 119). Still, 
this animal companion is not considered the hunter’s and mermaid’s equal. When he 
shreds the handkerchief that belonged to the hunter’s mother, this “fatherly” figure 
infantilizes the lynx by saying he cannot be blamed because “he doesn’t know any 
better,” which suggests his amorality (Jarrell 114). Essentially, the couple understands the 
lynx as “only” an animal and, at most, a child with no true moral sense.  
 Though the hunter and mermaid glorify the lynx, they permit only parts of his 
animality and they domesticate and Other the rest of him, just as they do with the bear. 
The hunter tames his second son before introducing him to his wife, and though Jarrell 
does not show the hunter’s methods, he describes how they resulted in the lynx letting his 
adoptive father pet him. Even so, we see both adult figures train the lynx. At first, they 
praise him for being intelligent enough to catch rabbits, but after he brings three home at 
once, it unsettles the mermaid. The hunter urges her to “Tell him no, no!” and, the next 
day, the couple tells the lynx “It’s your rabbit” (Jarrell 115-6, original emphasis). When 
the lynx acts like a lynx, by bringing home rabbits, squirrels, and even a fox, he is too 
wild, yet when he brings partridge, his domesticators accept the “gift” because they 
consume fowl. The lynx’s kills, with the exception of the partridge, must be hidden both 
in and outside of the home, since his hunts do not exhibit domesticated behavior. The 
lynx hunts not merely for food but also to express friendship, which his human and 
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animal-human counterparts consider as uncivil. Both the hunter and mermaid legitimize 
and even value the lynx’s animality to a certain extent, but only when it benefits them by 
providing companionship or meals.  
 As well as demanding the lynx to act more domesticated when outside, the hunter 
trains him to be gentler, a trait yet again determined by human notions. When the lynx 
mock-bites the hunter, the latter shouts “Ouch!” and “Easy! easy!” so his son never bites 
too hard (Jarrell 120). The hunter also disciplines the lynx during the boxing game they 
play together in which “each would try to touch the other without the other’s touching 
him” where they “hit, dodged, blocked, hesitated” (Jarrell 126-7). The lynx usually 
retracts his claws but “occasionally he [gets] too excited to remember” and cuts the 
hunter’s shirts, to which the hunter says, “Velvet paws! velvet paws!” (Jarrell 127). Here, 
the hunter’s command functions similar to the phrase used to domesticate the bear, but 
while “No, no!” prohibits the bear’s “messiness,” this command softens the lynx’s 
predatory nature. As “Velvet paws! Velvet paws!” further tames the lynx, ridding him of 
his defenses against the hunter and other predators, it ensures that he does not harm his 
putative parents. This protection, as it allows the family’s coexistence, helps actualize 
what the domesticators understand as paradise—at least until the animals bring home the 
human boy. 
 
Retaining Identity: The Bear and Lynx Animalize the Home and “Create” A Boy 
	
 Unlike the animals in Charlotte’s Web, the bear speaks vocally but mostly 
corporeally to respond to his domesticators. The first time we see the bear, he makes his 
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feelings obvious with his body language. After the hunter takes him from a tree, “he 
snapped and wriggled the whole way,” showing that he does not trust the man and does 
not want to leave with him (Jarrell 66). The only times we hear the bear speak, he growls 
at the hunter and mermaid from a corner in the house. While sleeping, the bear 
sometimes cries and pushes his face into the bearskin he sleeps on. Tellingly, his only 
comfort is in the skin of a bear killed by the hunter; the bear, likely traumatized from 
witnessing his mother’s death and being placed into a new, unnatural environment with 
strangers, clings to the bearskin.  
 As the hunter and mermaid domesticate the bear, he resists and retains his 
animality, acting like a bear rather than a human child. When the parents begin training 
him to drink his water at the table out of a bowl, the bear knocks the bowl off. Though he 
intentionally sabotages his place at the table, the hunter and mermaid understand the 
incident as the bear’s bad table manners and respond by placing his water bowl on the 
floor but still keeping his place at the table, with a bowl and chair, on which he begins to 
eat (Jarrell 74). When the couple plays with the bear, he engages partly because he is 
bored inside the home but also because he enjoys the attention. While playing, the bear 
catches the leather ball “in his mouth or bat[s] at it with his paws” to simulate his hunting 
skills restrained by domestication and to express his preference for hunting and playing in 
nature (Jarrell 72). He begins fishing for his domesticators but uses this opportunity to 
communicate with them that he prefers his animality over their civilization, namely their 
dinner routines. While fishing, the bear demonstrates his enthusiasm and prioritizes 
feeding himself with his natural hunting ability over being fed: “his muzzle would dart 
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out and his teeth ring shut on them with magical swiftness and certainty, so that you 
never would have believed how badly he ate out of his bowl” (Jarrell 75). Whereas eating 
from a bowl and even playing with a leather ball is unnatural for the bear, he “plays” and 
eats with his entire body when outdoors.   
 What makes the bear’s resistance so remarkable is that he learns human actions, 
ones we never see the hunter or mermaid teach him, to train them. The bear 
communicates naturally by scratching at the front door to train the hunter when he wants 
to come inside. Most significant, however, is how neither supposed parent teaches the 
bear to walk on two feet, yet he does so gracefully: 
 
He sat up and begged very beautifully, and he would walk on two legs almost as 
well as on four; when he would walk across the room on his hind legs, reach for 
something on the table, and then cram it into his mouth, he looked like a little boy 
in a bearskin (Jarrell 73).  
 
 
The bear begs and walks on his hind legs only to manipulate the hunter’s and mermaid’s 
desire to his benefit. When he stands and walks like a human, he knows the couple will 
give him food because they want a human boy, so he temporarily adopts human behavior 
to get what he wants. Though the bear enjoys fishing, he also enjoys being fed because he 
eats everything, both that which they provide him and that found in the meadow, forest, 
and beach. When the hunter and mermaid give the bear food, it allows him more leisure 
to sleep and be lazy, which he enjoys, though not at the expense of suppressing his 
natural fishing tendencies and losing the opportunity to fish. By participating in his 
domestication, the bear proves his intelligence as a bear, establishes agency as a member 
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of the animal family, and in turn defies his domesticators’ human-oriented invented 
paradise. The bear repeatedly clarifies that, though he acts as a child while in their home, 
he is a bear and refuses to abandon all of his animal qualities. 
 Similar to the bear, the lynx speaks both vocally and corporeally in response to 
his domestication. The first time we see the lynx, he expresses his feelings clearly by 
hissing at the mermaid when their eyes meet. He fears the mermaid because he has yet to 
be domesticated, but this situation soon changes because she begins taming him. 
Compared to the bear, however, the lynx seems to adjust to his housetraining more easily 
or perhaps resists it less because of his personality. Of all of his biological siblings, the 
lynx travels the farthest from the cave, even when his mother insists that he stay. He is 
naturally inclined to adventure, and perhaps he sees his time with the hunter and mermaid 
as a chance for exploration away from his biological mother’s worries, which makes him 
more pliant to these figures’ domestication. As a result, the lynx becomes a more active 
member of the hybrid family. He allows the hunter to pet and scratch his chin, and he 
even purrs and kneads his paws in response, while he also lets the mermaid hand feed 
him and plays with her each time she throws the leather ball. The lynx ultimately returns 
his adoptive parents’ affection by giving them “affectionate mock-bites” (Jarrell 120), 
rubbing against them, following them around the house, and bringing them back “gifts” 
from his hunts such as partridge, rabbits, squirrels, and a fox. 
 Notwithstanding his domestication, the lynx retains some animal characteristics, 
particularly his predatory nature. When playing with the leather ball, he imitates his 
hunting skills:  
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He gave the ball two immense, instantaneous bites, batted it from one paw to the 
other, flung it into the air, and then began to chase it around the room…the ball 
came to life and the lynx was after it. When the ball stopped he would hide behind 
some inch-high fold in a deerskin and then with agonizing slowness…would work 
his invisible way up to the ball (Jarrell 108-9).  
 
 
Instinctively curious, the lynx wants to determine what kind of creature the ball is, so he 
stalks it as if it were an animal he must chase. He jumps “in mid-air,” going in for the kill 
with “two immense, instantaneous bites” to catch the ball as if it were his prey (Jarrell 
108). When the ball ceases moving, the lynx hides to protect himself and to make sure the 
toy “died.”  
 Likewise, the lynx demonstrates his animality when eating partridge. In contrast 
to his delicate table manners, where he eats and drinks from dishes while sitting in the 
bear’s old chair at the table, the lynx eats partridge in a less civilized manner:  
 
he loved [partridge] so much that he would dab at his piece with his paw, work it 
out of his dish onto the table, and then with a rapt stare rub his head against it—
once he got so exited that he flung it into the air, batted it to the floor, and then 
chased it around the room as if it were his ball (Jarrell 112-3). 
 
 
When eating the “gift” he brings back for the family, the lynx consumes as he would 
naturally—like a predator. When he dabs, flings, bats, and chases the partridge, the lynx 
hunts and kills the deer a second time while at dinner. Ironically, the lynx only eats 
partridge in this manner because he is the one who hunted the deer and this knowledge 
brings out his animality, giving him a chance to break from his domestication if only 
temporarily. The lynx plays an active role in the family as a lynx, especially when sitting 
at the table, significantly countering his image as a human boy. In fact, his behavior 
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deconstructs the table, defining it not merely as a symbol of civilization but also an icon 
of his animality. Subsequently, the lynx works to unhinge the table’s and, by extension, 
the hunter’s and mermaid’s domesticity. 
 Like the bear, the lynx also trains the hunter and mermaid. First, he bathes the 
hunter’s hair and improves his appearance so much so that the mermaid “barely 
recognizes [him]” (Jarrell 121). Though the lynx’s grooming could signify his affection 
toward the hunter, he never washes the bear, with whom he develops a stronger sense of 
community, because his brother never domesticates him, unlike the hunter. Upon bathing 
the hunter, the lynx “lie[s] beside [his so-called parents], one paw outstretched, like a lion 
on a monument” (Jarrell 122). The lynx’s demeanor reveals his elation resulting from 
altering the hunter’s appearance and marking him with his scent. The lynx thus 
domesticates this father figure according to his, instead of the hunter’s, standards. 
Additionally, he trains the hunter and mermaid to wake up when he wants, likely so they 
will give him attention. When the couple oversleeps, or “when they [don’t] wake up as 
early as the lynx,” he awakens them (Jarrell 125). The lynx patiently waits as long as he 
can and then “very gently and carefully, his claws sheathed, [tries] to open the hunter’s 
eyes,” which prompts the hunter’s murmurs for the lynx to stop that concurrently wake 
the mermaid (Jarrell 125). Rather than simply fulfilling his adoptive parents’ demands, 
the lynx prioritizes his needs and commands the hunter and mermaid by deciding when 
and how they begin their day—with him. As he regulates their morning routine, the lynx 
ensures his agency and requires that the hunter and mermaid see, quite literally, his 
intervention. By retaining his animality to undomesticate the table and refusing to allow 
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couple’s domestication to remain one-sided, the lynx clarifies that he will not completely 
censor his “lynxish notions” and overall identity as an animal (Jarrell 118). In doing so, 
the lynx, like the bear, also reworks the hunter’s and mermaid’s anthropocentric idea of 
paradise. 
 From how the bear and lynx resist their domestication by preserving their 
animality and training the hunter and mermaid, we know they are fully aware of their 
Othering and intend on reversing the parents’ imagined Edenic vision to their benefit. To 
do so, they claim agency by partaking in the family’s construction and thus in their 
reality. The lynx, similar to Charlotte, is the mastermind behind his and the bear’s 
creation. After the lynx finds a boy washed on shore by the river, his mother dead in the 
pair’s canoe, he instinctually knows that the boy needs a mother and father to survive. 
The lynx also knows, based the hunter’s and mermaid’s behavior toward him and the 
bear, that they truly desire a human boy, not a humanized male animal. If he brings home 
a human boy, then it will divert the hunter’s and mermaid’s attention away from him and 
the bear. The lynx observed that, after he arrived, the hunter and mermaid ignored the 
bear and stinted his housetraining because they were so preoccupied with the lynx’s more 
advanced intellect, or simply his more active participation in the family. In fact, the 
couple gave the lynx the bear’s chair at the table. Recalling this behavior, the lynx makes 
the most of the boy’s situation and uses it to deter the hunter and mermaid from further 
domesticating him and, by association, the bear. Because interacting with a human boy 
will ease their adoptive parents’ loneliness, they will no longer need to humanize the 
animals, which will allow the lynx and bear the space to be animals. As such, these 
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siblings work together to complete the family by finding the boy and bringing him home.   
 Upon discovering the boy, the lynx comes home to enlist the bear’s help. 
Although it takes the bear two tries to understand the lynx’s gestures, he finally follows 
him because “the lynx’s trips almost always ended in something good to eat” (Jarrell 
135).31 The bear only follows his brother for food, but he, too, plays an equally pivotal 
role in the boy’s arrival. Both the lynx and bear use human behavior, learned from their 
domestication, to construct their image when interacting with the boy, similar to how 
Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton manipulate human tools (i.e., spoken, written, and 
performed human language) to rename Wilbur. Perhaps because his mother has already 
taught him the difference between domesticated and wild animals (after all, the boy 
knows the word “kitty”), the boy feels uneasy toward the bear when he walks on all four 
legs, but he trusts both animal siblings when they look more human, such as when the 
bear and lynx stand on their hind legs to look into the boat and determine whether his 
mother is dead (Jarrell 136).  
 Eventually, the boy trusts the lynx after he rubs his face against the boy’s and the 
bear after he walks on his hind legs, which makes him look “too good-natured for the boy 
to keep on being afraid of him” (Jarrell 136). Perceiving the animals’ human qualities, the 
boy begins trusting the lynx and bear, permitting them to bring him to their home. As a 
																																																								
31 From the beginning, the bear and lynx form a community, a commonality due to their animality, and in 
turn understand one another. When the lynx first meets the bear, he clings to and identifies with him as if 
he were his mother: “He had started out with one big furry thing, his mother, and the bear was bigger and 
furrier” (Jarrell 111). Whereas the hunter and mermaid fail to understand and value the lynx’s “gifts,” the 
bear understands the lynx, and vice versa, because his discoveries were “notions of what would interest a 
bear” (Jarrell 118-9). It is this very relationship that enables the lynx and bear to work together and 
complete the family. 
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result of the lynx’s hunting skills, the bear’s ability to walk on two legs, and their mutual 
understanding, the lynx finds the boy and the bear safely carries him home as he follows 
the lynx back to the house. Without the bear, the lynx likely would not have been able to 
safely transport the boy because human skin does not stretch like the back of a lynx cub’s 
neck. The lynx had not learned to walk on his hind legs, or he had chosen not to do so, 
and therefore needed the bear’s talent.32 
 Though one may interpret the lynx’s discovery of the boy as merely reprising his 
domestication, it differs greatly from his other “gifts.” Whereas these gifts include dead 
animals from his hunts, the lynx offers what the hunter and mermaid consider his best 
present because the boy is human. The lynx asks for the bear’s assistance because he 
needs the boy alive to redirect their domesticators’ attention. As his own paternal 
behavior demonstrates, the lynx cares more for the boy than the bear. As opposed to the 
bear, who initially makes it clear he has no interest in the boy by keeping his distance, the 
lynx comforts the human. When the boy begins crying, the lynx rubs his head against the 
orphan to ease his anxiety, and he continues to comfort the boy once home by purring. 
That said, the lynx exhibits more concern for the boy than the bear, likely because he, 
rather than his sibling, brings the boy home to achieve his goal.  
 Whereas we never see the lynx’s behavior upon delivering his other “gifts,” the 
narrator details the lynx’s behavior with the boy to emphasize its importance. The lynx 
																																																								
32 In Jarrell’s 1962 essay, “The Woman at the Washington Zoo,” he provides insight into his drafting 
process for “Jerome.” The author states that, while at the Washington zoo, he fed the lynxes who responded 
by standing on their hind legs (A Sad Heart 165-6). Because the bear, rather than the lynx, masters this 
human behavior to train the hunter and mermaid, Jarrell may have included him for more than humorous 
reasons—to allow his species, alongside the lynx’s, to prove their intelligence and enjoy a more elevated, 
humanlike familial position. 
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anxiously awaits the hunter’s and mermaid’s reaction. Like a cat with “a little mewing 
whine,” he paces from the forest to house (Jarrell 40). When the couple finally returns 
home, the lynx excitedly leads them to the boy by rubbing against the hunter’s legs, 
running back and forth from the boy to the hunter, and purring more loudly than ever. As 
the narrator comments, “The lynx trotted over and stood proudly at [the bear’s] side” to 
show the hunter and mermaid the boy (Jarrell 140, emphasis added). Here the lynx 
clearly demonstrates his pride, not simply in his great find but in his feat as a creator, the 
one who makes possible the animal family’s completion. Additionally, he demonstrates 
the bear’s role as co-creator. When showing the boy to their ostensible parents, the lynx 
stands beside the bear, rather than in front of him, thus suggesting that they jointly 
brought their new sibling home and should both receive credit. Though the narrator gives 
little insight into the lynx’s mind, this action suggests that he involved his brother, with 
whom he identifies most due to their animality, because he intended to stop both his and 
the bear’s domestication.  
 Once the hunter sees the boy, the wild siblings accomplish their plan, changing 
their family roles by actualizing their domesticators’ idea of paradise. The hunter 
“reach[s] down and touch[s] the boy the way you touch something in a dream to make 
sure it is real” and soon begins domesticating the boy’s appearance by grooming the 
boy’s hair to smooth it (Jarrell 141-2). Upon seeing his adoptive father’s reaction, the 
lynx “stop[s] being proud of his find and [leaves] for the forest,” showing that he 
considers his plan complete and may now leave for lynxish adventures in the forest rather 
than in the house (Jarrell 145). The bear, less invested in his brother’s plan, remains by 
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the fireplace, watching the mermaid and boy play as he and she used to, and 
“occasionally his paws would twitch, but he was a big bear now” (Jarrell 145). At times 
he wants to play with the leather ball, evidenced by his twitching paws, but he refrains 
because he outgrows his domestication, at least the aspect that trained him to consider 
inanimate objects as play. The bear’s resistance displays his acceptance of the boy, 
perhaps because he understands that the boy’s arrival allows him more freedom to be a 
bear. After all, the bear already understood why the hunter and mermaid humanized him 
and, to capitalize on their loneliness, learned to walk on his hind legs. With this 
realization in mind, the bear finally invests in the lynx’s mutually beneficial plan.  
 
The Lynx’s and Bear’s “Paradise”: A Coexistence Counternarrative 
 The Animal Family initially seems like a human story, since the main action 
surrounds the hunter creating his family, or ideal paradise, but the animals play a larger 
role. Like Charlotte, Wilbur, and Templeton, the lynx and bear offer a counternarrative 
similar to Merchant’s “new American Eden” stories (2). To produce their version of 
paradise, they also “master” their domesticators by learning that the couple humanizes 
them because they truly want a human boy, through whom the lynx and bear halt their 
own domestication. In establishing their own narratives, these brothers escape the 
hunter’s and mermaid’s objectifying relationship that mirrors Michael’s Human-as-
subject (I)/Nature-as-object (it) construction, in which human intervention often controls 
nature through science or other “technological fix[s]” but may also take “responsibility 
for” nature by claiming “stewardship” (138). The hunter’s and mermaid’s domestication 
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of their adopted children, in which they dominate the animals to rear them, reinforces the 
two interpretations of the Christian Genesis narrative: control and conservation of nature. 
In contrast, the lynx and bear construct a more equal animal-human relationship, 
emulating Michael’s Human-as-subject (I)/Nature-as-subject (Thou). When both 
humanity and nature act as subjects, both possess agency and understand one another “as 
cognizant, reflexive, [and] volitional” (Michael 139). Though under unequal 
circumstances because of communication barriers, humans and nature communicate with 
each other. Michael clarifies that this communication is an “exchange,” a back and forth 
action, which can even be non-linguistic (139). Though the animals in Charlotte’s Web 
speak to humans through the written and corporeal (or performed) word, similarly aiming 
to construct more equal relationships between humanity and nature, the bear and lynx talk 
corporeally, with the exception of the lynx’s meows and both animals’ initial hisses. 
When they retain their animality and train the hunter and mermaid for food or attention, 
both siblings communicate with their ostensible parents and respond to their 
domestication. But because the couple continues training them while erasing their 
animality, the lynx and bear bring back the boy to prevent from being further 
domesticated.  
 By bringing home the boy, the lynx and bear create Michael’s Human-as-object 
(me)/Nature-as-subject (Thou) configuration, which reverses the dominant Human-as-
subject (I)/Nature-as-object (it) by giving nature a divine power (139). Nature, as an 
agent, controls human destiny for a reason (Michael 139). The lynx and bear determine 
their domesticators’ destiny (correlating to their position as a man and woman expected 
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to raise a nuclear, or human, family in the 1960s) and future fulfillment by making a 
human boy part of the family, something neither the hunter nor the mermaid could do. 
The lynx and bear thus become godlike as they create, or complete, the family. In fact, 
the chapter entitled “The Lynx and the Bear Bring Home a Boy” begins much like the 
Genesis narrative. Although Jarrell’s narration does not distinguish the days of creation 
quite like Genesis, it mentions storms and water, alluding to the first few days of God’s 
creation of earth: “Once for a day and two nights it stormed, stormed terribly; on the 
morning of the second day the clouds and the wind and the rain were gone, and the 
washed sky was full of sunlight” (Jarrell 131). The narrator states that first storms 
brought water and then explains how the lynx brought the boy: “The lynx stood in the 
meadow and watched the hunter and the mermaid go away from him along the path that 
went up into the wood” (Jarrell 131). The narrative continues to the lynx’s discovery of 
the boy. In this biblical allusion, the lynx becomes an actor, or agent of change, just as 
the bear does because he aids his brother. As creators, the lynx and bear are more ethical 
than the hunter, and thus elevated above him, because they do not the steal the boy, as the 
hunter stole them, or manipulate the boy into coming home with them, as the hunter did 
to the mermaid. Rather, they save the boy whom the lynx knows cannot survive in the 
wild because of his vulnerable humanness and age; his survival instincts have been 
domesticated out of him by civilization.33  
 
																																																								
33 By having the bear and lynx acquire the boy morally instead of stealing him, as the hunter did to them, 
Jarrell elevates the animals’ morality over the hunter’s and therefore challenges his domination over them. 
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 Important to note, however, is that the bear and lynx choose to stay with the 
family. Because both animals could seriously harm or kill the hunter, mermaid, or boy, 
the fact that neither attempts to do so speaks volumes. The wild siblings are free to roam 
the meadow, forest, and beach. If they wanted to escape, they could. Since they both still 
hunt for themselves and the family, being domesticated does not prevent them from 
living in nature. Rather, the bear and lynx want to remain with the family because it 
provides them with benefits such as food and attention. They simply do not want to be 
domesticated as humans, hence losing their identity as animals. As such, the bear sleeps 
in the corner (presumably dark like a cave) and the lynx on the lion skin (for comfort as if 
from his species) to attain more natural environments and identities. Just as the animals 
from Charlotte’s Web wish to rework Wilbur’s image and Zuckerman’s paradise, the 
bear and especially the lynx hope to offer the hunter and mermaid an alternative, more 
inclusive paradise, where they can act as animals rather than as humanized animals. In 
short, the lynx and bear shape an Edenic reality that enables them to coexist with their 
adopted family. The couple stops domesticating their animal children as they focus on the 
boy who, because already human, offers easier interactions. The bear and lynx, then, 
become more like pets rather than sons; the bear often lies beside of the boy’s bed but 
sleeps in the corner, while the lynx sleeps at the end of the boy’s bed as he pets him.  
 Despite their status as creators and then completers, the boy’s presence in the 
family negatively affects the lynx and bear. Unlike Zuckerman and his neighbors who 
ultimately adopt the words and phrases in Charlotte’s web when discussing Wilbur, the 
hunter, mermaid, and boy do not embrace the wild siblings’ agency when retelling the 
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boy’s origin story. Instead of crediting his arrival to the lynx and bear, the boy uses their 
initiative to play a game, which depicts these brothers as false symbols, reducing the lynx 
to only the boy’s founder and the bear to only the animal on whom the boy slept after 
arriving to their home. The purpose of the boy’s game is to claim reality as fantasy. He 
pretends that his pets brought him home and that he came after them in the family 
because he and his adoptive parents would prefer to believe the opposite—that the boy 
came first and the lynx and bear after, where they played no real role in the family before 
or during his discovery. As the narrator explains, “because he knew it wasn’t so,” or 
because he wanted it to be fictional, “the boy enjoyed saying the lynx had found him” as 
if it were merely a story (Jarrell 158, emphasis added).	His game gives him a sense of 
belonging; it implies that the boy became part of the family because the hunter and 
mermaid sought out to create him instead of the lynx discovering him by chance. 
Regardless of the boy’s intentions, his game gives him more agency at the bear’s and 
lynx’s expense and, in doing so, gives him a higher familial position. The boy takes the 
place of creator, reinventing the dominant Human-as-subject (I)/Nature-as-object (it) 
reality based on a human-oriented paradise that rejects not only animality but also animal 
agency. 	
 The hunter and mermaid act as co-creators to fully attain their paradise, as they 
legitimize and further construct the boy’s lie each time they play his game. The mermaid 
states, “He’s [the boy] so different from our little ones. He’s better than they are—they 
are bad little things—and he’s a lot more interesting. He thinks of the queerest things” 
(Jarrell 160, emphasis added). Here, the mermaid objectifies the bear and lynx while 
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suggesting they lack sentience and intelligence because they are not human, which she 
believes prevents her from understanding their communication. The hunter also adopts 
this mindset as he increasingly neglects the animal brothers in favor of the boy. Together, 
by considering the bear and lynx as “things,” the boy and his adoptive parents objectify 
the animals, translating them from pets to fictional symbols. The game’s story and 
resulting mindset essentially writes the wild siblings out of the family. The only time the 
human members include the bear and lynx in their conversations is when they construct 
the boy’s position as first-born. Their game becomes reality so much so that “except for 
one or two confused, uneasy dreams, all the boy’s memories were memories of the 
mermaid and the hunter; he knew that the hunter was his father and the mermaid his 
mother and had always been” (Jarrell 156-7, original emphasis). In other words, the boy’s 
game distorts the line between fantasy and reality, illustrating how socially-constructed 
stories repeated verbally and mentally become truer with each telling, at least to each 
believer. 
 Because this game turns the lynx and bear into objects, they enjoy agency only 
briefly. However, the game simultaneously gives these siblings an opportunity to be 
animals. Because the hunter and mermaid ignore them, they no longer have to fulfill their 
role as human boys. But just like Wilbur, the bear and lynx never reach Paradise with a 
capital P because of how their other family members play God to recreate them as 
symbols. Ultimately, the brothers become accessories that the family’s other members 
use to rebuild their own Paradise, which marginalizes and objectifies the animals, giving 
the hunter, mermaid, and especially the boy full control over their representation. 
 
	 65 
Children’s Literature as Activism 
Why did White and Jarrell choose to write for children, and why did they 
anthropomorphize the animals’ communication or retain their animal voice? I explore 
these questions by first discussing each author’s philosophy on literary animal 
representations. Then I acknowledge the novels’ limitations, specifically arguing that 
neither White nor Jarrell completely denounce speciesism or anthropocentrism. Finally, I 
provide reasons why readers and scholars should resist romanticizing their novels, but 
suggest that we should ultimately avoid interpreting the animal characters as allegorical 
symbols because of what both authors say about animals and animal welfare. 
White and Jarrell chose children’s literature to advocate for animals because they 
valued a child’s worldview. Children, as White remarks, are “the most attentive, curious, 
eager, observant, sensitive, quick, and generally congenial [human beings]…on earth” 
(“Appendix D” 242). Because of children’s curiosity and sensitivity, they typically see 
animals as animals. They have yet to be conditioned into objectifying animals through 
language and behavior; they have yet to “grow up” and adopt speciesist views that 
require severing their connection to animals, as when Fern’s interest in boys causes her to 
lose the ability to hear Wilbur, and as when Jarrell’s boy begins hunting and constructing 
the bear and lynx as symbols. Though the two novelists primarily speak to children, 
White and Jarrell also hoped to reach adults. White saw his book’s message as applicable 
to adult readers especially because they often rejected animals’ “magic” or agency. In a 
letter to his agent for film rights, Jap Gude, White wrote that the Charlotte’s Web film 
should not change the novel’s message for adult viewers who “can’t accept the miracle of 
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the web” (White, “Appendix D” 225). In an August 1964 letter to Harry Ford, Jarrell 
reveals that he considered The Animal Family “half-for-children, half-for-grown-ups” 
(Randall Jarrell’s Letters 491). Both White and Jarrell used the influence of children’s 
literature, which touches readers of all ages, to argue for viewing reality through a young 
person’s perspective. To encourage children to preserve their connection to nature, and 
encourage adults to reclaim their childhood (not childlike) connection to nature by 
regaining a youthful perception, both White and Jarrell validate animality to elicit 
sympathy for animals. 
To accomplish his activist goal, White grants Wilbur certain rights as a pig 
because of his anthropomorphized language that makes him too humanlike to consume. 
Literary animal representation commonly uses anthropomorphism, and while this practice 
can accomplish speciesist or anthropocentric motives, John Simons shows that it does not 
always aid negative purposes (116). Readers may access nonhuman experience through 
anthropomorphism because it connects humans and animals through shared emotional 
experiences (Simons 116-17). Thus, if a writer uses anthropomorphism to highlight an 
animal’s emotional capacity, which often creates sympathy for animals and even 
legitimizes feeling for them, then Simons finds it appropriate (117). So long as the 
representation benefits readers’ relationships with animals and improves animals’ 
treatment, it is acceptable (Simons 117-8). To give readers such a lens, White 
anthropomorphizes Wilbur’s and the other animals’ language. Taken from White’s notes, 
some of the words the author sketches for Charlotte’s web include “man of distinction 
(pig of distinction)” (The Annotated 193). These notes illuminate White’s plan, showing 
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he did not intend to demean animals by giving them human language but rather sought to 
make humans and animals more equal. To highlight Wilbur’s uniqueness, White 
translates his and the other animals’ voices, offering a bridge for humanity to better 
understand and value their nonhuman counterparts, especially pigs, for more than their 
bodies. As a translating practice that bridges humans and animals, anthropomorphism 
evidences that we share common desires with animals. Since we value animals based on 
how human they seem, when readers see Wilbur’s desire to live and his animal 
community’s willingness to help, they grasp how animals are like us.  
White, however, only anthropomorphizes the animals’ voices. In his letters, he 
reveals that he extensively avoided over-anthropomorphizing the characters to maintain 
their animality. He discloses how much he despised Disney’s anthropomorphism because 
it makes animals “dance to [the company’s] tune” (White, “Appendix A” 223). He 
“preferred to dance to their [animals’] tune and came up with Charlotte and Wilbur” to 
avoid misconstruing animals (White, “Appendix A” 223). White thus ensured that Garth 
Williams’s illustrations did not anthropomorphize the animals, especially Charlotte, the 
story’s mastermind. Because the illustrator first depicted Charlotte with a woman’s face, 
White made him redraw her based on a natural history book (White, “Appendix A” 199). 
Williams eventually portrayed Charlotte as a spider, but a charming spider, and he did the 
same with Wilbur and the other animals to accentuate qualities that readers would 
perceive more positively (White, “Appendix A” 199). White’s strictness created more 
realistic animals to craft more empathy that readers could then transfer to actual animals. 
The author ultimately avoids anthropomorphizing animals beyond their speech because, 
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as he states in a letter to his editor Ursula Nordstrom, Williams’s initial human renderings 
of the animals were “horrible and would have wrecked the book” by de-animalizing his 
characters (White, “Appendix D” 221). He did not want Wilbur or the other animals to be 
visually seen as humans because that would drastically change the story’s message and 
thus diminish his activism; if the characters’ animality completely vanished, we would 
justifiably read the novel anthropocentrically and allegorically, even more than scholars 
currently do.34 Despite his “sanctuary” existing in literature, White hoped his novel’s 
perception and treatment of animals could be actualized in America. 
Contrasting with White’s animal representation, Jarrell depicts the bear and lynx 
more realistically. Jarrell clearly knew the effect of anthropomorphized animals who 
appeared in stories. Richard Flynn describes how Randall grew up reading 
anthropomorphized animal tales (Randall Jarrell 2). At twenty months old, he even 
recited in broken sentences “The Three Little Pigs,” “Three Little Bears,” “Red Riding 
Hood,” “Jack & The Beanstalk,” and “The Green Pear” (Flynn, Randall Jarrell 2). Even 
in The Gingerbread Rabbit, which he published just a year before The Animal Family, 
Jarrell anthropomorphizes the story’s animals. He creates “happy yet improbable families 
that do not exist in the real world but have to be invented” in The Gingerbread Rabbit, as 
well as in Fly by Night and The Bat-Poet (Flynn, Randall Jarrell, 101-2). Jarrell’s earlier 
involvement with literary anthropomorphism shows that his realism in The Animal 
																																																								
34 White’s strictness went beyond his anthropomorphism, as evidenced by his response when offered a 
movie deal. He demanded the right to edit the script and protection against new material in the movie such 
as “songs, jokes, capers, [and] episodes” to avoid “[violating] the spirit and meaning of the story” (White, 
“Appendix D” 220). Any small change could easily alter Wilbur’s portrayal, reducing him to meat and 
completely dishonoring White’s message. 
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Family is even more deliberate. In an October 1964 letter to Michael Di Capua, Jarrell 
remarks that “[The] Animal Family is realistic [because] the lynx and the bear never say a 
word” (Randall Jarrell’s Letters 494, emphasis added). Here, he does not imply the bear 
and lynx are mute but rather juxtaposes this volume to his Bat-Poet’s and Fly by Night’s 
“talking-animal world” (Randall Jarrell’s Letters 494). In The Animal Family, Jarrell 
presents the animal characters as animals to include them realistically in a family that, 
though fictional, teaches readers how to treat actual animals—as beings with whom to 
coexist rather than objects to cage.  
The Animal Family is more complicated than Charlotte’s Web. To domesticate the 
bear and lynx, Jarrell anthropomorphizes them through the hunter’s and mermaid’s 
language, but the couple’s rhetoric also allows readers to feel sympathetic toward the 
animals as children or pets. Here, the author foregrounds stewardship (because the 
parental figures allow wild animals in their home) but also explores dominion (because 
these figures domesticate and attempt to erase their adoptive children’s animality). Yet 
through the boy’s origin story, Jarrell ultimately turns the bear and lynx into literary 
symbols. Using an animal for symbolic purposes is the most common type of literary 
animal representation (Simons 115). Such symbolization, and every kind of animal 
representation, remains speciesist because we cannot reproduce nonhuman experience as 
humans (Simons 87). We can only represent it through human comparisons because of 
communication barriers that prohibit us from truly knowing and understanding nonhuman 
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experience (Simons 86).35 To critique reality, Jarrell may have ended his novel with the 
animals reduced to symbols, therefore suggesting that no happy ending exists because the 
boy becomes a hunter who disvalues animals. But given that Jarrell longed for a family, 
he likely indicated that neither he nor the novel needed the bear and lynx after the boy’s 
arrival because they complete their role as agents who inversely “adopt” the hunter and 
mermaid after the couple has adopted them.  
In “On Preparing to Read Kipling,” Jarrell identifies being adopted by wild 
animals as a means for substituting biological parents. He writes, “when your father and 
mother leave you in the forest to die, the wolves that come to eat you are always Father 
Wolf and Mother Wolf, your real father and real mother, and you are—as not even the 
little wolves ever quite are—their real son” (A Sad Heart 137). Jarrell found solace 
knowing that, even if his parents abandoned him, wild animals could provide a family. In 
his novel, the lynx and bear care for the hunter (and Jarrell) like paternal figures by 
bringing home the boy, who eases their loneliness. Because the boy’s human presence 
fills the family’s supposed void, Jarrell no longer considers the wild siblings as major 
characters for the remainder of his novel. Jarrell offers them his idea of a safe haven, 
where they may act as animals, after they metaphorically adopt him and fix his loneliness 
while writing the book. But since how he finally represents the bear and lynx overwrites 
every previous portrayal that helped generate sympathy for them, including their agency, 
																																																								
35 Simons acknowledges the difference between writing about an animal and physically harming one, but 
he claims that any literary animal representation exploits animals for human purposes, even when the 
author’s motive is to better their treatment (87). 
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this representation may be the one readers remember most. Readers might then view the 
brothers as mere symbols. 
By allowing their animal characters agency, White and Jarrell ultimately compose 
protest literature. The writers assert their characters’ right to better treatment by 
excluding Wilbur from slaughter and integrating the bear and lynx into the human family 
structure. For their time, both novels were radical because of how they spoke to the 
animal welfare movement. As men advocating for animals, White and Jarrell even helped 
break gender boundaries. During the 1950s and 1960s, society considered women the 
animal welfare movement’s leaders and, in turn, saw their roles as maternal, with their 
passions perceived as emotional hysteria (Beers 156, 158). White and Jarrell, whose 
maleness lent credibility to animal activism, helped legitimize animal welfare as a 
concern not simply for emotional women but for all of humanity.  
Yet neither novel completely rejects speciesism or anthropocentrism because both 
authors create their own Edenic realities that romanticize alternative, seemingly more 
humane forms of dominion over animals. White modeled Zuckerman after himself and 
thus identified with him above anyone else, even Fern (Sims 93). Paralleling 
Zuckerman’s personality, White saves Wilbur by granting him the right to escape 
slaughter, but the pig becomes a tourist attraction, which perpetuates another form of 
speciesism.36 What makes Wilbur’s survival so dangerous is that White gives readers the 
																																																								
36 Not surprisingly, White models Zuckerman’s farm after his own by exhibiting Wilbur instead of 
slaughtering him. In “The Practical Farmer,” written in August 1940, White describes his farm as “not 
really a farm at all but merely a private zoo [because] sometimes months go by when nothing but repair 
goes on” (White, One Man’s Meat 218).  
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impression that he enjoys life on the farm as a spectacle. This portrayal maintains the 
“humane” myth by suggesting that animals enjoy their oppression so long as we treat 
them with no extreme physical violence. White also ignores other animals exploited by 
the farm, as he excludes the cows, chickens, and roosters from Wilbur’s community. 
Apart from Charlotte and Templeton, the only animals who help Wilbur, with the 
exception of the sheep, are conveniently ones not farmed for their meat or other corporeal 
products. White’s omission of these animals, paired with his actual farm that he never 
transformed into a sanctuary, suggests that he only wanted to save a literary pig, not a 
real one.37 In his August 1940 essay “The Practical Farmer,” White states that “the cow is 
the foundation on which the “[farm’s] structure is built” because this animal produces 
cream, milk, butter, cheese, and even helps produce eggs and pig meat since skim milk 
helps chickens lay eggs and pigs grow (White, One Man’s Meat 217). Because cows 
bring the most profit, White excludes them from his activism. As a farmer, he could not 
risk including anything that would completely dismantle the farm and his livelihood. 
Even more telling, however, is that White saw animals as amoral, which prevented him 
from giving his characters more rights (White, “Appendix D” 223). White only saves 
Wilbur from slaughter to redefine him as an exhibit, reinforcing a less obvious type of 
dominion that nonetheless objectifies him. As a result, Charlotte’s Web, despite being 
radical for its time, remains covertly speciesist. 
																																																								
37 After reading Charlotte’s Web several times, White’s ten-year-old granddaughter, Alice, petitioned him 
to save a pig on his farm. She drew the “SOME PIG” illustration and placed it on the pig’s pen to remind 
White of his own philosophy. But, according to Michael Sims, he did not save this pig (235). 
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Jarrell, too, preserves his ideal Edenic reality with his novel. In fact, Mary Jarrell 
states that The Animal Family is deliberately “Jarrell’s Paradise” (Introduction 17). The 
author identifies with the hunter and, like White, modeled this key character after 
himself. Jarrell had a beard, hunted, wore fur, and “identified with Orion, the hunter 
constellation” (Mary Jarrell, Introduction 15). All of the novel’s hunting relics, such as 
the animal skins, came directly from Mary and Randall’s home (Mary Jarrell, 
Introduction 14). Though Jarrell blurs the animal-human dichotomy by depicting the bear 
and lynx as children, and even resists speciesism by allowing them moral superiority for 
ethically discovering (and saving) the boy, the hunter acquires the animals at their 
expense. The hunter’s bad dream convinces him that he needs a child, specifically a boy, 
to become like him. But because no humans live nearby, and because he considers it 
unethical to steal a human child, he captures the bear and lynx. He kills the bear’s 
mother, leaving the rest of her cubs behind, and takes the lynx because he believes his 
humanness better qualifies him to be the animal’s caregiver. As the hunter mentions to 
the mermaid when elaborating how he found the lynx, “The mother has four more, and 
she’ll never miss him—I don’t think she can count up to five, anyway” (Jarrell 104).38 
Rather than critiquing the hunter’s anthropocentric, often speciesist worldview, Jarrell 
embraces it. The animals achieve agency, but they never visit their biological families as 
the mermaid visits the seapeople, which reprises the hunter and Jarrell’s mentality 
regarding the lynx’s mother. Since their biological families never search for them, Jarrell 
																																																								
38 Interestingly enough, the hunter steals the bravest, or “wildest,” lynx who ventured further from the cave 
and whose mother who wanted him to stay inside. The hunter chooses this lynx perhaps to more clearly see 
his results as a domesticator and therefore feel more powerful. 
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implies that neither the bear nor the lynx are missed and, as these brothers contentedly 
live in isolation from their families, that those families do not miss them either. These 
implications suggest that animals lack emotional bonds with their kinfolk and, equally 
dangerous, that the family construct is strictly human. 
Just as scripture granted companion animals only friendship, not citizenship or 
equality (Minnis 92), Jarrell’s rhetorical anthropomorphism grants the bear and lynx only 
limited rights. Similar to Wilbur and the other animals, these siblings never enjoy 
complete equality. Rather, they live among the discarded skins of animals, from bears, 
lynxes, seals, and also deer, previously killed by the hunter. Because Jarrell never 
criticizes the boy’s origin story, he reinforces the ethos that privileges dominion over 
animals and reflects his notion of humanity’s place in nature. In “The Woman in the 
Washington Zoo,” he states that man “as he was first, still must be…the animals’ natural 
lord” (A Sad Heart 172). Here, Jarrell reveals that, though he opposed caging animals, he 
nevertheless accepts the zoo’s domination and, as his novel exemplifies, domination over 
them in the home as well. Equally worrisome, because the hunter requires human 
companionship to ease his loneliness, Jarrell implies that only humans, not even 
humanized animals, can fill our loneliness. Like Charlotte’s Web, The Animal Family 
covertly disseminates anthropocentric thought. 
As I have shown, the authors’ activism is not either-or; they do not advocate for 
animals without also reinforcing other speciesist or anthropocentric narratives. 
Something, perhaps the society in which White and Jarrell lived, their cognitive 
dissonance regarding their own participation in speciesism and anthropocentrism, or a 
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combination, held them back from producing even more radical works. Because these 
attitudes perpetuate myths that create oppressive animal-human relationships, 
contemporary readers should avoid romanticizing Charlotte’s Web and The Animal 
Family. As Merchant details, literature shapes our identity, morals, and behavior (3). Like 
the Zuckermans, we believe what we see in print and, like the hunter, mermaid, and boy, 
we adopt the language we hear. When readers, especially children, lose themselves in a 
writer’s paradise, they often seek to recreate it in reality. Because of literature’s impact, it 
is of utmost importance that we avoid speciesism and anthropocentric thought in both 
stories and critical responses. Words structure our perception of reality, making us 
believe their constructed knowledge. As White and Jarrell have their human and animal 
characters’ communication determine reality, either by erasing animals or by representing 
them and their rights, both authors stress storytelling’s importance. 
 Equally important, we should also avoid reading texts like Charlotte’s Web and 
The Animal Family as allegories, which trivializes the animal characters, and instead 
appreciate at face value what they teach us: how we understand and mark animals with 
language. Despite White’s and Jarrell’s shortcomings, their novels present two strikingly 
different counternarratives to speciesist and anthropocentric discourse and therefore 
reward further study. We may use Charlotte’s Web and The Animal Family as tools to 
teach both children and adults how we represent animals and how to appreciate animal 
communication and animal agency. White’s and Jarrell’s representation of human 
language reveals words’ implications and consequences, while illustrating the 
contradictory strategies we use to construct Edenic realities. Both authors’ representation 
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of animal language shows us the power of voice—written, vocal, corporeal, and 
performed—that enable the animal characters to reconstruct or subvert human-made 
paradise by making their animality present and clarifying their value as animals. We may 
use this knowledge to avoid erasing them through objectification or anthropomorphism, 
following the animals’ path and using words that tell alternative narratives.39 
																																																								
39 For examples on how to rework the words we use when referencing animals, see Joan Dunayer’s “Style 
Guidelines: Countering Speciesism” and “Thesaurus: Alternatives to Speciesist Terms” in Animal Equality: 
Language and Liberation. 
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ELECTRONIC KAIROS: CREATING THE OPPORTUNE 
 
MOMENT IN CONTEMPORARYADVERTISING 
 
 
 Rhetoric has adapted classical oratory to twenty-first century communication 
technology. In ancient Rome and Athens, the elite delivered speeches in the polis 
(Kennedy, “Rhetoric and Culture” 56). Because rhetors spoke to their homogenous 
audience face-to-face, they analyzed members’ reactions and adjusted their 
argumentative approach when necessary. In contemporary society, however, mass media 
has redefined the stage and context of speech making. Often, argumentation occurs 
digitally, where rhetors lack the ability to see their now heterogeneous audience behind 
the screen and consequently cannot gauge viewers’ reactions in the moment. But rhetors 
acclimate to digital environments by manipulating multimodality and classical rhetorical 
concepts to seize kairos, the right or opportune moment in a speech. By examining recent 
fast food commercials, this essay studies how advertisers attempt to seize kairos 
electronically.40 To do so, they utilize primary and secondary appeals that blur boundaries 
																																																								
40 Who are the rhetors behind advertisements? As Sally Gill demonstrates in her essay “And Now a Word 
About Our Sponsors: Advertising and Ethos in the Age of the Global Village,” two conflicting entities exist 
in advertising: the rhetor and the suits (Gill’s terminology). The rhetor writes the ads, while the suits (i.e., 
clients and account executives) market them (Gill 202). Gill emphasizes that each strives toward different 
goals. Whereas rhetors aim to be artists, the suits aim to be scientists (202). Though she does not use this 
terminology, Gill suggests that it is the rhetors who ethically employ rhetoric and the suits who sometimes 
distort it to fulfill their agenda. But in her time working with advertisers, Gill found that they never intend 
on hypnotizing their audience; they merely go beyond attempting to persuade (the “sales purpose”) because 
viewers are now skeptical and bored by advertising (Gill 200).	
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between entertainment and persuasion, creating kairotic conditions and mentalities so 
viewers may seize advertisers’ intended opportune moment. 
Given the circumstances of digital environments, how do advertisers produce 
kairotic conditions to seize the opportune, or best, moment? I begin exploring this 
question in my first section entitled “Kairos: From Orality to Electricity,” which 
introduces Gorgias’s understanding of the concept, followed by my notion of how fast 
food advertisers utilize electronic kairos. For the remainder of the essay I examine 
commercials from Burger King, Chick-Fil-A, and McDonald’s, organizing each based on 
what it promotes—either a product (i.e., new, old, or returning) or brand.41 Each 
commercial’s analysis addresses the primary appeal (entertainment and narrative 
transportation) followed by its secondary appeal (a product’s or brand’s “proof” 
demonstrated through intersections of ethos, logos, and pathos). My last section, “From 
Gorgias to Behind the Screen and Beyond,” summarizes Poulakos’s interpretation of 
how, even in antiquity, this sophist composed kairotic conditions in written texts to 
accommodate not seeing his audience, a method contemporary advertisers also follow but 
further develop by manipulating multimodality. Lastly, I outline why advertisers’ appeals 
																																																								
41 When I refer to each commercial’s advertised animal products as “beef,” “chicken,” “burger,” “meat,” 
“product,” “item,” “it,” or any similar phrasing, I do not intend on legitimizing animals’ meat status and 
objectification. I merely hope to reveal how advertisers promote products made from animals’ bodies as 
opportune for viewers, a stance I indicate by using scare quotes around the first reference of each of these 
words. Though I drop the quotes for convenience, each successive reference retains the same meaning and 
should be read similarly. To better understand why I make this choice, see Carol J. Adams’s theory of the 
absent referent, found in The Sexual Politics of Meat, and Joan Dunayer’s “Style Guidelines: Countering 
Speciesism” and “Thesaurus: Alternatives to Speciesist Terms” in Animal Equality: Language and 
Liberation. 
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effectively persuade viewers by giving them an experience they seek to recreate by 
consuming products and supporting brands. 
In response to James L. Kinneavy’s essay, “Kairos: A Neglected Concept,” 
scholars have deepened our understanding of how classical rhetors maneuvered the 
opportune moment. A few scholars have even inquired how rhetors forecast or create 
kairos in written and digital composition. Hunter W. Stephenson’s Forecasting 
Opportunity: Kairos, Production, and Writing traces how rhetors predict kairotic 
conditions to invent opportune moments. Stephenson’s theory explains how journalists 
consider uncontrollable elements, such as domain-specific knowledge, previously 
published material, publication times, audiences, and current events, alongside 
controllable elements, such as their composition’s style, to evoke a sense of urgency or 
importance. In Exploiting Kairos in Electronic Literature: A Rhetorical Analysis, Cheri 
Crenshaw reviews how fiction authors exploit electronic mediums with hypertext and 
interactivity to make texts timely. More recently, Aaron Hess’s “Critical-Rhetorical 
Ethnography: Rethinking the Place and the Process of Rhetoric” defines contemporary 
kairos by combining Gorgias’s and Aristotle’s philosophies on the concept. Hess 
proposes that, by using youth culture to fit into environments, an advocacy group called 
DanceSafe produces kairos. Similarly, Thomas Erickson’s “Creating Kairos” argues how 
an online blog, PepysDiary, constructs the opportune moment by posting daily entries 
catered to its audience.  
While these works introduce us to how rhetors craft kairos variously, they neglect 
how the concept operates in advertising, a field that receives less rhetorical attention. 
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Marketing scholars emphasize time’s importance in ads, but none approach kairos 
rhetorically. Advertising, however, is one of the most frequently experienced forms of 
contemporary rhetoric and necessitates in-depth consideration. I thus offer another 
interpretation to illustrate that, although kairos originated as a tool for orality, it is also a 
tool for contemporary rhetors. To better appreciate electronic kairos, this essay examines 
how a commercial’s digital and multimodal platform contributes to the creation and 
seizing of the opportune moment. While rhetors in all mediums generally compose 
kairotic conditions based on audience and other timely contexts, advertising considers 
both with its entertainment, rhetorical proofs, and multimodality. Though other classical 
rhetoricians embraced kairos and the three rhetorical appeals, I rely on the Sophistic and 
Aristotelian philosophy because they more accurately comprise advertisers’ strategies. 
Hess uses a similar concept of kairos, one based upon culture and the same foundational 
rhetoricians when addressing DanceSafe’s advocacy, but I expand his theory by defining 
electronic kairos as a moment viewers seize after experiencing a commercial’s 
entertaining, emotional story. Rather than rhetors solely situating themselves with respect 
to their audience, as Hess argues, advertisers also place audiences into controlled 
environments formed by their narratives.  
Though various advertisements circulate daily, I foreground fast food 
commercials because they function differently from other ads. Commercials that promote 
medicine, cosmetics, hygiene products, clothing, restaurants, beer, and even other types 
of food, advertise more traditionally and thus rarely entertain. Rather, they exclusively 
use ethos, logos, and pathos, or what I term as fast food’s secondary appeal, and in turn 
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actualize less kairotic opportunities. Other aspects of advertising affect electronic kairos, 
such as the programs during which commercials air, the ads viewers see before and after 
each commercial, and of course other types of commercials, but I only examine how fast 
food rhetors create timeliness as an entrance into marketing’s tactics. With my discussion 
on commercials’ primary and secondary appeals, I seek to broaden our understanding of 
how entertainment functions as persuasion and how ethos, logos, and pathos intersect. 
When we realize how advertisers produce kairos, we better understand and appreciate 
how rhetors’ techniques have advanced with communication media. Ultimately, we gain 
the knowledge necessary to make more informed choices as consumers of both products 
and entertainment culture, often within the same realm. 
 
Kairos: From Orality to Electricity 
Ancient rhetoricians defined kairos as the right time, as opposed to chronos 
(linear time) and akairos (time without opportunity) (Sipiora 2). Kairos predominantly 
influenced rhetoric during the First Sophistic Movement with Gorgias (Sipiora 3), who 
believed speech must be timely to situations because its space is temporary (Poulakos, 
“Toward a Sophistic” 39).42 Ideas depend on contexts and lose effectiveness if rhetors 
neglect voicing them in the right, or opportune, moment. When spoken at the right time, 
rhetors convey their situation’s urgency and importance (Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic” 
																																																								
42 Pythagoras, another Sophistic rhetorician, also influenced classical kairos. For him, the concept served as 
an educational tool to advise the public how to live (Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical” 65). See Kinneavy’s 
“Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory” for more information on Pythagoras’s influence. 
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40). As John Poulakos demonstrates, timeliness cannot be taught, but it can be felt by 
considering the following factors when writing: 
 
the cultural norms in which he [or she] participates, his [or her] reading of the 
situation he [or she] wishes to address, his [or her] image of [the] audience, and 
his [or her] prediction of the potential effects of his [or her] words on his [or her] 
listeners (“Toward a Sophistic” 42). 
 
 
In other words, rhetors must anticipate their audience’s response to accommodate 
potential listeners’ needs (Sipiora 11). A speech also requires to prepon (a discussion’s 
appropriateness), another classical concept achieved by tailoring rhetorical strategies to 
an audience and occasion (Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic” 41). When rhetors adapt a 
speech to listeners, it engages them, increasing their likelihood of being persuaded 
(Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic” 41). Kairos closely relates to to prepon and, in fact, the 
two concepts cannot be separated because a speech’s suitability relies on rhetors’ seizing 
of the opportune moment. If rhetors give speeches relevant to their audience but in an 
untimely manner, the speech will fail, and vice versa (Poulakos, “Toward a Sophistic” 
42). As Poulakos states, “the right thing must be said at the right time; inversely, the right 
time becomes apparent precisely because the right thing has been spoken” (“Toward a 
Sophistic” 42). In short, kairos is the combination of appropriate rhetorical strategies 
ultimately at the opportune time.  
Stephen McKenna suggests that a speech’s right moment ceased with mass 
media’s expansion because the “defining situation of rhetoric is [now] an antisituation, 
‘the context of no context’” (104). Here, McKenna alludes to akairos and insinuates that 
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kairos no longer exists. However, fast food advertisers can, and often do, utilize the 
opportune moment with strategies that embody and extend classical notions such as 
Gorgias’s kairos and Aristotle’s rhetorical appeals. Essentially, kairos becomes a tool for 
both composition and delivery for contemporary rhetors.43 With advertisers’ primary and 
secondary appeals, both of which invoke various values and beliefs, they ultimately 
create multiple kairotic opportunities to reach new media’s vast audience members. As 
advertisers entertain viewers, they make a narrative timelier by creating the right mindset, 
while the intersection of ethos, logos, and pathos simultaneously makes a product more 
punctual by “proving” its value. Both appeals help actualize kairotic conditions and 
mentalities that allow viewers to then seize advertisers’ intended opportune moment—the 
combination of their narrative’s ESP (emotional selling proposition) and product display. 
Seizing kairos thus no longer relies on face-to-face response or even solely on rhetors. 
Instead, the audience plays a more active role; viewers seize advertisers’ intended 
opportune moment and bridge rhetor and audience separated by the screen. 
 
Entertainment as Persuasion 
Because commercials interrupt a show’s or film’s narrative transportation, 
viewers often perceive them unfavorably (Carpenter and Green 178). Accordingly, fast 
food advertisers strive for entertainment, a less obvious form of persuasion, to transport 
viewers and avoid disturbing their absorption in other programs. Rhetors consider their 
																																																								
43 Of course, not all fast food commercials incorporate both primary and secondary appeals, but enough do 
that it warrants an in-depth study to better understand how both appeals create kairotic conditions and seize 
the opportune moment.  
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audience, situation, and story (i.e., dramatic plot, relatable characters, and emotional 
components) because a story’s “timeliness and relevance to universal feelings or issues” 
enables narrative transportation (Carpenter and Green 171, 184, emphasis added). Here, 
Carpenter and Green emphasize that a narrative must be kairotic, or timely and 
appropriate, to transport an audience. Because advertisers cannot see their viewers to 
gauge their responses, creating kairotic conditions requires a few adjustments: first, they 
must, as Poulakos suggests, learn their anonymous audience by researching their interests 
(i.e., hobbies and habits), values (i.e., passions), and beliefs (i.e., cultural norms). 
Advertisers weave viewers’ investments into commercials, which provide entertainment 
based on consumers’ values, beliefs, and accompanying emotions, to appropriately join 
products and potential buyers. This primary appeal envelops viewers in a story’s 
imaginative universe through narrative transportation theory, which provides them the 
chance to leave reality and lose “awareness of the outside world” (Carpenter and Green 
170, 182-83). These components create kairos because, when entertained, viewers enter a 
kairotic, or more receptive, mentality that makes a narrative more appropriate to its 
designated audience.  
Entertainment media’s imagery, often demonstrated through multimodality, 
increases viewers’ involvement by giving them imaginative situations to enjoy on-screen 
(Carpenter and Green 172). But a narrative transports viewers only if they remain 
attentive, willingly suspend disbelief of the story’s reality, and respond emotionally 
(Carpenter and Green 172, 171). Equally important, a story, whether fiction or nonfiction, 
only immerses viewers so long as it “'rings true'” and viewers relate to it (Carpenter and 
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Green 179). Fast food advertisers therefore transport viewers by engaging viewer 
participation (i.e., making sense and meaning) while simultaneously appealing to their 
values and beliefs. Viewers accept the narrative’s reality, and their resulting emotions 
rouse them to imagine themselves using a particular product and identifying with its 
brand. According to Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification, individuals identify with 
others when they feel as if they belong to a community that shares principles, or 
"common sensations, concepts, images, idea[s], [and] attitudes" (20-21, 28). Rhetors 
must use their audience’s language to encourage such a connection: "You can persuade a 
man only insofar as you can talk his language by speech, gesture, tonality, order, image, 
attitude, idea, identifying your ways with his” (Burke 54, original emphasis). In other 
words, rhetors foster identification through commonalities exemplified either by 
appropriating their audience’s beliefs or by demonstrating an already existing bond 
resulting from their genuine adherence to such beliefs (Burke 56). To nurture viewers’ 
identification, fast food advertisers thus make their products more fitting by writing 
consumers’ values and beliefs, ones their brand often embraces, into commercials’ 
narratives. 
Because of narrative transportation’s emotional and cognitive involvement, it 
often alters viewers’ attitudes and beliefs through three means: "affective, cognitive, and 
imagery processes" (Carpenter and Green 169, 173). In affective responses, a story’s 
emotional events inspire attachments to characters, which makes viewers react more 
emotionally to the entire narrative and, subsequently, the product and brand (Carpenter 
and Green 173-4). Cognitive responses occur because narratives foreground the imagined 
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story, making viewers less likely to respond negatively with counterarguments (174). As 
Carpenter and Green explain, "Transportation is a pleasurable state, and transported 
individuals are typically not motivated to interrupt this experience” (174). A narrative’s 
mental imagery also alters behavior, as it invokes the audience’s viewpoints. Emotional 
imagery in particular makes viewers more resistant to counterpersuasion and it even helps 
them better recall a story’s themes and messages after their transportation (Carpenter and 
Green 175). Additionally, when repeatedly exposed to a narrative, its themes better 
persuade viewers and seem realer (Carpenter and Green 176). Narrative transportation 
ultimately gains its influence from how viewers react to a story’s events as if they were 
real, which in turn heightens their emotional response (Carpenter and Green 174). After 
being transported, viewers watching fast food commercials undergo any or all of these 
responses that change their opinion of the product and brand. Entertainment, then, 
becomes persuasion; narratives transport viewers into kairotic mentalities that prime them 
for the commercial’s ESP and product display.  
Since advertisers’ goal is to sell, they do not merely seek narrative transportation 
but escapism that promotes products. Fast food commercials, because of their 
entertaining elements, now operate much like product placements, which occur when 
advertisers integrate products into a film’s or tv show’s narrative to merge entertainment 
and persuasion. Product placements vary in subtlety, ranging from indirect appearances 
(i.e., a branded item on a table) to more direct presences (i.e., a discussion on a product) 
(Cowley 39). Because of their elusiveness, viewers often overlook product placements 
and their persuasive motive, giving these types of advertisements an advantage over more 
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traditional ones (Cowley 45). When viewers notice an ulterior motive, however, they 
become apathetic and passive, and they may even distrust and discredit the brand 
(Cowley 45). Thus, fast food commercials mimic product placements, functioning as 
abbreviated films or shows. Viewers experience a smoother transition between programs 
and these commercials because they also lose themselves in their cinematic narratives. 
Fast food stories imply a disassociation from their entertaining narrative and advertised 
products; viewers feel as if the narrative is separate from the advertisement until the ESP 
and product display at the end—once already hooked, entertained, and affected by its 
reality.44 Viewers know, simply by virtue of commercials airing during a program’s 
break, that they advertise products, but because their narratives transport viewers and 
seem like product placements, this marketing strategy makes viewers more receptive to a 
company’s message.  
As fast food commercials simulate product placements, they affect viewers 
through temporal co-occurrence.45 In this process, a narrative makes viewers feel good by 
“creat[ing] new, or reinforce[ing] old, brand associations” that positively transform their 
attitudes toward a product and its brand (Cowley 39). Temporal co-occurrence shapes 
viewers’ attitudes much like psychological conditioning, as viewers experience the 
“repeated pairing” of products and ensuing feelings (Cowley 40). The fast food 
																																																								
44 Some commercials, such as the one from McDonald’s that I review shortly, integrate products into their 
narratives, but because they entertain, viewers likely overlook the integration, making these commercials 
function like product placements. 
45 Other theories, such as the exposure effect and evaluative conditioning, explain product placements’ 
influence. The exposure effect impacts viewers by simply exposing them to the item, logo, or brand, while 
evaluative conditioning works by discretely including the product in the narrative (Cowley 39). However, 
temporal co-occurrence most accurately clarifies how fast food commercials modify viewers’ perceptions. 
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commercials discussed below, which resemble product placements, demonstrate this 
process. While viewers become more cognizant of the advertisement after hearing the 
ESP and seeing the product display, they transfer their still-fresh emotions (resulting 
from their transportation) to the product and brand. Viewers often “finish” a commercial 
by “imagin[ing] themselves using the product,” which helps them decide if the item fits 
(Carpenter and Green 178). From this point, viewers associate such feelings with the 
product and brand, and consider a commercial’s narrative appropriate. They seize the 
opportune moment, subsequently begin consuming the product and supporting its brand, 
and advertisers fully achieve kairos both in their narrative and in reality. 
 
Product “Proofs” 
Advertisers cannot sufficiently transport every viewer to alter their perception, so 
they also “prove” their product’s and brand’s worth through intersections of ethos, logos, 
and pathos. As I will clarify with each commercial’s secondary appeal, ethos, logos, and 
pathos still exist but intersect with one another to legitimize and sell narratives, products, 
companies, beliefs, and lifestyles—often ones with which viewers may identify. Ethos is 
now part of logos, logos is now part of pathos, and pathos is now part of ethos, and so on 
because each appeal assists one another enthymematically.  
The enthymeme is often characterized as a truncated syllogism, meaning that it 
comprises a premise and conclusion but no middle premise. Both the premise and 
conclusion, however, imply an argument. Based on this implication, an audience fills in 
the missing premise by making an inference, a connection, between the two premises 
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provided by rhetors (Conley 169). To conclude an enthymeme, audiences rely on 
commonplace values and attitudes. As Lloyd L. Bitzer indicates, “the speaker does not 
lay down his [or her] premises but lets his [or her] audience supply them out of its stock 
of opinion and knowledge” (407, original emphasis). An audience already knows the 
missing part; they need only access the necessary knowledge either through what the 
speaker, or the speaker’s opponent, previously confers (Conley 175). Both rhetor and 
audience play equally important roles; the rhetor supplies a suggestion and the audience 
completes the enthymeme by concluding the suggestion (Bitzer 408). Both the speaker’s 
and the audience’s role are crucial to the enthymeme’s success because, as Bitzer 
highlights, “enthymemes occur only when speaker and audience jointly produce them” 
(408).  
Antoine C. Braet argues that Aristotle’s three rhetorical appeals “prove” 
enthymematically and can even “co-occur in one enthymeme” (311).46 Though 
rhetoricians prioritize logos’s enthymematic nature, they often ignore how ethos and 
pathos function as enthymemes.47 Braet, however, believes Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
acknowledged ethos’s enthymematic components because, when speakers claim someone 
as praiseworthy or blameworthy, these assertions can be proven or disproven. Speakers 
prove or disprove their credibility based on how accurately they depict individuals, which 
“implies [a speaker’s] goodwill toward [an] audience can be argued” (Braet 311). 
																																																								
46 For an analysis of the three rhetorical proofs as arguments, see Wayne Brockriede’s and Douglas 
Ehninger’s “Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation and Application” in which they review substantive 
(logical) arguments, authoritative (ethical) arguments, and motivational (pathetic) arguments. 
47 Braet distinguishes between the three rhetorical appeals, as enthymemes, by stating that Aristotle 
correlated ethos to the speaker, pathos to the audience, and logos to the subject (309). Logos, the appeal 
typically considered an enthymeme, uses logical premises, or specific topoi, to prove a point (309-10). 
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Essentially, ethos can be used to “deny or to mitigate a prejudice” against speakers 
because, as they defend themselves, the appeal operates enthymematically (Braet 312). 
Braet points out that ethos aids logos by “proving” a speaker’s credibility, which makes 
an audience more likely to “accept the proof relative to the issue,” or logos (Braet 312). 
In other words, logical proofs suggest a speaker’s ethos indexically (Braet 313). Such 
indexicality takes precedence because suggestions, rather than subjective proofs that 
instill doubt, better evidence one’s credibility (Braet 312). Braet illustrates how indexical 
ethos works enthymematically: “I perceive index x; if I perceive index x, then I can come 
to the conclusion y (ethos); therefore y is present” (312, original emphasis). He clarifies 
that “only the ‘ethical’ ideas can function as premises,” meaning that these ideas must be 
present in arrangement, style, or delivery to index ethos (Braet 312).  
Braet also understands pathos as an enthymeme because it suggests emotions 
logical to a situation and thus evidences why such emotions should be felt. To explain 
how pathos works as enthymematically, Braet offers its structure: “A speaker begins with 
a premise and then offers a conclusion, while the audience infers the “appearance of 
intended pathos” (315). Because of an audience’s emotional involvement in the 
enthymeme, they infer which emotion, such as anger, to feel based on the situation (315). 
As rhetors then provide reasons behind feeling or not feeling particular emotions, they 
convince their audience to react passionately (Braet 315). As Braet reminds us, this is 
Aristotle’s “rational form of psychology” (315). Pathos also suggests a speaker’s ethos 
and in turn heightens both the ethical and pathetic appeal (Braet 315). This suggestive 
 
	 96 
ethos can also combine with pathos to argue why an audience should experience or not 
experience an emotion (Braet 315).  
Braet does not address multimodality in his interpretation, but his findings 
nonetheless apply to new media. He believes that ethos and pathos cannot become logos, 
only supplement one another to help the audience better accept both proofs, but in 
contemporary advertising all three appeals aid one other. Advertisers utilize a 
commercial’s multimodality (i.e., layered text, images, verbal narrations, music, etc.) that 
allows ethos, logos, and pathos to intersect with and assist one another, ultimately 
“proving” a product’s merit and further stimulating viewers. Visuals, perceived as logical 
proof, complement ethos understood through a narrative’s characters and values, and vice 
versa. Pathos and ethos relate to the product and brand, which makes both appeals 
relative to the central issue, unlike ethos and pathos in Braet’s rendering of Aristotle’s 
philosophy. Meanwhile, the pathetic proof, found everywhere in a narrative, intensifies 
both logical and ethical proofs, and vice versa. Because the rhetorical appeals circle one 
another, logical and ethical proofs legitimize emotions felt based upon a product’s “truth” 
and brand’s credibility. Put differently, ethos, logos, and pathos function indexically, 
suggesting and aiding one another, to prove why viewers should support a product and its 
brand. As a result, the appeals intersect, where each becomes ethical, “logical,” and 
emotional through enthymematic suggestions.  
This secondary appeal acts as a failsafe that creates additional kairotic conditions. 
If a commercial’s narrative fails to persuade by entertaining, then it persuades by 
demonstrating “proof,” or ethos, logos, and pathos, to substantiate why viewers should 
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purchase products. These enthymematic suggestions make products and brands more 
appropriate and timely by placing viewers into a kairotic mentality, like narrative 
transportation, simply through a more traditional method. As the enthymeme necessitates 
participation, it offers viewers an alternative experience in which they become 
collaborators by inferring and concluding suggestions. Because the enthymeme compels 
contribution from both rhetor and audience, it reiterates Jamieson’s claim that advertisers 
“[make] the audience an accomplice” to foster meaning-making and identification with a 
commercial (184-5). When viewers experience a product’s worth by completing 
enthymemes, a process that entails temporarily adopting advertisers’ mentality to 
understand their argument, viewers’ perceive the item more meaningfully, hence 
increasing their likelihood of relating to it and its brand. As Bitzer notes, “since rhetorical 
arguments, or enthymemes, are formed out of premises supplied by the audience, they 
have the virtue of being self-persuasive” (408). Jeffrey Walker extends Bitzer’s claim, 
stating that the enthymeme’s inferential nature, which requires audience participation, 
encourages an audience to identify with a rhetor’s stance (Walker 59). Persuading 
themselves by identifying with a commercial’s argument enables viewers to seize 
advertisers’ intended opportune moment, their ESP and product display. Viewers then 
undergo the same process that results from narrative transportation, temporal co-
occurrence, and associate the advertised product with its “proofs.” Just as advertisers’ 
primary appeal, their secondary appeal connects companies and consumers. To more 
clearly demonstrate both strategies, I spend the rest of this essay discussing fast food 
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commercials, beginning with Burger King’s narrative that advertises a returning product 
as if it were new. 
 
Burger King: A Returning, Yet Still “New,” Product  
Primary Appeal: A Chicken Pregnant with Chicken Fries 
To create the opportune moment, advertisers compose pathos-driven narratives 
that entertain viewers by using cultural values and beliefs. Such an appeal, often but not 
always accompanied by absurd humor, primes viewers, making them more receptive to 
products because of a narrative’s plot and resulting emotions. A variety of fast food 
commercials exemplify this method. Burger King, for example, broadcasts multiple 
narratives—from adolescent hens taking selfies before going on dates to multicultural 
roosters fighting over who gets the last pack of chicken fries—to sell chicken fries.48 One 
particular commercial begins with a chicken sitting on a couch with her parents, a brown 
hen and rooster. A pack of fries lies beside of the chicken, as she reluctantly tells her 
parents “French fries and I are pregnant, and we’re having chicken fries” (“Burger 
King”). Her mother frantically flaps her wings, while her father tells everyone to calm 
down. Pillows fly onto the floor, disturbing the perfectly knit living room furnished with 
drapes. In the background a smaller hen, the chicken’s sibling, asks “Again?” to insinuate 
this is not her first pregnancy (“Burger King”). The scene ends with a picture of chicken 
																																																								
48 For a brief analysis of how Burger King sexualizes their chicken fries, see Margo DeMello’s “The Sexual 
Politics of Burger King Chicken Fries.” 
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fries on a kitchen table, as the narrator claims “there’s just no stopping true love” and that 
“chicken fries are back” (“Burger King”).  
In only fifteen seconds, Burger King appeals predominantly to customers who 
previously consumed chicken fries since they state “chicken fries are back” (“Burger 
King”). To remind viewers of their importance and urgency, the foundation upon which 
rhetors seize kairos, Burger King promotes chicken fries as a returning yet “new” 
product, which conveys their previous, now refreshed, popularity. Viewers begin 
recalling the product’s importance. They understand that, because chicken fries 
successfully sold once, consumers enjoyed them and will likely enjoy them again. As 
viewers discern that the franchise formerly stopped selling this product, they assume the 
company may do so again, which portrays chicken fries almost as if they were a limited 
time “item.” This recognition creates a sense of urgency, making viewers worry about 
missing their opportunity to enjoy chicken fries again, or try them for the first time, 
which prompts viewers to quickly consume the product before removed from Burger 
King’s menu.  
As this commercial’s timeliness helps grasp viewers’ attention, its narrative 
incongruity makes it more alluring. Almost immediately, Burger King captivates viewers 
with the ridiculousness of a chicken and pack of fries falling in love and mating, but this 
humor is not ordinary; it is absurd. Elliott Oring remarks that “every joke is in some 
sense absurd in that it rests upon a violation of logic, sense, reality, or practicable action” 
(14). Both ordinary and absurd humor utilize incongruities, but absurd humor is 
“nonsensical,” meaning that the joke never resolves its incompatibilities and often 
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requires an audience to “accept the impossible” (Oring 13-15).49 Despite seeming 
impractical, absurd humor’s nonsensicality must be appropriate so listeners can 
understand its connection to the topic or situation (Oring 16). The absurdity of Burger 
King’s interspecies relationship, especially one between a chicken and an inanimate 
object, adds a humorous element that transports viewers into the commercial’s reality, 
one where anything occurs. Though chickens and fries cannot mate, they can in this 
narrative’s world (although we never learn how). This logic clashes with reality, but 
because it fits the narrative’s world, viewers humor what ifs and are in turn amused by 
their suspension of disbelief.50 
Once hooked and entertained by the chicken and fries’ pregnancy, viewers begin 
making sense out of the narrative, which prompts them to identify with its values and 
further transports them into its reality. Burger King uses their ESP (emotional selling 
proposition), “there’s just no stopping true love,” to seize the opportune moment in which 
viewers are most likely to crave chicken fries. This statement heightens viewers’ 
emotions by associating the product with companionship, a desire all of humanity shares, 
and appears at the commercial’s end so viewers make the connection on their own. 
According to Kathleen Hall Jamieson, advertisers often “[make] the audience an 
																																																								
49 Oring clarifies the difference between humor and complete nonsense: “With utter nonsense, no 
conceptual frame is grasped that lends the necessary appropriateness to the absurdity. The result is not 
amusement but puzzlement” (20). 
50 Carpenter and Green stress that, if a narrative strays from its reality or seems too unrealistic, it may 
decrease a viewer’s engagement (174). In commercials such as Burger King’s, however, advertisers atone 
for their illogical reality by highlighting its absurdity. Because the narrative makes viewers laugh, they do 
not care to challenge its realism or lack thereof. Plus, viewers clearly know when a narrative clashes with 
reality, but imagination is the very element that gives consumers a chance to escape and achieve what 
seems impossible in their reality. 
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accomplice,” a role that requires viewers to make meaning out of ads, because it 
increases the chance that they will identify with the positive experience [felt during the 
commercial]” (184-5). Advertisers invite meaning-making by juxtaposing images, asking 
rhetorical questions, and speaking in a strange grammatical construction, among other 
methods (Jamieson 185-7). Burger King visually juxtaposes the chicken and the pack of 
fries to help viewers understand their pregnancy (i.e., that the chicken and the pack of 
fries consummated to make chicken fries), which encourages viewers to identify with the 
“true love” simulated on screen. As Burke states, rhetors commonly appeal to love and 
enmity to boost audience identification (20). When the chicken discloses her motherhood, 
viewers ponder love because of how closely society attaches it to pregnancy, a cultural 
norm that utilizes one of Poulakos’s suggestions for seizing kairos. Society values both 
true love and pregnancy, but values pregnancy as a result of true love even more. After 
experiencing the narrative’s absurd love, viewers feel contented and perhaps even 
hopeful; they rationalize that, if a chicken and a pack of fries can fall in love, then so can 
they. Because this commercial situates viewers into a kairotic mentality, where they now 
equate chicken fries to true love, this association makes Burger King’s ESP and product 
display both timely and appropriate, allowing viewers to seize the franchise’s intended 
opportune moment.  
This commercial encourages alternative interpretations to create multiple kairotic 
opportunities. Though Burger King mainly addresses meat eaters, the franchise considers 
yet another of Poulakos’s suggestions: their audience’s image, specifically their lifestyle. 
To predict opposing reactions, Burger King appeals to a larger audience, one who may 
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not buy their products otherwise, by tailoring their narrative to those concerned with 
meat’s ethics.51 The ESP, “there’s just no stopping true love,” not only correlates chicken 
fries to true love but also to the “humane” slaughter myth many consumers cite to justify 
animal consumption. Instead of promoting meat production’s violence, which would 
elicit negative emotions toward chicken fries, Burger King renders meat a result of 
pregnancy—a family value that gives rather than takes life.  
Contrasting the previous reading, this interpretation transports viewers through 
ethics. The chicken and pack of fries’ pregnancy urges viewers to make meaning out of 
the narrative. Since the chicken carries her child to term for Burger King’s viewers, it 
seems as if she gives chicken fries to customers, making animal consumption appear 
more “humane.” She even excitedly advertises her child’s “meat” to viewers, which 
reinforces the myth that chickens consent to their, or their children’s, slaughter. While 
nonsensical in reality, since chickens oppose their consumption, the narrative implies that 
her “sacrifice” is realistic. Incidentally, the chicken is a broiler chicken, a common type 
bred for the US meat industry beginning in the early 1900s (Leeson and Summers 3). 
Burger King includes this ostensible meat chicken, rather than a hen, to ascribe her 
“selflessness” to the product and illustrate chicken fries as morally justifiable. While 
some viewers may read the broiler chicken’s ironic inclusion as absurdly or even 
ordinarily humorous, the intended audience likely finds it calming because it gives them a 
																																																								
51 Advertisers frequently gain viewers’ support by exploiting social movements (Jamieson 226). Because of 
newfound concerns about the planet and its inhabitants that arose in the 1990s, advertisers began presenting 
their products as “environmentally responsible” (Jamieson 176). Fast food commercials, such as Burger 
King’s and Chick-Fil-A’s (discussed next), follow suit and appeal to the “humane” meat myth.	
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friendlier slaughterhouse image with which to identify as they consume chicken fries. As 
Burke articulates, moral growth depends on ethical principles, reputation, and love (24). 
Because Burger King establishes a moral explanation for chicken fries, they suggest that 
consuming the product remains loyal to viewers’ principles and fosters their integrity. 
The franchise thus transports viewers into a reality that matches their idea of animal 
consumption—one they believe prevents chicken abuse. Since these viewers care about 
animal welfare, Burger King’s “humane” portrayal of chicken fries inspires positive 
emotions, or yet another kairotic mentality, that eases concerns about meat. As a result, 
the ESP and product display remain timely and appropriate for these viewers, which 
allows them to seize Burger King’s intended opportune moment. 
Regardless of which interpretation viewers find relatable, the commercial’s 
pathetic reality exemplifies Aristotle’s theory of how narration “[puts] the judge into a 
given frame of mind” (180). To shape an intended temperament, rhetors must calm, 
rather than anger, their audience (Aristotle 217). Aristotle states that  
 
the frame of mind that makes people calm…is plainly the opposite to that which 
makes them angry, as when they are amusing themselves or laughing or feasting; 
when they are feeling prosperous or successful or satisfied; when, in fine, they are 
enjoying freedom from pain, or inoffensive pleasure, or justifiable hope (217).  
 
 
Given Aristotle’s definition, this “frame of mind”—the positive associations that incite 
calmness—fosters a kairotic mentality by opening viewers to the narrative’s persuasion. 
Fittingly, Burger King not only sells chicken fries but also positive emotions. As the 
narrative transports viewers, it allows them to escape and live vicariously through its 
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reality, finally attaining “true love,” “humane” meat, or simply a laugh. Through the 
process of temporal co-occurrence, viewers transfer their feelings onto the product, which 
makes them more malleable and increases their likelihood of consuming chicken fries. 
Jamieson comments that these positive emotions and associations generate positive 
encounters, which suggests that viewers seek an item because of its “desirable 
[experience]” (184). Though Burger King targets returning customers, they interest most 
viewers, both old and new, by promoting the above values and beliefs alongside their 
product. However, in case their narrative fails to transport viewers and create kairotic 
opportunities, the franchise supplements their intended opportune moment with a 
secondary appeal, as discussed below. 
 
Secondary Appeal: Interspecies Love, “Humane” Meat, and Winking Chickens 
As advertisers engage viewers’ senses through layered visuals, sounds, songs, and 
simulations of smells and tastes, they seek to reach consumers by offering an experience 
of “proofs” in which they must participate.	A narrative’s multimodality enables ethos, 
logos, and pathos to intersect, giving each qualities of the other. This strategy 
enthymematically demonstrates a product’s value and connects both product and brand to 
viewers’ identity, which creates additional kairotic conditions and permits viewers to still 
seize advertisers’ intended opportune moment, their ESP and product display. These 
viewers also undergo temporal co-occurrence and in turn transfer their perception of the 
product to reality. Though ethos, logos, and pathos cannot be entirely divorced because of 
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their intersections, I discuss each separately to more clearly illustrate how all three 
appeals function as the others. 	
Burger King’s predominant appeal to ethos is their recurring chicken characters 
who sell their own flesh or, more accurately in this particular narrative, the chicken 
selling her unborn child’s flesh.52 Because viewers have seen similar characters in the 
franchise’s commercials, they are more likely to trust the pregnant chicken. Additionally, 
viewers trust chicken fries’ “true love” value because of the chicken’s 
anthropomorphism. She and her family speak like humans, live in a house furnished with 
human belongings, and idolize human customs such as pregnancy from a loving 
relationship or marriage. Because of how society elevates humanity over animality, the 
chicken’s anthropomorphism, which emphasizes her human traits, lends her credibility by 
making viewers believe her sentience and capacity to love. Such an ethical appeal also 
functions “logically” and emotionally because the commercial’s layered narration (i.e., 
verbal, visual, and written claims) presents opportunities for viewers to draw additional 
conclusions. Viewers hear the ESP, “there’s just no stopping true love,” followed by the 
product display and the chicken fries hashtag that reinforce the product’s name and 
associated values (“Burger King”). As viewers attach “true love” to the chicken fries, 
they understand the chicken’s anthropomorphism as “logical” because her actions seem 
human. Since we prioritize human principles and actions over those of animals, the 
																																																								
52 Though proper grammar requires “that” and “which” when referencing animals, I reject this practice 
because it objectifies them. Instead, I reference animals as “who” and “whom” to counter their object status 
and grant them the right to a subject’s language that illustrates their personhood.	
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chicken’s anthropomorphism becomes emotional; it appeals to viewers as humans who 
can identify with the chicken’s pregnancy or her family’s dramatic response. 
This narrative’s alternative interpretation establishes ethos differently and, in 
doing so, encourages viewers’ cognitive dissonance. Burger King employs a talking 
chicken who announces her pregnancy and advertises her child’s flesh to authorize 
consuming chicken fries. As the chicken endorses her child’s slaughter, which implies 
that eating meat is consensual, the franchise seeks to legitimize the chicken fries’ ethics 
by portraying them as “humane.” Like the previous reading's appeal to “true love,” this 
premise also becomes “logical” as viewers perceive the chicken’s credibility. Her 
anthropomorphized message becomes “evidence” to consume chicken fries, as it suggests 
seemingly rational reasons for consuming her unborn child. Upon seeing the product 
display that accentuates the chicken’s endorsement, or her pregnancy and wink, viewers 
may rationalize that we should eat chickens. Instead of humanity taking animals’ lives 
from them, the chicken’s wink suggests that she “gives” us her child’s flesh, which 
designates consuming chicken fries as moral. Such a thought incites viewers’ emotions 
by alluding to the chicken’s supposed consent and the resulting morality of the product, 
both heated debates in the animal welfare and animal rights movement regardless of 
one’s stance.  
Burger King uses their product display to provide logos. Though narration, songs, 
and written captions help convey messages, commercials rely on visual argumentation. 
Anthony J. Blair defines a visual argument as one simply presented pictorially to 
illustrate a “reason for accepting or believing some proposition, for taking some other 
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attitude or for performing some action” (49). Essentially, visuals function as enthymemes 
whose images make suggestions inferred by viewers (Blair 50). Burger King uses 
chicken fries’ image for various purposes. First, this product display “proves” the item’s 
taste by making chicken fries look appetizing on screen, increasing the likelihood that 
viewers will purchase them. To make the product more appealing, Burger King 
anthropomorphizes the pack of chicken fries by painting a winking face on the paper 
container. Like the commercial’s narrative, this wink fosters multiple interpretations that 
again utilize the narrative’s “true love” and “humane” meat values. Viewers observe the 
wink either as an act of rebellion to suggest the chicken chooses true love over her 
family’s disapproval, or as reinforcement for the chicken’s “sacrifice” in which she freely 
“gives” her child’s flesh.53 Regardless of viewers’ perception, the wink operates as 
“proof” to reinforce such values’ “truth.” 
Logos, too, becomes ethical from the chicken’s wink that Burger King uses to 
authorize chicken fries. Depending on viewers’ understanding of the wink, the franchise 
either strengthens or resists traditional notions of race and sexuality. Because the 
chicken’s pregnancy results from heterosexuality, it appeals to tradition’s “authority,” 
but, as the chicken mates with fries, a vegetable and entirely different “species,” her 
pregnancy supposedly represents interracial relationships. By choosing such a 
controversial couple, Burger King seeks to extend the chicken’s credibility as upholding 
traditional conception while also adhering to contemporary dating practices. The product 
																																																								
53 In this first interpretation, the chicken’s wink signifies a flirtatious gesture that sexualizes the chicken 
fries and insinuates that consumers eat the result of a rebellious yet sexy relationship. 
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display also develops the chicken fries’ credibility because images always seem as if they 
reveal the truth. As Blair describes, visuals’ realism grants them power (51). Illustrations 
make viewers believe they have “direct access to what is visually portrayed in a way that 
print does not,” which empowers viewers; they “see for themselves” rather than listen to 
a report that only gives them “second-hand access” to events (Blair 51). Visuals, then, 
give a “façade of rationality” (Blair 57). When viewers see the pack of chicken fries 
wink, they recall the narrative’s values and believe the gesture to be genuine. 
As with any food product, chicken fries’ image is emotional because of the 
feelings it stirs: hunger, cravings, and even relief due to the chicken’s endorsement. 
Because all possible motives behind the chicken’s wink are controversial, the “evidence” 
becomes even more emotional as viewers infer her intention. In the first interpretation, 
Burger King speaks primarily to heterosexual viewers, which excludes those in the 
LGBTQ+ community. Viewers belonging to marginalized races may find the chicken and 
fries’ interspecies relationship offensive because it appropriates prejudice and compares 
them to a chicken and pack of fries, which further objectifies these consumers because of 
how speciesist attitudes deem animal comparisons as offensive.54 For viewers 
conscientious of meat’s production, the wink’s second interpretation affects them 
emotionally. During the product display and beyond, Burger King’s visuals lend their 
argument more permanence because, as Blair points out, images create a more “vivid and 
immediate” experience viewers see for themselves (52). Subsequently, the chicken’s 
																																																								
54 In 1970, Richard Ryder coined speciesism as “the widespread discrimination that is practiced by 
[humanity] against other species…based upon appearances—if the other individual looks different then he 
[or she] is rated as being beyond the moral pale” (quoted in Waldau 28). 
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wink, paired with the chicken fries’ product display, elicit an even more emotional 
response from viewers, and one they better trust, because they see the “evidence” with 
their own eyes. 
Though I have already discussed Burger King’s appeal to pathos, or adoption of 
viewers’ values (i.e., “true love” and “humane” meat), this commercial depends on the 
feelings these principles incite. The narrative’s emotional impact enables its principles to 
become “logical” and ethical, ultimately designing conditions that facilitate the blending 
of each appeal since each circles back to the narrative’s values. Finally, Burger King 
generates kairotic conditions to ensure that most viewers seize the commercial’s ESP and 
product display. After experiencing each “proof,” viewers undergo temporal co-
occurrence; they consider chicken fries as loving and “humane” because of the 
narrative’s enthymematic suggestions. For those not entertained and fully transported into 
Burger King’s reality, this perception cultivates identification, making the product 
timelier and increasing the likelihood that viewers will purchase chicken fries. Though all 
companies promote brands while advertising their products, in the next section I examine 
how Chick-Fil-A uses these primary and secondary appeals to more directly authenticate 
their name and its accompanying motto. 
 
Chick-Fil-A: The Name 
Primary Appeal: Sassy, Self-Preserving Cows  
Burger King is not the only franchise that creates kairos by entertaining viewers 
with narratives rooted in consumers’ values and accompanying emotions. In fact, Chick-
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Fil-A’s trade character, the “Eat Mor Chikin” cow, has followed such a strategy ever 
since 1995 (“The Cow Campaign”).55 The “Eat Mor Chikin” cows challenge meat eaters, 
usually as they eat a “burger” sold by a competing company, to eat more “chicken” 
instead of “beef” products. As Chick-Fil-A articulates, these “fearless cows [act] in 
enlightened self-interest, [realizing] that when people eat chicken, they don’t eat them” 
(“The Cow Campaign”).  
These cows continue their activism in a recent Chick-Fil-A catering commercial. 
An airplane drops a cellphone in a pasture, prompting two cows to begin texting beef 
eaters. The first recipient, a woman jogging, receives a text saying “BEEF SLOWZ U 
DOWN” accompanied by a frowning emoticon (“Chick-Fil-A”). The cows then text a 
selfie, with the caption “BEEF IZ DISTURBING,” to a man in a business meeting who 
reacts by scanning the room in terror (“Chick-Fil-A”). A teenage girl receives a text 
while eating a burger, which she later puts down in disgust after opening a selfie from a 
cow who orders her to “DROP THA BURGER MISSEE” (“Chick-Fil-A”). The cows’ 
last recipient, an astronaut, opens an email saying “EAT MOR CHIKIN ROGER” 
(“Chick-Fil-A”). The narrative returns to the cow who instigated the messages as he or 
she wears a straw hat and poker face, but both stare into the camera to confront viewers. 
When the commercial cuts to a table full of fresh fruit, chicken tenders, chocolate chip 
																																																								
55 According to Chick-Fil-A’s timeline devoted to the “Eat Mor Chikin” cows, this marketing tactic first 
began on a billboard in 1995. In 1997, the cows became famous on tv. Since, the cows have continued 
protesting and accumulated over 500,000 Facebook fans on their website, eatmorchikin.com, created in 
2009 (“The Cow Campaign”). The cows’ “activism” remains so popular that Chick-Fil-A sells cow 
calendars and other merchandise. The franchise even poses as the cows to interact with fans on Facebook 
and Twitter. Chick-Fil-A’s extensive, clearly successful characterization of these cows likely inspired 
Burger King’s anthropomorphized chickens. 
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cookies, and Coke Zero, viewers see the franchise’s catering options. Finally, the narrator 
urges viewers to “give [their] gathering something to gather around” and to “try catering 
at Chick-Fil-A” (“Chick-Fil-A”). 
Similar to Burger King, Chick-Fil-A also entertains viewers with a world in 
which everything happens without explanation. A phone falls out of the sky, curiously 
landing in front of cows who begin texting their audience. Chick-Fil-A offers no 
explanation for how the cows accessed their audience’s phone numbers, how they learned 
arguments humanity uses against meat consumption, how they appropriated human 
language, or how they knew exactly the right place and time to reach each member of 
their audience. Since none of these events normally transpire in reality, each catches 
viewers’ attention. Some may find the cows’ anthropomorphism absurdly humorous 
because of their perceived intellectual capacity, while others may interpret the entire 
narrative as funny because of its absurdity. Regardless, the narrative transports viewers, 
allowing them to escape into its alternative reality that insinuates that Chick-Fil-A grants 
cows equality; their characters speak and act like humanity and in turn enjoy the right not 
to be eaten at the franchise. Because the commercial remains loyal to the reality Chick-
Fil-A has constructed with their “Eat Mor Chikin” cows, viewers accept the narrative’s 
nonsensicality. 
Like most fast food advertisements, Chick-Fil-A’s narrator verbalizes the ESP 
(emotional selling proposition), “give your gathering something to gather around,” after 
the cows’ mischief to stimulate viewers’ involvement and identification (“Chick-Fil-A”). 
Because the plot is relatively obvious, it requires less participation from viewers. 
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Nevertheless, Chick-Fil-A employs emotional tactics that inspire viewers to make sense 
and meaning out of the events. When the commercial begins and viewers see the airplane 
dropping the cellphone, the plot thus far makes little sense. Once viewers observe the first 
text message, however, they connect the phone to the cows and realize their authorship. 
After interacting with the narrative, viewers become more engaged in the story and more 
emotionally receptive, which initiates a kairotic mentality, making the cows’ messages 
more timely, digestible, and appropriate to the audience.  
Chick-Fil-A continues their emotional appeal to augment their narrative’s kairotic 
conditions by advertising healthy and “humane” lifestyles, both of which further transport 
viewers as they identify with each recipient’s reaction to the cows’ argument. The first 
text sent to the woman jogging, “BEEF SLOWZ U DOWN” (“Chick-Fil-A”), appeals to 
health-conscious viewers, especially those who prioritize proper exercise and nutritious 
diets, by implying beef’s health risks. Though most commercials glorify products by 
connecting them to positive concepts, the cows’ message associates competitors’ 
products with a negative quality (i.e., poor health slowing one’s fitness goals) to slander 
beef products’ image. By making beef appear unhealthy, the cows enhances chicken 
products’ image as seemingly more wholesome and appropriate for health-conscious 
customers, which prompts these viewers to identify with the cows, agree with their 
message, and prioritize a diet they perceive as healthy. The message sent to the 
businessman, which reads “BEEF IZ DISTURBING,” compels viewers to acknowledge 
the reality of cow slaughter (“Chick-Fil-A”). Though this statement could allude to beef’s 
unhealthiness, which the cows’ first message already addressed, the cows define chicken 
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as more “humane” than beef to reach more viewers: those unsure about consuming cows 
or those already against such a lifestyle. Because these viewers value animal welfare, 
they then adopt the cows’ beliefs and foreground Chick-Fil-A’s more “respectable” 
products. Like the preceding message, this one also elevates the franchise’s items as 
morally superior by demonizing competing products. These viewers also identify with the 
cows, which prevents viewers from morally consuming beef because of the similarities 
between them and the animals. The cows’ commands, “DROP THA BURGER MISSEE” 
and “EAT MOR CHIKIN ROGER,” become more appropriate after viewers identify with 
one or both of the cows’ previous messages. Upon seeing these demands, viewers recall 
the cows’ first two arguments that give viewers reason to drop their burger and eat more 
chicken products.  
Within thirty seconds, the cows’ messages cause viewers to feel guilty for 
consuming their species. Chick-Fil-A magnifies these characters’ messages by following 
Aristotle’s advice of how “men become calm when they have spent their anger on 
somebody else” (217). Whether knowingly or not, the franchise also employs Aristotle’s 
understanding of pathos as a kairotic strategy. For Aristotle, the emotional appeal’s 
success depends upon three elements: the emotion, the individual who roused the 
audience, and the occasion (kairos) that inspired such feeling (Kinneavy, “Kairos in 
Classical” 70).56 When crafting calmness and anger, the two most juxtaposed emotions, 
Aristotle notes how rhetors must understand “the disposition of those who are angry, with 
																																																								
56 Kinneavy reads Aristotle’s sixteen references of “poia” as kairos, since it means “reasons or occasions,” 
and he indicates how Aristotle uses “poia” when discussing each emotion: love, benevolence, pity, and fear 
(Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical” 71).  
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whom they are angry, and for what reasons [poia]” (qtd in Kinneavy, “Kairos in 
Classical” 71, original emphasis). Rhetors must also “determine the state of mind which 
makes men [and women] mild, toward whom they become mild, and the reasons [poia] 
which make them so” (qtd in Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical” 71, original emphasis). By 
foregrounding beef products’ negative consequences, or the reasons why consuming this 
type of meat makes consumers angry, Chick-Fil-A essentially diverts viewers’ attention 
to beef. This distraction helps viewers better identify with Chick-Fil-A, the franchise that 
portrays their products and overall name as ostensibly more healthy and moral. As Burke 
indicates, prejudices can help individuals identify because some deem “warped motives” 
soothing (27, 37). As Chick-Fil-A portrays their company more favorably than that of 
competitors’, the franchise appeals to a speciesist attitude that values cows over chickens 
(for reasons I will discuss when explaining the commercial’s secondary appeal). Because 
of the cows’ arguments for opposing their slaughter and consumption, viewers identify 
with the animals and Chick-Fil-A. 
As a result of the associations formed by these cows’ messages, viewers undergo 
temporal co-occurrence. They determine beef products to be unhealthy and inhumane, 
and they resent competing companies like Burger King and McDonalds that sell beef. 
Viewers then feel more positively toward chicken products, praising them as healthier 
and more “humane” than beef because, as Gunnar Andrén asserts in “The Rhetoric of 
Advertising,” all positive characteristics insinuate no negative ones (76). Viewers’ 
emotional identification with the cows culminates the ESP, which urges viewers to “give 
[their] gathering something to gather around” because of chicken products’ perceived 
 
	 115 
health and moral “superiority.” As viewers regard Chick-Fil-A positively, they seize the 
franchise’s intended opportune moment, their ESP and product display. Rather than 
advertising a particular product or even their catering options, Chick-Fil-A ultimately 
legitimizes their name and motto so viewers maintain cows’ and their own health, both 
timely issues that in turn create a sense of urgency and importance. In doing so, Chick-
Fil-A hopes to attract new customers, but the franchise also seeks to strengthen their bond 
with already loyal customers who, after seeing Chick-Fil-A’s “ethics,” will likely spend 
even more money for their catering business. 
Interestingly, this commercial exemplifies how rhetors create kairotic conditions 
to seize electronic kairos, although the cows use slightly different methods to achieve 
their goal. Instead of relying on only positive or negative associations, Chick-Fil-A also 
correlates the cows’ emotionally loaded texts to the actions in which the recipients 
partake while receiving the messages. The cellphone notes the time as 7:27, which serves 
as the opportune moment for the cows to emotionally affect and reach each character. 
The best time to appeal to the jogger’s health is when she is indeed jogging. When 
addressing the business man, who perhaps cares about animal welfare since the cows 
send him a text suggesting beef production’s violence, proves most effective when bored 
and likely thinking of eating while in a business meeting. The cows best reach the 
teenager while she eats a burger.57 The commercial never reveals the astronaut’s actions 
before receiving his email, however. Despite this shortcoming, the occasions during 
																																																								
57 Since advertisers seldom catch their audience while eating a burger, as the cows do, Chick-Fil-A includes 
this scene to simulate how they hope viewers will react—replacing beef products with chicken.  
 
	 116 
which the human characters receive the cows’ messages increases their likelihood of 
feeling guilty because the animals catch these humans in their most emotionally, and 
often physically, appropriate mentality.58 Because only the teenager changes her actions 
by halting her beef consumption, this method does not affect all. Chick-Fil-A 
acknowledges this drawback by complementing their primary appeal with intersecting 
“proofs” to provide additional reasons why viewers should replace beef with chicken 
products, which I demonstrate next. 
 
Secondary Appeal: Omniscient, Texting Cows on a Speciesist Mission to Save Their 
Lives 
 Chick-Fil-A uses ethical, logical, and pathetic enthymemes to “prove” their 
company’s name and products’ value. The narrative’s foremost appeal to ethos is the 
cows’ omniscience—first as cows slaughtered for their flesh. Because of these 
characters’ identity as cows, they can accurately expose beef production’s immorality; 
they know how the industry treats them and they can speak for their species to clarify that 
they want to live. Additionally, the cows’ omniscience grants them their audience’s 
																																																								
58 This commercial exemplifies classical kairos, although the cows communicate via cellphone, because it 
mirrors ancient orators’ craft that benefited from their live audience’s reaction. More specifically, Chick-
Fil-A places viewers into the classical rhetor’s role as they interpret the characters’ body language to 
understand the narrative. The commercial never shows the first woman’s reaction to the message, but the 
message the cow sends to the business man prompts paranoia; he does not know who sent the message or 
how its author knew of his guilt. The following two recipients, the teenage girl and astronaut, both react 
similarly by scanning the room to determine who sent the message and how its author knew how and when 
to reach them. Because Chick-Fil-A neglects to explain the cows’ omniscience, viewers must gauge the 
recipients’ body language, especially their worrisome expressions, to conclude their emotions. While 
viewers do not use this information to seize kairos with their target audience, they nevertheless use it to 
make sense and meaning out of the narrative, which results in their seizing of Chick-Fil-A’s intended 
opportune moment. 
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names, phone numbers, moral weakness (i.e., fear, guilt, or passion), and, more 
importantly, daily schedule and opportune moment. Though the average person lacks 
access to such information unless we stalk someone, the cows automatically know all. As 
godlike figures, the cows’ awareness allows them to transcend their meat status and 
authorizes them to speak above humanity.  
While the cows’ omniscience primarily implies their authority, it also evokes an 
emotional response. Because Chick-Fil-A’s cows embody such knowledge and enjoy a 
superior status, their image clashes with popular beliefs that mark cows as insentient and 
unintelligent objects. As these characters’ omniscience verifies their cognizance, it 
challenges how society perceives cows and thus provokes viewers’ emotions, whether 
anger (from opposing this portrayal), happiness (from supporting this portrayal), or 
remorse (from feeling guilty about their diet or lifestyle). Since seeing connotes 
believing, the cows’ knowledge, evidenced by their messages, provides visual “proof” for 
their intelligence that distinguishes them from other animals farmed for their bodies. The 
cows stipulate reasons for why we should not consume them, which viewers must accept 
as logical because these characters’ omniscience disproves the arguments we use to 
justify their slaughter. Because society values intelligence (measured by human 
standards) and God (or anyone godlike), viewers likely foreground the cows’ similarities 
to humanity and change their perception of and perhaps even behavior toward the 
animals, at least while eating at Chick-Fil-A. 
To create logos, Chick-Fil-A illuminates that the cows indeed send the messages 
to potential customers by including visual “proof,” or selfie videos and pictures of each 
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cow, in the second and third texts. The narrative even alternates between showing these 
characters in the pasture, as they send their messages, and then ends with the cows’ 
mischievous expressions so no doubt exists that they composed each text. After 
understanding the cows as the authors, viewers infer that they send the messages to 
protect themselves. But what makes viewers suspend their disbelief and accept the cows’ 
authorship is each message’s misspelled words: “BEEF SLOWZ U DOWN,” BEEF IZ 
DISTURBING,” “DROP THA BURGER MISSEE,” “EAT MOR CHIKIN ROGER” 
(“Chick-Fil-A,” emphasis added). These errors also serve ethical and emotional purposes, 
again suggested enthymematically. Visuals, according to Blair, establish a sense of ethos 
when they indicate authority, as when white lab coats signify physicians and scientists 
(54). When viewers see the cows’ misspellings, they might reason that the characters 
learned human language by listening to us speak, as each misspelling sounds correct; the 
cows express their point clearly, just with grammatical errors. These inaccuracies extend 
the cows’ credibility, making their behavior and agency believable to viewers who 
otherwise may not trust texting cows, since these animals do not use cell phones to 
communicate in reality.  
Similarly, a visual’s symbolism “evoke[s] involuntary reactions” (Blair 54). 
Knowing the cows reason and compose arguments like humanity heightens viewers’ 
emotions because these animals’ omniscience and communication diverge from common 
speciesist attitudes that designate cows as intellectually “inferior.” The cows’ messages, 
as they adopt human language, disprove this perception by showing they are in fact like 
us. These commonalities incite sympathy for the animals as they bridge cows and 
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viewers, but because the cows’ language resembles a human child’s rather than an 
adult’s, Chick-Fil-A maintains the belief that animals cannot attain an adult human level 
of intelligence, only a human child’s at most. Because the cows misspell nearly half of 
their messages, the franchise diminishes the animals’ intelligence and preserves speciesist 
notions. In doing so, the cows’ inferior status (resulting from their elementary 
misspellings) contrasts their superiority (gained from their godlike omniscience) to 
trigger emotional reactions. Depending on viewers’ position on the animal welfare or 
animal rights movement, they either accept or reject the cows’ demonstration and 
correlate their stance to support or oppose consuming cows. While the cows’ language 
sustains some viewers’ speciesist attitudes, others may view the characters more 
sympathetically. After all, human adults typically display more compassion to those 
considered smaller and more vulnerable, both in physicality and perceived intelligence, 
such as human children and animals. 
 If not already obvious, Chick-Fil-A’s dominant appeal to pathos is their 
speciesist motto. The cows do not merely oppose their objectification but they support 
eating other animals, especially chickens. Rather than seeking to dismantle speciesism’s 
foundation, the cows only address issues that directly affect them; they highlight their 
predicament’s imminence, while simultaneously diminishing the importance of chickens’ 
treatment in agriculture, by writing to their recipients in all capital letters. Capitalization 
in electronic situations (i.e., text, email, and social media speak) typically conveys 
excitement, anger, or emphasis, but given the cows’ situation we know they follow this 
practice to emphasize their words’ urgency and importance. Their capitalization conveys 
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that, if viewers do not eat chicken instead of cows, then these cows—the ones with whom 
viewers have become attached—will be slaughtered for consumption. After 
understanding this message, viewers realize that the cows act in self-defense of animal 
agriculture. The cows’ desire to survive petitions all viewers, regardless of their beliefs 
on animal welfare or animal rights, because we prioritize and understand the desire to 
live, even if we cannot relate to animal agriculture’s cruelty. As viewers imagine how 
they might feel as a cow in the industry, they become empathetic to the animals’ 
experiences and resulting emotions.59  
The cows’ advocacy also contributes credibility and realism to their messages, as 
its speciesism further suggests similarities between humans and these animals. To 
accompany their anthropomorphized language (i.e., texting and emailing) and behavior 
(i.e., wearing human hats), the cows act more human by adopting human prejudice. 
Because these characters speak as cows to portray beef, not chicken products, as 
disturbing, viewers who support meat consumption likely find this amusing, similarly to 
how some laugh at racist jokes when told by an individual of the same race the joke uses 
as its punch line. Here, the cows’ betrayal of chickens increases their credibility because 
the cows become even more human. Their messages’ content also serves logic to viewers 
by offering various reasons not to eat beef, which disseminates a speciesist and fallacious 
																																																								
59 Continuous exposure to the “Eat Mor Chikin” cows also inflates viewers’ emotions and the cows’ 
credibility. As the cows star in every Chick-Fil-A commercial, they form a long-term relationship to 
viewers. Such an emotional bond, in which viewers regard the characters similarly to pets, makes them 
more sympathetic toward the cows and their messages. While the cows develop their relationship with 
viewers, they become familiar and thus trusted representatives. Viewers, as a result of their attachment to 
the cows whom they trust, more willingly listen to their messages and subsequently support Chick-Fil-A 
and their products. 
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argument that suggests viewers must eat chickens to stop cows’ slaughter. These 
characters’ appearance, as real rather than animated cows, grounds viewers in a sense of 
reality and thus reasoning. Because viewers see the cows as they would in reality, they 
believe the animals’ message is real—that these cows represent actual cows, not merely 
Chick-Fil-A’s fictional ones. When paired with their messages, the cows’ image 
exacerbates viewers’ guilt; if they consume beef, viewers eat animals like these 
humanlike cows.  
Like Burger King, Chick-Fil-A’s enthymematic “proofs” make their company 
name and products more kairotic for viewers not transported by their commercial’s 
reality. The cows’ human qualities motivate viewers to protect them, unfortunately at 
chickens’ expense. These viewers ultimately undergo temporal co-occurrence, which 
leads them to elevate consuming chickens over cows because they believe such a choice 
helps save the latter and helps sustain their own health. Such an outlook permits viewers 
to seize Chick-Fil-A’s ESP and product display, thus increasing their likelihood of 
identifying with the franchise and hiring them for catering. The following commercial by 
McDonald’s follows suit, but instead of utilizing primary and secondary appeals to 
advertise their name, the franchise revitalizes an old product by recontextualizing it with 
new narratives. 
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McDonald’s: An Old Product New 
Primary Appeal: Super Bowl Snacks and Adrenaline, But Only For a Limited Time 
In addition to Burger King and Chick-Fil-A, McDonald’s also creates kairotic 
conditions with their narratives. A commercial, which aired during the 2017 Super Bowl, 
begins with men playing an informal football game. Music begins playing as we see a 
young black man, with a full marching band behind him, rapping to various situations: 
“Woo! Called your old number, are you bringing the thunder?” (“McDonald’s”). As the 
football team becomes competitive, the marching band continues playing and we see a 
Big Mac sitting atop one of the drums. The background singers shout, “There’s a Big 
Mac for that!” (“McDonald’s”). Next, the rapper addresses a group of men watching the 
Super Bowl. “On the edge of your seat,” the camera shows three men jumping and 
screaming in excitement, as the rapper continues, “Your team can’t be beat” 
(“McDonald’s”). Before the background singers repeat, “There’s a Big Mac for that,” the 
commercial shows one of the men eating the product (“McDonald’s”). Finally, the rapper 
walks through a house with the men from the previous scene. He raps, “Only in it for the 
half-time show?” while we see that only one man is excited for this event 
(“McDonald’s”). The rapper continues, “It’s okay, we know!” followed by the 
background singers’ “There’s a Big Mac for that” (“McDonald’s”). The narrative quickly 
switches back and forth between all three situations, while the rapper ends his song by 
stating, “Got into formation, pumped up the nation, got your own celebration. Ow” 
(“McDonald’s”). The informal football game’s winner begins eating a Big Mac as the 
rapper articulates the ESP (emotional selling proposition): “Juicy, cheesy, iconic—“ 
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(“McDonald’s”). Midway through this statement, the screen simultaneously shows the 
product’s three sizes as the rapper states “Big Mac” (“McDonald’s”). The rapper finishes 
the ESP, “Now in three sizes, but only for a limited time” (“McDonald’s,” original 
emphasis). The narrative revisits all three situations, showing each “limited time,” and 
finally ends with the rapper stating “Man, I’m lovin’ it. Ba-da-ba-ba-ba,” as the screen 
displays the McDonald’s and Super Bowl logos (“McDonald’s”). 
 Like the aforementioned commercials, this one belongs to a series. McDonald’s 
presents four other narratives in which the same rapper advertises the Big Mac to 
multiple audiences, from students and businesspeople to athletes and celebrities. In their 
Super Bowl commercial, however, McDonald’s better refines their audience to the 
game’s fans. In thirty seconds, the narrative foregrounds three situations to create 
different kairotic moments, again following Poulakos’s recommendations, by appealing 
to American values: football, the Super Bowl, and the half-time show. Rather than using 
animals or a fantastical setting, McDonald’s uses human characters and realism to 
advertise feelings viewers can experience with the Big Mac when the Super Bowl airs.60 
Because of the narrative’s realism, McDonald’s rarely incorporates absurd humor. The 
commercial’s absurdity ceases at the rapper’s and marching band’s theatrics and the Big 
Mac set atop their drums. Regardless, with each situation’s values, the franchise 
																																																								
60 The Super Bowl is known and loved for its entertaining commercials. As Bernice Kanner describes, it is 
the “Super Bowl of advertising” because viewers widely anticipate the game for its ads (1, 3). Hence, 
viewers watching the Super Bowl already expect advertisements to entertain them, which McDonald’s 
clearly knows because they deliver a commercial kairotic to both its context and audience. 
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transports viewers by offering them a sense of community and belonging with which they 
can identify.  
To establish a communal bond between viewers, McDonald’s utilizes Aristotle’s 
pathos that calms an audience. Aristotle mentions that “we feel calm towards those who 
humble themselves before us and do not gainsay us” and “we also feel calm towards 
those who are serious when we are serious, because then we feel that we are treated 
seriously and not contemptuously” (216). In these statements, Aristotle reveals how to 
ease an audience simply by respecting and accepting them. McDonald’s similarly 
comforts their target audience, men, by including them in their narrative’s conversation 
and portraying these viewers as equal to the franchise. This equality follows Aristotle’s 
guidelines for creating love, which he believed depended on circumstances that convey a 
speaker as “more generous and worthy of love” (Kinneavy, “Kairos in Classical” 70). 
Though love differs from acceptance, it elicits comparable emotions to make viewers 
regard McDonald’s more positively. By positioning their franchise as equal to their 
viewers, McDonald’s characterizes themselves as more deserving of viewers’ time, 
money, and support. 
The commercial’s first situation, a football game between friends and family, 
builds sports fanatics’ excitement for the Super Bowl and transports them into the 
narrative’s reality. This scene’s quick movement mirrors that of a football game, while 
the men’s aggressive expressions imitate players’ emotions. As viewers recall past 
adrenaline rushes they experienced while playing football, they identify with the men on 
screen and become more competitive for the Super Bowl, which makes them more 
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receptive when the rapper challenges them by asking, “Called your old number, are you 
bringin’ the thunder?” (“McDonald’s”). Here the rapper speaks to viewers. As James W. 
Pennebaker articulates, rhetors seem considerate of others when they refer to their 
audience as “you” (Pennebaker 71). Speaking directly to viewers makes this scene more 
personal and provides an opportunity for them to revive their football experiences. 
Because this question evokes viewers’ already-relatable memories and forms a more 
intimate relationship between consumers and McDonald’s, viewers more personally react 
to and identify with the narrative. To connect viewers’ experiences to the product, the 
rapper invites viewers to recollect the hunger they felt after playing a game, prompting 
them to agree that a Big Mac, popularly considered a “comfort” food, is an appropriate 
solution. Because this situation uses viewers’ physical and emotional memory, they 
perceive the product more positively, perhaps as even more energizing and fulfilling than 
before they saw the commercial.  
The second situation, which shows how fans anticipate and react to their favorite 
team winning, functions similarly to transport viewers. The three men anxiously yet 
excitedly watch the Super Bowl. One holds his hands together, almost as if he were 
praying, while the other man tightly grips a football in his hands. The man in between 
them sits with his eyes and mouth open in shock. As the rapper claims their “team can’t 
be beat,” all three stand up and scream with jazz hands. This behavior exemplifies 
anxiety felt during the game and pride felt when one’s preferred team wins, both of which 
viewers identify because they have likely reacted similarly when watching a game. Since 
this commercial first aired during the Super Bowl, viewers imagine themselves in this 
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situation and think of their favorite team winning. When viewers see one of the men eat a 
Big Mac to celebrate his team’s victory, the product becomes more timely and 
appropriate. In fact, this gesture urges viewers to consume the burger, which explains 
why the team’s win comes before the half-time show situation—so viewers can visit 
McDonald’s during the half-time show, return home before the game resumes, and 
celebrate with a Big Mac when their team wins. That said, this scene acts as the most 
situational, or most kairotic, because it allows viewers the chance to actualize the 
narrative’s reality by eating a Big Mac during what McDonald’s terms the most 
opportune moment. 
The third situation transports viewers indifferent to sports by illustrating the half-
time show. In this kairotic opportunity, three men watch the event but only one, the man 
shimmying on the couch, seems interested. Just as the informal football game prepped 
viewers by allowing them to re-experience the sport’s emotions, this man’s dances rouse 
viewers’ half-time hype. Because only one man anticipates watching the Super Bowl for 
its half-time show, McDonald’s acknowledges these viewers’ minority status. Despite 
their typical exclusion from Super Bowl conversations, the rapper speaks to and even 
joins these viewers with his rap that consoles them: “It’s okay, we know” 
(“McDonald’s,” emphasis added). This phrase shows McDonald’s acceptance of these 
viewers, which makes them feel as if they belong, an inclusiveness sports fans may not 
grant them. Since “we” creates a “group identity” that embraces two or more people 
(Pennebaker 41), a greater intimacy results between the franchise and consumers, 
increasing viewers’ emotions and likelihood of identifying with the Big Mac. Because of 
 
	 127 
this situation’s hype and sense of community, viewers feel both entertained and included, 
making the product more personal and appropriate. 
As viewers escape into the narrative’s reality by revisiting their experiences, 
McDonald’s rap makes them participants, which furthers their transportation and 
encourages them to perceive the product more meaningfully. Carpenter and Green 
articulate how rhyme and music increase an audience’s attention while also 
defamiliarizing them from reality to lure them into their world (172). The rap’s repetition 
fosters viewers’ participation in the narrative’s construction (“McDonald’s”). As Burke 
indicates, an audience collaborates with a rhetor by learning a speech’s patterns and using 
that knowledge to complete it as they listen (59). Recognizing and completing the 
narrative’s recurring statement (i.e., “there’s a Big Mac for that”) makes viewers more 
pliant to the franchise’s message. This participation increases viewers’ possibility of 
identifying with the claim, Big Mac, and McDonald’s because, as Burke comments, an 
audience identifies more with rhetors when involved in their speech (57-8). 
After viewers’ transportation, participation, and identification, they undergo the 
process of temporal co-occurrence.61 Viewers group their football memories with the 
narrative’s experience: adrenaline, hunger, anticipation, pride, entertainment, and 
community. Viewers then associate each positive emotion felt with McDonald’s and 
agree that there is a Big Mac for “that”—their preferred aspect of the game. Meanwhile, 
																																																								
61 McDonald’s attempts to reach multiple viewers with their situations, but some may identify with more 
than one. If so, each situation prepares viewers for the next; the first scene prompts them to elevate the Big 
Mac as a necessity, while the next urges them to consume the product during the half-time show, and 
finally viewers may enjoy the remainder of the game like the man in the commercial’s last scene.  
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by attaching the Big Mac to the Super Bowl, McDonald’s makes an old product seem 
new. The three sizes (i.e., Mac Jr., Big Mac, and Grand Mac) regenerate McDonald’s 
signature product, while the ESP’s key phrases, “iconic” and “only for a limited time,“ 
places viewers in a kairotic mentality; they believe the Big Mac’s importance (i.e., that 
they consume a “legendary” product) and urgency (that they must hurry because the three 
sizes are a limited time offer) (“McDonald’s”). Such a mentality ultimately allows 
viewers to seize McDonald’s intended opportune moment—their ESP, “Juicy, cheesy, 
iconic Big Mac. Now in three sizes, but only for a limited time,” and product display 
(“McDonald’s,” original emphasis). 
Each situation’s connection to the Super Bowl makes the Big Mac timely as the 
commercial airs during the game, but once viewers see the narrative afterward it may not 
be as effective.62 Viewers no longer anticipate the game’s results or half-time show, and 
those whose team lost may no longer feel prideful, which would cause these viewers to 
perceive McDonald’s narrative and Big Mac negatively because neither directly pertain 
to them.63 Alternatively, the commercial may more successfully affect viewers who 
enjoyed the game because their team won, making McDonald’s narrative even more 
entertaining and relatable. Thus, unlike the first two commercials that appeal to more 
universal contexts, this one remains kairotic for only a limited time like the Big Mac’s 
																																																								
62 According to iSpot.tv, this commercial was active for at least a month after the Super Bowl 
(“McDonald’s”). 
63 Pennebaker, upon examining group identity and sports, finds that if one’s team wins, he or she states “we 
won,” but if one’s team loses, he or she says “they lost,” showing that sports fans only identity with 
winning teams (233, emphasis added). 
 
	 129 
three sizes. To offset this shortcoming, McDonald’s, like other advertisers, includes 
secondary appeals and extends their narrative’s shelf life. 
 
Secondary Appeal: Real, “Iconic” Burgers for Men 
McDonald’s supports their primary appeal by incorporating ethos, logos, and 
pathos to “prove” the Big Mac’s value. Like Burger King’s and Chick-Fil-A’s narratives, 
these rhetorical appeals intersect with one another, each functioning enthymematically to 
make suggestions. McDonald’s most prevalent ethical appeal is their narrative’s realism 
that defines the product and its associations as real and therefore obtainable. Each 
situation, with the exception of the rapper and his marching band, is realistic. Rather than 
requiring viewers to suspend their disbelief to identify with their characters, McDonald’s 
illustrates men in common settings. Because viewers likely cherish memories that 
resemble the narrative’s situations, they are more likely to trust that “there’s a Big Mac 
for that” as the marching band repeats the claim (“McDonald’s”). Viewers recollect their 
physical and mental state in the simulated experiences and agree that the product would 
enrich each activity, either by easing hunger, comforting anxiety, celebrating a team’s 
win, or simply providing a quick dinner or half-time snack.  
Because McDonald’s bases each situation on viewers’ personal experiences, their 
realism also suggests pathetic and logical appeals. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this method 
elicits an emotional response, as viewers better relate to each situation, making the 
narrative and the Big Mac more apt. Most viewers can position themselves into at least 
one of the situations because they have likely already enjoyed playing an informal 
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football game, witnessing their favorite team winning, or watching a half-time show. If 
not, viewers can experience at least one situation for the first time with the Super Bowl. 
To prolong viewers’ emotional response, McDonald’s implies that they can attain 
community by consuming the Big Mac because its creators seemingly accept all viewers.  
This strategy becomes logical. Since McDonald’s utilizes a more realistic 
escapism, where viewers do not have to change worlds or identities to obtain their desired 
results, this “proves” that there is a Big Mac for each situation regarding the Super Bowl. 
McDonald’s hones this “evidence” by incorporating their product into the narrative, 
before the product display, to visualize the Big Mac’s suitability. By the end of the 
commercial, viewers observe two men eating the burger at their opportune moment, after 
playing an informal football game and during the half-time show. Because viewers see 
these men consume the product in various circumstances, the ethos of viewers’ judgment 
disproves potential doubts and implies that the Big Mac can fulfill consumers’ needs. The 
marching band’s premise, “there’s a Big Mac for that,” subsequently becomes true for 
viewers (“McDonald’s”). 
To appeal to logos, McDonald’s mainly uses their product display that becomes 
more effective because viewers have already experienced each kairotic moment and 
understood that the Big Mac’s sizes correlate to each situation. Even so, presenting the 
burger at the end allows viewers to see for themselves the three different sizes, which 
McDonald’s hopes will prove their ESP’s claim that defines the Big Mac as “juicy, 
cheesy, [and] iconic” (“McDonald’s”). Upon seeing each size, viewers likely discern the 
Big Mac as all of the above based on each burger’s appearance and positive associations 
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typically attached to meat products.64 As the product display suggests arguments about 
the Big Mac, it also establishes credibility and invokes emotions. When McDonald’s 
describes the product to make it more appealing, they specifically choose the word 
“iconic” to indicate the Big Mac’s ethos. Most of McDonald’s customers or potential 
customers, such as those who consume fast food, know that the Big Mac is the 
franchise’s signature item. The burger thus already holds credibility as a more “classic” 
and “timeless” product.65 Yet this limited time deal, which presents three sizes to satisfy 
various degrees of hunger, portrays the Big Mac as even more “iconic.” Instead of only 
being able to choose one size, viewers now have three options. They no longer have to 
order multiple Big Macs to get full (they can now order the Grand Mac) or, alternatively, 
they no longer have to overeat to finish a Big Mac (they can now order the Mac Jr.).  
The adjectives used to characterize the Big Mac (i.e., “juicy, cheesy, iconic”) 
become emotional because of the setting in which viewers hear them (“McDonald’s”). 
Since this commercial first aired during the Super Bowl, the product display meets 
viewers when their emotions are already heightened by watching the game and 
anticipating its results. Because the game airs around dinnertime, it reaches viewers when 
they may be hungry. Both of these kairotic states enhance the product display’s 
effectiveness because, when already in an emotional state, viewers become more 
receptive to the Big Mac, whose three images serve to increase viewers’ hunger.  
																																																								
64 For an analysis of meat’s social meanings, such as religion, patriotism, masculinity, health, and meat as 
product, food, and meal, see Heinz’s and Lee’s “Getting Down to the Meat” (90).	
65 Ever since 1967, the Big Mac, initially created to compete with Burger King’s Whopper, has been 
McDonald’s “signature sandwich” (Chandler para 4). 
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McDonald’s predominant emotional appeal may be less obvious to those who 
quickly watch the commercial, but it nevertheless influences viewers. Despite 
McDonald’s three sizes suggesting that there is a Big Mac for everyone (i.e., those who 
want a regular, large, or super-sized burger), the franchise excludes women by speaking 
directly to men. Only male characters appear in the narrative and, consequently, the 
commercial’s second person pronouns only connect the franchise to male viewers. This 
seclusion maintains sexism, specifically masculine and feminine stereotypes. As 
McDonald’s preserves gendered interests, they reinforce the Super Bowl as a man’s 
entertainment and gender the Big Mac as a man’s food. Such an implication seeks to 
empower men, especially those already sexist, and in turn raise their testosterone for the 
Super Bowl and burger. McDonald’s exploitation of gender roles also enthymematically 
establishes ethos and logos. McDonald’s builds the Big Mac’s already “iconic” 
credibility by attaching it to gendered notions of sports and food, where tradition’s 
authority elevates the product as more “old-fashioned.” In turn, the franchise develops 
their ethos as a company that upholds “traditional” values. Lastly, just as seeing leads to 
believing with nearly every other commercial, when viewers realize the narrative shows 
only men celebrating the Super Bowl and consuming the Big Mac, this “proves” that both 
activities remain a man’s role. Ultimately, this “evidence” sustains a sexist attitude 
against women who enjoy sports (i.e., the “butch” stereotype) and also men who choose a 
vegetarian diet or vegan lifestyle (i.e., the “sissy” stereotype).  
As a result of experiencing each of these suggestions, viewers identify with these 
“proofs” and complete the process of temporal co-occurrence by associating the Big Mac 
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with its demonstrated value. Finally, they perceive the product as a real, “iconic” burger 
for men. This perception enables viewers to seize the commercial’s ESP and product 
display, making the Big Mac more kairotic for viewers unable to become transported in 
the franchise’s reality, which in turn increases their likelihood of purchasing a Big Mac. 
McDonald’s, and by extension all advertisers’, primary and secondary appeals seem 
groundbreaking because of how they create kairos in a more controlled manner than 
classical rhetors. But as discussed in the final section below, these strategies may not be 
as new we believe because Gorgias employed similar techniques in his compositions. 
Nevertheless, viewers’ intense, imaginative experiences that result from commercials still 
influence them in ways they often overlook. 
 
From Gorgias to Behind the Screen and Beyond 
As I have shown, with new communication technology comes new opportune 
moments and methods to profit from them. However, even Gorgias cultivated kairos to 
seize the opportune moment in his compositions. According to Poulakos’s analysis of 
Palamedes and Helen, Gorgias gives readers an impression of timeliness, or urgency and 
importance (“Kairos” 90). In the Palamedes, Gorgias composes kairotic opportunities by 
dramatizing both the occasion and audience (Poulakos, “Kairos” 91). Gorgias’s 
dramatization transforms an ordinary occasion into “a unique rhetorical event” by 
showing the importance of “Odysseus’ charges against Palamedes [that] appear sudden 
and preposterous” (Poulakos, “Kairos” 92). Gorgias also makes the situation urgent by 
having Palamedes express that his behavior only results from his predicament’s urgency 
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(Poulakos, “Kairos” 93). Then, to elevate his audience and make them more responsive 
to his dramatization, Gorgias portrays them as extraordinary, or of distinguished 
character (Poulakos, “Kairos” 93). Gorgias’s Helen appeals to popular beliefs, or three 
“undeniable propositions” regarding praise and blame, to illuminate how Helen has been 
blamed unjustly when she simply reacted to rhetoric’s magic (Poulakos, “Kairos” 94). To 
prove this, Gorgias uses reason, a unique topos since poets typically argue from 
inspiration, to “recast common belief in a new light,” allowing a new, surprising 
argument to change the audience’s current belief (Poulakos, “Kairos” 94). Just as in the 
Palamedes, Gorgias also construes the Helen’s audience as one that may advance from 
their fixed beliefs and perceive Helen’s reaction differently—based on reason (Poulakos, 
“Kairos” 95). 
Poulakos believes Gorgias wrote these titles as teaching manuals for rhetoric, 
concluding that he saw kairos as a tool for both orality and written composition. Since 
Gorgias composed conditions that allowed him to seize kairos with the written word, 
rhetors creating kairotic moments is not as contemporary as it may seem. Advertisers 
utilize Gorgias’s techniques by dramatizing products with entertaining narratives that 
distinguish items as unique, important, and urgent. To place viewers into a kairotic 
mentality, they embed popular values and beliefs into their stories and, in doing so, create 
new arguments that viewers transfer to the advertised product. Advertisers even elevate 
their audience by attaching their product and brand to viewers’ investments, which 
insinuates that viewers remain loyal to their principles and even become better people by 
using and supporting advertised products. But because of new media’s multimodality, 
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advertising affords more kairotic opportunities and thus extends Gorgias’s conception of 
kairos.  
Contemporary rhetors benefit from their electronic medium because it enables 
them to further dramatize their narratives and transport viewers, which provides them an 
opportunity to escape reality as it persuades. Such an emotional experience increases 
viewers’ likelihood of identifying with a commercial’s narrative, product, and brand. 
Rather than simply appealing to each rhetorical appeal separately, advertisers exploit 
their multimodality by combining ethos, logos, and pathos to “prove” a product’s and 
brand’s importance. Because advertisers appeal to as many audiences as possible in 
fifteen to thirty seconds, their narratives often create kairotic conditions that allow 
viewers to seize multiple opportune moments, depending on what influences individual 
viewers.66 Above all, advertisers enjoy less error when creating kairos because they wield 
and thus control new media’s rhetorical tools (i.e., narrative transportation, 
multimodality, and the psychological effects resulting from both) that surpass rhetors’ 
face-to-face deliveries and viewers’ imaginative capacities. 
But why, exactly, do these methods work so effectively in consumerism? 
Advertisers make their commercials as memorable as possible by revisiting themes (like 
Burger King’s chickens who sell their flesh and McDonald’s “there’s a Big Mac for that” 
situations) and utilizing recurring characters (like Burger King’s chickens, Chick-Fil-A’s 
																																																								
66 Commercials’ images especially help produce multiple kairotic moments. According to Blair, the visual 
enthymeme differs from its verbal counterpart because visuals foster multiple, “equally plausible” 
enthymematic interpretations (50). Equally important, images more emotionally affect viewers by 
articulating what words often cannot (Blair 50). Because visuals pose an argument more quickly than 
verbal claims, they communicate with an audience more efficiently (Blair 51). 
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cows, and McDonald’s rapper and marching band). When a commercial’s narrative 
already feels familiar, either because it belongs to a series or routinely incorporates the 
same characters, viewers better remember its reality and arguments, thus increasing 
viewers’ likelihood of consuming the advertised product. Carpenter and Green reveal that 
audiences recall emotional, text-based narratives much as they remember imagined 
scenes, but that audiences recall multimodal narratives similar to how they remember 
reality. Though memories created in reality remain more intense, a narrative’s vivid 
details greatly intensify an audience’s experience (Carpenter and Green 174). Hence, 
advertisers pair their primary and secondary appeals not merely to ensure their 
commercial’s timeliness, but also to provide viewers with a personalized reality so they 
can experience its simulated narrative and “proofs” that build an appetite for products 
beyond their commercials.  
Though seemingly neutral, experiences also function argumentatively because 
they “have been carefully designed to provide evidence for [a] conclusion” (Groarke 151-
2). Leo Groarke reveals that an activity as impartial as a tour of Shanghai poses an 
argument about exploring the city (152). The fast food commercials discussed above 
serve similar purposes as their multimodality captivates viewers. Based on Mahoney’s 
understanding of Marshall McLuhan’s pronunciation theory, technology has reworked 
perception and objectivity, where contemporary rhetors’ speeches now rely on a 
hierarchy of senses that limit sight, but not sensations such as hearing, which we lack the 
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ability to mute (12).67 Touch, however, remains the most intimate because it uses all 
senses (Mahony 13). Because commercials’ multimodality combines each sense, their 
narratives’ multi-faceted claims, which simulate sight, sound, music, smell, taste, and so 
on, mimic a sense of touch. As viewers identify with a narrative’s reality or “proofs,” and 
subsequently the product and its brand, the commercial impacts them emotionally, which 
makes commercials self-persuasive. Since advertisers’ primary and secondary appeals 
personally influence viewers by nurturing their identity, this intimacy touches them 
emotionally, thus altering their mood—the most powerful determining factor in any 
decision, especially consumption, because we buy with our emotions. Upon feeling a 
commercial’s reality and “proofs,” viewers ultimately strive to recreate their encounter by 
purchasing the advertised product and supporting its brand. That said, viewers no longer 
merely buy products but experiences that uphold their values and beliefs.  
This essay illustrates the strategies advertisers use to create kairos, but it in no 
way exhausts how all advertisers or rhetors do so. The following questions thus deserve 
further discussion: How do other aspects of advertising, such as the programs during 
which commercials air and the ads viewers see before and after each commercial, affect 
viewers’ kairotic mentality? How do advertisers create kairos with picture ads, product 
labels, and even a product’s placement in a store—perhaps the timeliest moment to sell 
because the audience is already near the product? How does a product’s label strengthen 
customers’ loyalty to a brand by “proving” its worth during consumption to capture a 
																																																								
67 Patrick Mahony indicates that McLuhan’s theory on classical pronunciation, enacted when rhetors orally 
delivered speeches, depended on their voice and gesture (12). 
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future opportune moment? How do advertisers create kairos and sell products by 
objectifying animals through speciesist appeals, and how do their accompanying animal 
characters contrast and reinforce such prejudice? Equally important, how do advertisers 
target viewers with other intolerances (i.e., sexism, racism, homophobia, transphobia, 
Xenophobia, etc.) that also objectify marginalized communities, and why are these biases 
used to sell fast food products? Finally, how do rhetors in other digital settings create 
kairotic conditions and opportunities so they, and their audience, may seize kairos?
	 139 
WORKS CITED 
 
 
Adams, Carol. The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory. 
Continuum, 1990. 
 
Andrén, Gunnar. “The Rhetoric of Advertising.” Journal of Communication, vol. 30, no. 
4, 1980, pp. 74-80. ProQuest, 
https://login.libproxy.uncg.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.unc
g.edu/docview/1302215960?accountid=14604. Accessed 20 Oct. 2015. 
 
Aristotle. “Rhetoric.”  The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from Classical Times to the 
Present, edited by Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg. Bedford/St. Martin’s, 
2001, pp. 179-240.  
 
Bitzer, Lloyd L. “Aristotle’s Enthymeme Revisited.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 
45, no. 4, 1959, pp. 399-408. Routledge, doi: 10.1080/00335635909382374. 
Accessed 11 Nov. 2016. 
 
Blair, J. Anthony. “The Rhetoric of Visual Arguments.” Defining Visual Rhetorics, edited 
by Charles A. Hill and Marguerite H. Helmers, Lawrence Erlbaum, 2004, pp. 41-
61. EBSCOhost. Accessed 23 Mar. 2017. 
 
Braet, Antoine C. “Ethos, Pathos and Logos in Aristotle’s Rhetoric: A Re-Examination.” 
Argumentation, vol. 6, no. 3, 1992, pp. 307-20. Springer, doi: 
10.1007/BF00154696. Accessed 20 Mar. 2017. 
 
Brockriede, Wayne and Douglas Ehninger. “Toulmin on Argument: An Interpretation 
and Application.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 46, no. 1, 1960, pp. 44-53. 
Routledge, doi: 10.1080/00335636009382390. Accessed 11 Apr. 2015. 
 
“Burger King Chicken Fries TV Commercial, ‘Pregnant.’” iSpot.tv, 
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/78xp/burger-king-chicken-fries-pregnant. Accessed 27 
Sep. 2015. 
 
Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. University of California Press, 1969. 
 
Carpenter, Jordan M. and Melanie C. Green. "Flying With Icarus: Narrative 
Transportation and the Persuasiveness of Entertainment." The Psychology of
	 140 
Entertainment Media: Blurring the Lines Between Entertainment and Persuasion, 
edited by L. J. Shrum. 2nd ed., Routledge, 2012, pp. 169-194. 
 
Chander, Adam. “The Genius Behind the Big Mac.” The Atlantic, 7 Dec. 2016, 
www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/12/big-mac-creator-
mcdonalds/509795/. Accessed 23 Mar. 2017. 
 
“Chick-Fil-A Catering TV Commercial, ‘Opportune Moment for the Cows.’” iSpot.tv, 
https://www.ispot.tv/ad/AwNR/chick-fil-a-catering-opportune-moment-for-the-
cows. Accessed 2 Dec. 2015. 
 
Crenshaw, Cheri. Exploiting Kairos in Electronic Literature: A Rhetorical Analysis. 
Dissertation, Texas Woman’s University, 2008. UMI, 2008. 
 
Conley, Thomas M. “The Enthymeme in Perspective.” Quarterly Journal of Speech, vol. 
70, no. 2, 1984, pp. 168-187. Routledge, doi: 10.1080/00335638409383687. 
Accessed 22 July 2015. 
 
Cowley, Elizabeth. “As a Backdrop, Part of the Plot, or a Goal in a Game: The 
Ubiquitous Product Placement.” The Psychology of Entertainment Media: 
Blurring the Lines Between Entertainment and Persuasion, edited by L. J. Shrum. 
2nd ed., Routledge, 2012, pp. 37-63. 
 
DeMello, Margo. “The Sexual Politics of Burger King Chicken Fries.” The Dodo, 13 
Apr. 2015, https://www.thedodo.com/the-sexual-politics-of-burger-king-chicken-
fries-1088669238.html. Accessed 2 Dec. 2015. 
 
Dunayer, Joan. “Style Guidelines: Countering Speciesism.” Animal Equality: Language 
and Liberation. Ryce Publishing, 2001, pp. 179-186. 
 
---. “Thesaurus: Alternatives to Speciesist Terms.” Animal Equality: Language and 
Liberation. Ryce Publishing, 2001, pp. 187-201. 
 
Dunn, Anne. “Ethics Impossible? Advertising and the Infomercial.” Remote Control: 
New Media, New Ethics, edited by Catharine Lumby and Elspeth Probyn. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 135-136.  
 
Erickson, Thomas. “Creating Kairos.” Interactions, vol. 22, no. 4, 2015, pp. 64-66. 
CrossRef, doi: 10.1145/2775087. Accessed 21 Nov. 2015. 
 
Gill, Sally. “And Now a Word About Our Sponsors: Advertising and Ethos in the Age of 
the Global Village.” Rhetoric, the Polis, and the Global Village: Selected Papers 
from the 1998 Thirteenth Anniversary Rhetoric Society of America Conference, 
 
	 141 
edited by C. Jan Swearingen. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 
1998, pp. 199-208.  
 
Groarke, Leo. “Going Multimodal: What is a Mode of Arguing and Why Does it 
Matter?” Argumentation, vol. 29, no. 2, 2015, pp. 133-55. Springer, doi: 
10.1007/s10503-014-9336-0. Accessed 17 Nov. 2016. 
 
Heinz, Bettina and Ronald Lee. “Getting Down to the Meat: The Symbolic Construction 
of Meat Consumption.” Communication Studies, vol. 49, no. 1, 1998, pp. 86-99. 
Routledge, doi: 10.1080/10510979809368520. Accessed 26 Oct. 2016. 
 
Hess, Aaron. “Critical-Rhetorical Ethnography: Rethinking the Place and Process of 
Rhetoric.” Communication Studies, vol. 62, no. 2, 2011, pp. 127-152. Routledge, 
doi: 10.1080/10510974.2011.529750. Accessed 11 Nov. 2015. 
 
Jamieson, Kathleen Hall and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell. Interplay of Influence: News, 
Advertising, Politics, and the Mass Media. Wadsworth Publishing Company, 
1992.  
 
Kanner, Bernice. Introduction. The Super Bowl of Advertising: How the Commercials 
Won the Game. Bloomberg Press, 2004, pp. 1-9. 
 
Kennedy, George A. “Rhetoric and Culture/Rhetoric and Technology.” Rhetoric, the 
Polis, and the Global Village: Selected Papers from the 1998 Thirteenth 
Anniversary Rhetoric Society of America Conference, edited by C. Jan 
Swearingen. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 1998, pp. 55-62.  
 
Kinneavy, James L. “Kairos: A Neglected Concept.” Rhetoric and Praxis: The 
Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning, edited by Jean Dietz 
Moss. The Catholic University of America Press, 1986, pp. 79-106. 
 
---. “Kairos in Classical and Modern Rhetorical Theory.” Rhetoric and  
Kairos: Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Phillip Sipiora and 
James S. Baumlin. State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 58-73. eBrary. 
Accessed 13 Nov. 2015. 
 
Leeson, Steven and John D. Summers. “Industry Development, Genetics and Breeding 
Programs.” Boiler Breeder Production. Nottingham University Press, 2009, pp. 1-
21. ebrary. Accessed 23 Mar. 2017. 
 
Mahony, Patrick. “McLuhan in the Light of Classical Rhetoric.” College Composition 
and Communication, vol. 20, no. 1, Feb. 1969, pp. 12-17. JSTOR, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/354107. Accessed 20 Oct. 2015. 
 
	 142 
“McDonald’s Big Mac Super Bowl 2017 TV Commercial, ‘There’s a Big Mac for 
That.’” iSpot.tv, https://www.ispot.tv/ad/A338/mcdonalds-big-mac-super-bowl-
2017-theres-a-big-mac-for-that#. Accessed 20 Mar. 2017. 
 
McKenna, Stephen. “Advertising as Epideictic Rhetoric.” Rhetoric, the Polis, and the 
Global Village: Selected Papers from the 1998 Thirteenth Anniversary Rhetoric 
Society of America Conference, edited by C. Jan Swearingen. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Inc., Publishers, 1998, pp. 103-110.  
 
Oring, Elliott. “The Senses of Absurd Humor.” Engaging Humor. University of Illinois 
Press, 2010, pp. 13-26. ebrary. Accessed 15 Mar. 2017. 
 
Pennebaker, James W. The Secret Life of Pronouns: What Our Words Say About Us. 
Bloomsbury Press, 2011. 
 
Poulakos, John. “Kairos in Gorgias’ Rhetorical Compositions.” Rhetoric and Kairos. 
SUNY Press, 2002, pp. 89-96. ebrary. Accessed 22 Feb. 2017.  
 
---. “Toward a Sophistic Definition of Rhetoric.” Philosophy and Rhetoric, vol. 16, no. 1, 
1983, pp. 35-48. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40237348. Accessed 27 Aug. 
2015. 
 
Primeau, Ronald. “Classic Rhetoric for Modern Survival.” The Rhetoric of Television. 
Longman, 1979, pp .20-34. 
 
Shrum, L. J. “What’s So Special About Entertainment Media and Why Do We Need a 
Psychology for It?: An Introduction to the Psychology of Entertainment Media.” 
The Psychology of Entertainment Media: Blurring the Lines Between 
Entertainment and Persuasion, edited by L. J. Shrum. 2nd ed., Routledge, 2012, 
pp. 1-7. 
 
Sipiora, Phillip. “Introduction: The Ancient Concept of Kairos.” Rhetoric and Kairos: 
Essays in History, Theory, and Praxis, edited by Phillip Sipiora and James S. 
Baumlin. State University of New York Press, 2002, pp. 1-11. eBrary. Accessed 
13 Nov. 2015. 
 
Stephenson, Hunter W. Forecasting Opportunity: Kairos, Production, and Writing. 
University Press of America, 2005.  
 
“The Cow Campaign.” Chick-Fil-A. Accessed 2 Dec. 2015. 
 
Waldau, Paul. The Specter of Speciesism: Buddhist and Christian Views of Animals. 
Oxford University Press, 2002. 
 
	 143 
Walker, Jeffrey. “The Body of Persuasion: A Theory of the Enthymeme. College English, 
vol. 56, no. 1, Jan. 1994, pp. 46-65. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/378216. 
Accessed 22 Jul. 2015. 
 
 
 
 
